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Abstract 
 
This dissertation problematizes contemporary ideas of epistemological dependability 
and advances queer theory’s critique of heteronormativity by reading the psychoanalytic 
concept of the uncanny in conjunction with the critical concept of the queer to produce the 
queer uncanny. The first chapter analyzes the The Wizard of Oz (1939) and introduces the 
disruptive interpretive potential of the queer uncanny in several of its manifest tion : the 
compulsion to repeat, doubling, and dislogic.  The second chapter focuses on the novel 
Mysterious Skin (Scott Heim) and of redemption in light of childhood sexual molestation, 
demonstrates the ability of the queer uncanny to broaden available interpretative ranges vis-à-
vis cultural discourses surrounding traumatic events like child sexual abuse.  The final chapter 
applies the lens of the queer uncanny to a municipal domestic partnership registryordinance 
that by its own terms provides no rights to registrants but which upon further analysis turn  
out to offer evidence of the performative potential of the queer uncanny.  
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Introduction 
“Topsy Turvy: Joining the Queer and the Uncanny” 
 
 
          When I went on my first Atlantis week-long all-gay vacation for men at a coastal resort 
in Mexico, I and the other men I met agreed that this was special, that somehow this vacation 
was unique.1  But what exactly did we mean by that?  I began to push the other men to 
articulate exactly why this vacation experience felt so different.  Was it ju t that we were on 
vacation and for a time liberated from work and domestic concerns?  No, many of us 
vacationed frequently.   Was it that we found sexual encounters easy to initiate?  Again, no, 
for the sexual possibilities on this trip seemed no more or less numerous than in regular lif .  
Was it perhaps the week of gay-themed entertainment and programming?  Again, no, because 
most of us frequented gay-themed comedy shows, films, and performances.  My own initial 
reaction came from my training in American Studies and in Women’s Studies:  there is power 
in numbers and we were likely building community with others like us, having a chance to 
“be ourselves” together.   Certainly we could analyze this experience using the rubrics that 
have fruitfully explored issues of identity and community in gay bars, gay enclaves, gay 
bathhouses, and the like – that is, as an example of how delimited physical spaces which 
contain or attract concentrations of gay men can have individual and social implications.  It 
                                                          
1 Atlantis Events is a Los Angeles-based company that charters entire cruise ships or land resorts, 
books gay-themed entertainers and activities, and markets the vacations to gay men aged eighteen and 
over, although men and women of any orientation are welcome.  Because of the timing, cost, and 
focus of the vacations they are largely populated by gay men between thirty and seventy years of age.  
See Atlantis Events, Inc. “Atlantis: The Way We Play.” http://atlantisevents.com.  Accessed 16 
February 2011. 
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would also be tempting to examine the Atlantis situation as a moment of queer conscious ess, 
a twist on Marxist coming to consciousness in which a person finds himself in a particular set 
of social circumstances and recognizes his place in it for the first time – and more importantly 
his connection to others similarly situated.  This, indeed, is how much work in gay and lesbian
studies has progressed, by examining social sites and cultural moments in which gay men nd 
lesbians have recognized themselves and each other and thereby been able to band together to 
develop friendships, communities, and social movements.  While these explanations certai ly 
fit the facts, I remained skeptical because nearly all of the men I vacationed with were, to 
large degree, like me – not at all socially, politically, or geographically iso ated.  To a man we 
were all living relatively open lives in communities, workplaces, organizations, and family 
circles that were for the most part gay or gay-friendly.    
There was something uncanny about the Atlantis vacation, and I was reminded of 
Sigmund Freud’s short essay on the uncanny and the anecdote in which he came up on the red 
light district of an Italian city and then inadvertently came back upon it several more times in 
the course of a single sojourn.  On the Atlantis vacation one could walk anywhere on the 
resort and know, without a doubt, that every other man there, excepting perhaps men on the 
resort staff, was gay.   It was a feeling that one need not speculate about or even for a moment 
guess at the sexual orientation of the other men at the resort.  It was not frightenin , but it was 
at once both unfamiliar and familiar, both novel and known.  As a friend put it, it was like 
being in the twilight zone because normal life was turned upside down and the world was 
topsy-turvy.  This resort, this itinerary of activities and shows, this on-going experience was a 
‘real, truly live place,” and not simply a break with our every day realities or an escape from 
the daily grind.  What I discovered, in staying in contact with my friends after our returns to 
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our respective homes, is that the experience stayed with them, that there was a period in 
which the two moments merged and overlapped.  Unsatisfied at reading this as community-
building, I turned to queer theory for guidance. 
Scholarship dealing with identity and community in the lesbian and gay context forms 
an important and essential archive of such times and places and developments.2  But such 
work has not been the only thread in the development of gay and lesbian studies; parallel to, 
or perhaps more aptly, in opposition to, such studies has been the development of queer 
theory, emerging in the early 1990s from the intersections of literary, critical, and gender 
theory.  While gay and lesbian studies largely remains committed to an essentialized gay or 
lesbian identity and the behaviors and movements associated with such as a means of 
uncovering gay and lesbian history and forwarding a progressive politics for full inclusion of 
gays and lesbians into society, queer theory has concerned itself with deconstructing the 
notion of any essential self and with examining the ways in which various discourses 
(particularly those of gender and sexuality) shape, limit and enable the range of possibilities 
for the individual subject.  This queer theoretical approach begins to get more directly at what 
I sense is going on at the Atlantis resort and what is the subject of this dissertation:  a 
fundamental uncanniness at the levels of both ontology and epistemology, a sense of the 
familiar but unfamiliar, a “crisis of the natural, touching upon everything that one might have 
thought was ‘part of nature’: one’s own nature, human nature, the nature of reality and the 
                                                          
2 Examples of this sort of work include Allan Bérubé’s study of the centrality of World War II to the 
development of gay and lesbian identity, George Chauncey’s masterful unearthing of gay life in New 
York City in the first decades of the twentieth century, and Esther Newton’s cultural history of the gay 
enclave on Fire Island.  Bérubé, Allan.  Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women 
in World War II.  New York: Free Press, 1990; Chauncey George. Gay New York: Gender, Urban 
Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940.  New York, Basic Books, 1995; and 
Newton, Esther.  Cherry Grove, Fire Island: Sixty Years in America’s First Gay and Lesbian Town.  
Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. 
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world.”3  It may seem a small thing to be able for even a day to exist in an environment where 
the normal rules do not apply, where the usual expectations are disrupted, but such moments – 
what I will define as the queer uncanny – need not be merely fleeting blips on the radars of 
our existence but can be taken up as fractures and fissures in the heteronormative ontologies 
and epistemologies that structure our existence.  In other words, topsy turvy may be more than 
a feeling.  The queer uncanny names moments and spaces when dislogic, repetition, and 
multiplicity can suggest new ways of knowing and living. 
 
Contentions and Approaches 
         To problematize contemporary ideas of epistemological dependability (i.e., how we 
know what we know) and to advance queer theory’s critique of heteronormativity in its many 
forms this dissertation reads the psychoanalytic and literary concept of the uncanny 
(Unheimliche) alongside the decidedly postmodern critical concept of the queer, joining the 
concepts to suggest the queer uncanny.4  Two central contentions structure this dissertation.  
First, this projects asserts that the queer uncanny (a concept explained below) offers us a 
useful way of actively (re)engaging how we know what we think we know not only because it 
provides us with a different way of viewing the world or the events that take place within it 
but because it allows for a multiplicity of interpretations to coexist and allows for interpretive 
and epistemological points of view that work alongside and yet against standard 
heteronormative frameworks of understanding.  The second contention is that while 
                                                          
3 Royle, Nicholas.  The Uncanny.  Manchester: Manchester Univ Press, 2003.  1. 
4 My first acquaintance with the phrase itself was in Olu Jenzen’s article of the same name.  Jenzen is 
to be credited with developing the concept as applicable beyond literary studies of th  gothic.  I extend 
Jenzen’s work in the article by developing the concept further and by utilizing it in different contexts.  
Jenzen, Olu.  “The Queer Uncanny.” eSharp.  9.  Spring 2007.  
http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/esharp/issues/9/.  Accessed 10 February 2009. 
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contemporary gay and lesbian activism continues to rely heavily on a politics of 
representation and a strategy of seeking inclusion through sameness (i.e., a focus on visibility 
and an identity politics that asserts “we’re just like you”) that strategy is serving not to 
liberate gays and lesbians (or humankind more generally) but to bind all human subjects more 
firmly to a system of heteronormativity that continues to dictate what counts as “legitimate 
and recognizable” forms of personal and group identity and to continue to exclude those who 
fall outside this realm of recognizability.5 In this regard the project seeks to critique the liberal 
humanist project of gay and lesbian studies and activism in favor of a de-identitied approach 
in which sexual orientation is an element but not the defining element. 
In accord with both my intellectual training and my previous work, the dissertation 
proceeds under the assumption that certain elements of identity – namely, gender and 
sexuality -- are omnipresent, structuring individual and collective experiences a d that that 
omnipresence is the basis from which the human psyche develops, even as other axes of 
identity may be added to the mix.6  In addition, although this project dwells in the realm of the 
theoretical, the intention is to recognize that theory and practice (what many ight call 
                                                          
5 Edelman, Lee.  No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive.  Durham NC: Duke Univ Press, 2004.  
105. 
6 The Atlantis resort vacation that serves as the seed bed for this project conforms to precisely the 
circumstances for which queer theory is oft and rightly criticized: a theory focused on gay, white men. 
I attempt in this dissertation to move beyond the resort vacation -- which is in a sense controlling for a 
number of important variables like gender, race, and class -- and to begin the important work of 
addressing the queer uncanny with a female character, a novel focusing on two young, rural, and less-
class-privileged characters, and a city ordinance that ostensibly applies to all citizens of a midwestern 
college town. Even so, this work highlights the possible trajectories for further development of the 
queer uncanny. Although not dealing with the queer uncanny, a body of work that suggests its 
potential is already extant and includes David Eng’s work with psychoanalytic theory and race and 
Martin Manalansan’s fascinating ethnographic work in which he deftly explores the interactions of 
gender, class, race, and sexual orientation among Filipino immigrants in New York City. Eng, David. 
Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America. Durham NC: Duke Univ Press, 2001. 
Manalansan IV, Martin. Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in New York City. Durham NC: Duke Univ 
Press, 2003.  
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“theory” and “real life”) are not separated but are rather mutually informing existing in a sort 
of call-and-response relationship, a continuing reiteration and reflection of one anoth r.  
To employ a queer theoretical lens is to do more than locating gays and lesbians in 
history or literature or film or to catalogue varieties of non-normative sexual behaviors.7   In 
building a body of history and theory, some scholars in lesbian and gay studies have at 
focused on outlying forms of sexuality and suggested that among those most certainly queer 
would be “radical self-defined lesbians and gays … sadomasochists, fetishists, bisexuals, 
gender-benders, radical heterosexuals.”8 The problem with attempting to create a list of 
identities or behaviors that are or are not queer is that such a list fails to takeinto account how 
those behaviors and identities, which might seem quite beyond the normative pale in written 
form, might be quite un-queer in their actualities and it tempts us to create yet nother binary -
- queer/un-queer – and to then fit texts into that binary as queer texts or un-queer texts in 
much the same way we might say that something is Southern literature or African-American 
drama or heterosexual behavior.  One way of thinking about the text from this vantage point is 
by thinking of queer not as a descriptor or as a position vis-à-vis a text but rather as a 
                                                          
7 A number of scholars have mounted influential and persuasive critiques of wetern-centric feminist 
and queer studies. Gayatri Gopinath, for example, works against the notion of s ngular identity and 
troubles notions of spectatorship in relation to queer.  In the south Asian disaporic context, Gopinath 
argues that the impossibility of the queer female diasporic subject requires viewers to resituate 
themselves vis-à-vis certain cultural texts and to read those texts not overlaid by semi-permanent 
notions of what “lesbian” sexuality is like but rather from a starting point that recognizes the 
impossibility of such desires. The result is a more nuanced form of particition and viewing, a 
reaching to “encompass cultural interventions … such as queer spectatorial practices, and the 
mercurial performances and more informal forms of sociality …that occur at queer night clubs, 
festivals, and community events” that offer “sexual and racially margin lized communities [the space 
to] reimagine their relation to the past and the present [and to] what constitutes a viable archive of 
South Asian diasporic cultural production in the first place.” Gopinath, Gayatri.  Impossible Desires: 
Queer Diasporas and the South Asian Public Cultures.  Durham NC:  Duke Univ Press, 2005.  22.  
8 Weeks, Jeffrey.  Against Nature: Essays in History, Sexuality, and Idetity.  London: Rivers Oram, 
1991.  113. 
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sensibility or aesthetic (or even as an “attitude,” as Doty describes it9), uch that reading a text 
queerly is about pricking one’s ears and eyes to the ways in which all texts contain fractures, 
fissures, and spaces from, in, and by which the stability of single meanings, univocal 
interpretations, and normative prescriptive and descriptive understandings are challenged, 
resisted, expanded, or allowed to stand.   
The question of whether any text can be understood as a queer text or whether any text 
may be read queerly is not simply a matter of grammar; the difference is as constitutive of 
queer theory as the very malleability of the term queer itself.  To label a text s queer is to 
situate that text and to begin limiting its interpretational possibilities by layering upon the 
noun a descriptive adjective which serves not only to describe what the text is but alo wh t it 
is not.  My queer theoretical approach to texts is to employ queer as an adverb: to r ad the text 
queerly.  This approach is valuable for two reasons.  First, it allows a multiplicity of 
approaches to the text to remain viable and in play without the finality or certainty that an 
authoritarian reading implies.  While one person may see merely a children’s animated 
television program, another may see an allegory for the condition of the modern subject and 
another yet may see a prophetic warning of a religious nature.  Second, it allows the text to be 
dynamic rather than static, living rather than dead.  Texts are always “ orks in progress [not] 
… museum pieces.”10 This performativity of the text, the idea that it is never “finished” but 
rather always in the process of being (re)created harkens to deconstruction and the notion of 
différance and suggests that meaning may re-present itself in slightly altered form each time 
the text is engaged.  The text itself is but a collection of words, images, shapes, textures, and 
the like, each of which is legible and cognizable only within the situational and contextual 
                                                          
9 Doty, Mark.  Making Things Perfectly Queer: Interpreting Mass Culture.  Minneapolis: Univ of 
Minn Press, 1993.  xv. 
10 Phelan, Shane.  Postmodern Lesbian Politics.  Minneapolis: Univ of Minn Press, 1994.  41. 
8 
 
parameters of the circumstances in which it is both encountered and engaged.  These two 
elements are in keeping with poststructuralist thinking in general and with queer theoretical 
thinking in particular, concerned as both are with the defamiliarization of the familiar and 
with the perpetual slippage of meaning. 
 At this point, the objection may be raised that if we are not allowed to describe a text 
as something (e.g., African-American, queer, southern) then every text is everything.  Not 
quite.  My resistance to adjectivally qualifying any text as something is ot based on the idea 
that no text is no thing or that all texts are all things; nor is my resistance anti-common-
sensical.  Of course William Faulkner may be responsibly referred to as a Southern writer; of 
course, Brokeback Mountain may be with some authority classed as a gay film; of course The 
Color Purple may be rightfully termed an African-American novel.  My objection is that the 
tendency to refer, categorize, term, and describe such texts as such things has the tendency 
over time to transform the adjective (a grammatical form that is intended to provide more 
information) into a noun (a grammatical form which is a linguistic proxy or signifier for the 
thing to which it refers) with all of the permanency and seemingly direct correlation that 
implies.  By referring repeatedly to a text as a certain type of text or as having a certain 
quality we by and by so interassociate the adjective and the noun it modifies that they become 
the adjective-noun kin to dead metaphor, as described by Donald Davidson.11  F r Davidson, 
dead metaphors are understood as those in which the “nameless act” has become known or 
has become so familiar through its place holding moniker that the entire compound analogy – 
A:B : C:D (A is to B as C is to D) – collapses, no longer requiring the full sequence of 
cognitive steps (no matter how quickly they might be completed) and resulting not simply in a 
                                                          
11 Davidson, Donald.  "What Metaphors Mean." On Metaphor.  Ed. Sheldon Sacks.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978.    
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collapsed form but in an entirely new form– A:D.   Davidson uses the example of the mouth 
of a bottle:  
[W]hen “mouth” applied metaphorically to bottles, the application [of 
mouth to bottles] made the hearer notice a likeness between animal 
and bottle openings.   Once one has the present use of the word, with 
literal application to bottles, there is nothing left to notice.   There is 
no similarity to seek because it consists simply in being referred to by 
the same word.12   
Similarly, we may be so attuned to phraseologies like “southern writing” or “gay film” 
that we no longer hear (by which I mean “cognitively process”) the modification of the noun 
by the adjective, instead hearing only “southernwriting” or “gayfilm” as neologistic 
unmodified nouns.   
 
Queer Theory and the Jouissance of No Future 
There seems often to be the impression that if a project deals with lesbians and gays in 
any way, it is a queer theory project; but this is not the case. Queer theory is often 
misunderstood as trying to prove that certain historical or literary figures were lesbian or gay 
or that some set of sociocultural circumstances provided fertile ground for the development of 
gay community, and too often the queer theoretical label is applied to projects that fall more 
rightfully in the realm of gay and lesbian studies.  If we describe the “queer” of queer theory 
with too much certainty, we immediately lose sight of the very point of queer theory.  The 
undefinability and the irascibility of “queer” are constitutive of the queer th oretical project.  
Growing out of gay and lesbian studies, queer theory fomented and began to take shape in the 
early 1990s as much attention was paid to the disconnection among sex, gender, and sexual 
                                                          
12 Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean,” 37.  Emphasis in original.  
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orientation and a great deal of work went into unmasking the hidden assumptions of 
universality, essentialism, and naturalness of heterosexuality.  Queer theory has in many ways 
moved beyond such an intense focus on sex and sexuality though still tied to those 
foundational considerations, and might more aptly be understood as an effort to destabiliz  
the stability often ascribed to particular identities, to disconnect the presumed connections 
between and among various behaviors and identities, and to “queer” the apparent norms and 
normativity that structures so much of the life of the subject.   Queer theoretical projects do 
focus on issues of gender and sexuality, in part because of the expanded definition that queer 
theory employs in understanding those terms.  In many ways, queer theory recogniz s the 
polymorphous perversity of the human subject and recognizes that pleasure and the sexual 
drives are often piqued, aroused, satisfied, or left wanting not simply in the arena of the 
genitals or even based on one’s specific object choice but on the flux and flow of power and 
in the reach of a broad based affective range.  In this regard, then, queer theory is not simply a 
theory of sexuality but is rather a critical theory of power insofar as the world in which we 
live is created and recreated through universalized, essentialized and naturalized not ons of 
what is normal and these notions of normal serve in turn as the foundations or starting points 
for developing and maintaining systems of power. What distinguishes queer theory from 
postmodern theory more generally is this emphasis or fundamental reliance – whether implicit 
or explicit – on sexuality and the sexual pulse as the driving force and underpinning for the 
creation, deployment, and experiences of power in nearly all parts of human experience, from 
the interpersonal sexual, familial, and collegial relationships to economic, governmental, 
medical, and legal structures on both the local and macro levels. 
11 
 
The truth about queer theory is that despite any claims adherents to it might make 
about it being a general theory, it does rely on sexuality as the nexus of its analysis, revealing 
the debt it owes to Freud and his progeny.  Although queer theory emerges in part from the 
work of lesbian and gay studies with its focus on identity – the location of identities in 
history, the liberal humanist leveraging of identities in the current age to promote future 
political change – identity in the realm of queer theory is quite a different bei g altogether.  
Lesbian and gay studies is for the most part modeled on a liberal humanist approach to 
identity, holding that there is an “essence” to each human and that humans who share certain 
common identities are alike enough to be presumed to want the same progress within the 
same sociocultural framework.   We might go so far as to suggest that lesbian and gay studies 
is very much invested in heteronormativity and in the standard system of gender relations.  As 
Michael Warner has written in a different context:  “Het culture thinks of itself as the 
elemental form of human association, as the very model of inter-gender relations, s the 
indivisible basis of all community, and as the means of reproduction without which society 
wouldn’t exist.”13 And lesbian and gay activism seems to great degree to agree, putting much 
effort into securing marriage rights for same-sex couples, repealing laws th t prohibit gays 
and lesbians from fostering or adopting children, and ending the U.S. military’s ban on 
homosexuals serving openly – all efforts that rely implicitly (or not so implicitly) on the 
argument that gays and lesbians are no different than heterosexuals. 
 If anything, queer theory attempts to do something which reeks very much of the 
uncanny: to defamiliarize the familiar and to familiarize the unfamiliar, to take the places in 
which we feel most at home and to make them un-homelike and to take the foreign places and 
                                                          
13 Warner, Michael.  “Introduction.”  Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory.  Ed. 
Michael Warner.  Minneapolis: Univ of Minn Press, 1993.  vii-xxxi.  xxi. 
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make them wanderable.  Working predominately but not entirely with gender and sexuality 
(and their correlatives difference, identity, and power), queer theory takes normativity (and 
particularly heteronormativity) as its predominant target, focusing intently o  the elements of 
human life that systems of normativity produce as essential, natural, and universal.  The 
standard story of human development goes something like this: one is born with a body that is 
recognizably male or female and that ages into adulthood accordingly; that one behav s in 
accordance with the status conferred by the particular genitals; and that upon sexual maturity 
a male-bodied person would be sexually attracted to a female-bodied person and vice versa.  
This standard story makes very firm connections among sex, gender, and sexuality and is 
based on a number of assumptions that usefully illustrate the very work that queer theory 
attempts to do.  First, the notion that there are two sexes and only two sexes.  Second, that the 
two-sex schema is natural and universal.  Third, that biology is, as the old saying goes, 
destiny.14 In other words, humans are born as either/or, humans live their lives according to 
that initial either/or, and anyone (any “thing”) outside of that either/or is non-human -- queer.  
Theorist Judith Butler understands this schema in a slightly more nuanced way as the 
heterosexual matrix:  
a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of gender intelligibility that 
assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a 
stable sex expressed through a stable gender … that is oppositionally 
and hierarchically defined, though the compulsory practice of 
heterosexuality.15  
                                                          
14 Oyama, Susan, Paul E.  Griffiths, and Russell D.  Gray.  Cycles of Contingency: Developmental 
Systems and Evolution.  Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001.  120-121. 
15 Butler, Judith.  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.  New York: Routledge, 
1990.  115n6. 
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To great extent queer theory helps resolve (by problematizing, never by finall
solving) some of these issues by beginning with the assumption that identities are always 
constructed rather than natural, always contingent rather than essential, and alw ys situated 
and contextual rather than universal and immovable.  Such an approach a priori decenters 
heterosexuality and puts the entire heterosexual matrix in the position of being radically 
deconstructed, at least theoretically.  But another way that queer theory diverges from identity 
politics (actually not so much a separate difference as an extension of the one already
discussed) is the uncertainty of outcome that queer theory offers any attempts at change.  
Unlike identity politics, which portends to be able to evaluate a given system with reference 
to its inclusion/exclusion of humans of particular identities and then develop useful strategies 
for excluded or marginalized humans navigating that system almost always based on the 
presumption that more inclusion and less exclusion is better for all, queer theory offers n  
such certainty or comfortably deductive predictions.  Instead, queer theory changes (indeed, 
wipes out) the ontological ground on which any subject stands and forces a radical 
reevaluation of the very meanings of identity, change, and progress.  Queer theory, however, 
rather than assuming that, for example, gays and lesbians have some commonality among 
them, the poststructuralist parentage of queer theory demands recognition that all identities 
are contingent and foundationless.  Again, this is akin to dead metaphors.  Rather than 
assuming that one “is” gay, a queer theoretic would focus on the verb form: one is “being 
gay” or one is “gaying.” Again this is more than mere grammatics; it is a resistant politics that 
demands vigilance be paid to the identity as an ever-changing product of intersecting cultural 
forms.  Any movement, therefore, cannot be understood simply in the binary identity-politics 
framework of forward/backward or progressive/regressive but must be understand a  
14 
 
potentially multidirectional and always without certainty the direction taken will produce the 
results desired. 
 Queer theory itself, for all of its refusal to be defined or stabilized, has indeed tended 
toward a certain stability, most especially as it has become ensconced in particular academic 
departments.  Yet it remains an essentially contested area with different adherents operating 
under different assumptions about the value (or non-value) of queer theory.  A group of queer 
theorists working in a utopian vein theorize queer in various forms as a vehicle for possibility 
and hope, positing queer as that which may enlarge or reconstruct our notions of the 
normative and in that respect enlarge or enrich human experience, often in a very broadl
philosophical or sociological sense.  Queer is the horizon of possibility, for these theorists, 
whether or not we recognize it or choose to move toward it; it is the step just beyond where 
we are, always mobile; it is always just out of reach but always beckoning.   The anti-
relational strain of queer theory, with which I align myself, is, as the name suggests, less 
hopeful, and tends to see queer through a much more psychoanalytic lens as the structural
location of that which must be disavowed but which must not be destroyed completely for it is
against this disavowed, removed, distanced structural location that the terrain of the rmative 
is meted out.  Where the utopian strain of queer theory might be described as hopeful and 
very much related to a future, the anti-relational strain of queer theory is “lavihly present 
tense" often arguing against the very notion of a future.16  
Perhaps the best and most recent statement of the anti-relational strain of queer theory 
is the one that serves as the springboard for this dissertation: Lee Edelman’s 2004 polemic, 
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No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive.17  Steeped in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, 
Edelman posits that in order for subjects to manage, both individually and collectively, the 
gnawing lack that serves as the center of subjectivity itself, we have produced a grand 
narrative by which to produce a feeling of unity, permanence, and cohesion where ther  is 
none:  the figure of the Child is not simply a straw man, a mere figure, the figur of the Child 
“invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought.”18  Our fear of 
facing the lack that is constitutive of our being as subjects and our fear of death as the 
collapsing of the ego fully into that lack, has spawned a fiction of epic proportions in which 
the figure of the Child and the futurity it holds in its hands is projected forward and once 
projected as an externalized figure, allows us to identify in part with “what’s to come” and 
then to project backwards from the child to ourselves again as the parental, care giving 
protectorate.  By this elaborate schema, the entire force and logic of the political field is 
subtended by this Child.  This all Edelman terms “reproductive futurism”  - a system of logic, 
a weltanschauung, that structures not just our notions of the future but which serves to shore 
up our uncertainties about the present.   
All of this is premised on the disavowing of a certain set of negativities regardin  
sexuality and the placement of those negativities onto the “queer” – that is, the being that has 
“no future” because it does not reproduce and may not be fully human.  Queers, then, are 
those whose raison-d’être does not correspond to or run in conjunction with this “reproductive 
futurity” and the compulsory reproduction it demands, in either the immediate physical sense 
or in the more generalized but equally powerful political sense of always keeping one’s eyes 
trained with hope on the future.  Queers are those whose bodily, libidinal and even cultural 
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foci are far afield from the real or presumed reproductive capacities and responsibilities 
necessary to support the fiction of the child and hence their non-reproductive energies (both in 
the sense of their sexual activities but more so in the sense of their perceived location utside 
of the political logic of futurity at all) leaves them outside of the realm of the Symbolic social 
order.  Edelman makes clear, however, that the being left outside is not mere accident.  The 
queer is not a person or identity but a structural position – a displacement or exclusion of all 
the hope and investment piled onto and into the figure of the “Child” as the overarching 
future-figure par excellence.  The position and the occupants who fill it are read as not simply 
outsiders but as against the future and against children.19  In this particular moment, the 
rhetoric of recruitment, sexual abuse, narcissism, and lack of reproductive capacity delimit the 
discursive contours of the category; at other moments in time different rhetorics may apply. 
Edelman argues that the political field is largely and even wholly dominated by a logic 
that refuses to be refused, based as it is on “reproductive futurism” and a focus on the future 
that is projected out onto and then back from the image of the Child as the symbol, repository, 
and torch of that future – indeed the Child as the Parent of us all.   This image – of the child 
who requires our protection, our attention, our vigilance – preserves heteronormativity and s 
attendant privileging and the communal relations it implies and effects by reminding us at 
every turn that the point, the raison d’être of our existence is to be responsible parents, in loco 
parentis, for the figure of the child and by limiting the scope and terms of any debate that can 
take place.   If you are not with us, you are against us, and the rhetoric surrounding nearly 
every major social issue of the day in some way points to or uses as its crux the child.  
Recycle so that the children inherit clean water and fresh air.  Monitor the internet so that 
children do not stumble upon obscenity.  Stop abortion so that children are not murdered in 
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the womb.  Save the children.  Think of the children.  Fight for the children.  Protect the 
children. How, exactly, does one ot help, think, or fight for the children and still remain 
invested in the social order?  In standard slogans and demands like these, children (te 
specific little beings) are a stand-in for the Child and Edelman demands that queers not fight 
their position in the structure (as lesbian and gay activist would) but instead  
[say] explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic 
order for they stand hear anyway in each and every expression of 
queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name 
we’re collectively terrorized; fuck [Little Orphan] Annie; fuck the 
waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws 
both with capitals ls and with small; fuck the whole network of 
Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.20 
Queerness and the figure of the queer help us think about what it would mean to not 
help, think, or fight for the children because, as Edelman argues, just as the Child is the 
future-projection on to which we cast our own desire to exist when we know we will not, so 
too is the queer a figure-projection onto which is cast that outside of the politically demanded 
logic of heteronormativity and reproductive futurity, a cultural and figurative space for the 
excess of the psyche – the death drive – to reside.  The queer figures as a “bar to the every 
realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social tructure or 
form.”21  The death drive, for both Freud and Lacan and for queer theorists, is the drive, 
parallel to the drive toward life, toward realization, toward complete unity, that wants to shred 
it all apart, to put it all in reverse, to move back to the primary state of unoriginated beingness.  
In Lacanian terms, the death drive resides within and as constitutive of the Symbolic order, 
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emerging in relation to a surplus or excess that meaning misses.  Reproductive futur ty and 
the politics it both spawns and is spawned by promises an antidote to the excess, an orderly, 
continuous (re)staging of our desire to reach the point where being and meaning are u ified.22 
This leads us, though, to a second important element of Edelman’s argument:  
“queerness could never constitute an authentic or substantive identity, but only a structural 
position determined by the imperative of figuration.”23  In other words, queerness is a space, a 
place-holder, and simply identifying as homosexual or engaging in same-sex behaviors is not 
guarantee that one will occupy this structural position; rather, Edelman is argu ng that the 
position should be embraced, that the abjected position of “queer” is one which we should 
work not to eliminate (via a liberal progressive politics of full inclusion or via a 
fundamentalist program to eliminate difference) but rather to recognize as essentially 
constitutive of not something so vague as our “world view” but of all politics, progressive or 
not.   To this end, Edelman advises that “we should listen to, and even perhaps be instructed 
by, the readings of queer sexualities produced by the forces of reaction.”24  Edelman’s point 
seems to be less about doing so in the service of short-term achievement of some sort f social 
or political acceptance than about a more long-range and devastating agenda of dismantling 
our very notions of the social and of the future (i.e., reproduction) on which those notions are 
based. 
          To make this differentiation clear, Edelman, in Lacanian fashion, adopts the neologism 
sinthomosexuality.  In Lacanian terms, the sinthome (also known as the “symptom”) is 
jouissance itself, unburdened by the need to refer to anything, unburdened by the need to 
address anyone/thing, unburdened by signification or the Symbolic.  In other words, it is the 
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particular modality of jouissance for the particular subject or the very particul r way that a 
certain subject enjoys.  The sinthomosexual, then, is the being occupying “the site where the 
fantasy of futurism confronts the insistence of a jouissance that rends it precisely by rendering 
it in relation to that drive.”25  In other words, the sinthomosexual is the subject who refuses to 
reproduce (both in the sense of off-spring and in the sense of participating a politics based on 
reproduction) and whose particular node of enjoyment is centered and based elsewher 
besides the reproductive regime: Ebenezer Scrooge before the ghostly visits, Almira Gulch, 
Silas Marner before Eppie. As Edelman imagines it, homosexuality is a position that is the 
receptacle of everything that reminds us of the lack, the alienation, the space, around which 
our egos cohere.   It thus serves as the limit in both the individual and collective political 
sense: “while the heteronormative political imagination propels itselfforward in time and 
space through the indisputably positive image of the child, and while it projects itslf back on 
the past through the dignified image of the parent, the queer subject stands between 
heterosexual optimism and its realization.”26 
 
The “Queer” of the Queer Uncanny 
 Part of the difficulty in any project situating itself as a queer project is in defining the 
term queer, and this dissertation takes up the complicated task of juggling a number of 
approaches to queer.  As with queer theory, too often queer is understood simply as a 
synonym for gay, lesbian, or LGBT.  While that connection is useful for many it fails to 
differentiate fully the power and consequence of the term queer as it used in queer theory, 
where it may or may not refer to sexual or gender orientation: 
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I want to construct “queer” as something other than “lesbian,” “gay,” 
or “bisexual”; but I can’t say that “lesbian,” “gay,” or “bisexual” 
aren’t also “queer.” I would like to maintain “lesbian,” “gay,” or 
“bisexual” as concepts that have specific historical, cultural, and 
personal meanings; but I would also like “lesbian,” “gay,” or 
“bisexual” culture, history, theory and politics to have some bearing 
on the articulation of queerness.27  
Definitions of “queer” vary but generally converge around some notion akin to Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s idea of “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and 
resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s 
gender, or anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically.”28 We 
might also consider queer as “a strategy, an attitude, a reference to other identities and a new 
self-understanding.”29  Even then we venture further into the definitional woods as queer 
understands common words in perhaps uncommon ways – a “new understanding” is an active 
“articulat[ion of] a radical questioning of social and cultural norms” such that “a s rategy” is 
often an attempt to “fuck up the mainstream,” while a “queer attitude” would “mark a 
growing lack of faith in the institution of the state, in political procedures, in the press, the 
education system, policing the law.”30  Some like Cherry Smith propose that queer is about 
what one does and some of the actions that she cites approvingly as queer include the use of 
provocative acronyms, outing, actions that promote the visibility of queer sex practices, and 
the reclaiming of historically or currently pejorative terms (like queer).  In the case of each of 
these actions, the effect is disruptive and shocking.   
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This focus on surprise and shock is also found in Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth 
Freeman’s discussion of queer, in which they explore a number of queer practices and 
descriptors that include not only many of the actions cataloged by Smith but also assimilation 
refusal; the use of devalued forms of affect like longing, accusation, and embarrassment; 
reclamation and reterritorialization of public space; strategic use of other theoretical stances 
and rights movements like identity politics and the peace movement; exploitation of internal 
differences; deliberate incoherence or anti-logic; anger and rage; and surprise.31  Berlant and 
Freeman’s essay highlights what makes queer both attractive and repulsive: its “d liberately 
unsystematized” system which seems to encompass almost any action or approach, even those 
which we might think of as decidedly heteronormative if placed in a new, alternative or 
problematized context.    
The role of the outsider – whether in the sociocultural sense of not belonging or in the 
sense of being outside of heteronormative time/space is also central to queer.  As Sallie Munt 
writes, the figure who “has been shamed, who has turned away and been released, whose gaze 
is momentarily free to look around and make new, propitious connections….  Being non-
intelligible means more potential for new identities to form, in the moment of radical 
indecipherability, when the subject is turned, s/he is lost from view and undefined… and thus 
discursively more open to resignification.32  Eschewing a focus on the position of shame, 
Judith Halberstam has defined queer as “an outcome of temporality, life scheduling, and 
eccentric economic practices.”33  This definition seems to focus on the heteronormative 
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teleology rather than on any set of individual or group identity categories and suggest that 
queer is not a label or space occupied only by non-heterosexuals but by anyone who lives 
outside of the dictated parameters of what is expected, most especially in late capitalist, 
20th/21st century western world.  Indeed, the reference to eccentric economic practices 
suggests that an economic element would exist in any manifestation of queer.  Halberstam has 
specific ideas in mind with these concepts: “ “Queer time” is a term for those specific models 
of temporality that emerge within postmodernism once one leaves the temporal frames of 
bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and inheritance.  “Queer space” 
refers to the place-making practices within postmodernism in which queer people engage and 
it also describes the new understandings of space enabled by the production of queer 
counterpublics.”34  Hence, the acorn in queer time is not destined to be an oak tree; maturity, 
reproduction, resolution, and the like are not necessary components of queer time, although 
they might be elements of it. 
 
The “Uncanny” of the Queer Uncanny 
 In a relatively short 1919 essay Sigmund Freud explores in psychoanalytic terms what 
he recognizes might more properly be addressed within the realm of aesthetics:  the 
uncanny.35  Recognizing that aesthetic inquiry is most usually concerned with beauty and the 
sublime, Freud is drawn to the darker side and to that dreadful and sometimes horrific feeling 
that is produced in the human mind by encountering particular literary or actual circ mstances 
or situations.  In the essay Freud first concerns himself with defining the word and tracing its 
etymology before then moving to a psychoanalytic dissection of the concept centered on 
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E.T.A. Hoffman’s masterful short story, “The Sandman.”  From this Freud extrapolates a 
plethora of examples of illustrative examples of the uncanny before finally asserting a 
foundational and psychological origin for this feeling.    
 In the first part of his essay, Freud defines the uncanny as “that species of th  
frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar.”36 In this 
definition Freud draws on but works diligently to separate himself from an earlier work on the 
uncanny by Ernst Jentsch in which Jentsch defined the uncanny as "doubts whether an 
apparently animate being is really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might be, in 
fact, animate."37  For Freud this definition is insufficient because it fails to take into the 
account the philological history of the word (in the German language), demonstrating hat the 
word and its opposite have over time come to mean the same thing.  Too, Freud is 
unconvinced by Jentsch’s focus on the uncanny as that which is unfamiliar and as that which 
produces intellectual uncertainty. 
 While unheimlich means strange, unfamiliar, and peculiar; heimlich is defined as both 
(1) belonging to the house, not-strange, familiar, intimate and as (2) concealed, secret, 
withheld from sight and from others, two definitions in which Freud finds no contradiction 
but rather finds evidence for his thesis: “Heimlich thus becomes increasingly ambivalent, until 
it finally merges with its antonym unheimlich.”38  This is central to Freud’s thesis because his 
understanding of the uncanny is that it is always something that is both familiar and 
unfamiliar at the same time: “For us the most interesting fact to emerge from this long excerpt 
is that among the various shades of meaning that are recorded for heimlich there is one in 
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which it merges with its formal antonym, unheimlich, so that what is called heimlich becomes 
unheimlich.”39 
 The next section of Freud’s essay is a direct engagement with Entsch’s reading of 
E.T.A.  Hoffman’s short story, “The Sandman” and the textual site at which Freud departs 
dramatically from Jentsch’s understanding of the uncanny.  The short story is quite circuitous 
and complex, dealing with Nathaniel’s childhood and his issues with father-figures and the 
two different women that he loves.  The story is divided into three narrative moments.  In the 
first, Nathaniel fears the Sandman who collects the eyes of naughty young children and feeds 
them to his own bird-children.  This figure takes on association with a friend of his fat er’s 
(Coppelius) when the friend threatens to burn out Nathaniel’s eyes after Nathaniel is caught 
spying on his father and Coppelius; the horror of the incident puts Nathaniel into a long 
illness.  Later as a young man, Nathaniel buys a spy-glass from the optician Coppola and 
becomes infatuated with a woman (Olympia) upon whom he spies (much to the chagrin of his 
fiancée Clara).  Nathaniel becomes obsessed with Olympia, much to the chagrin of his fiancée 
Clara, only to find that Olympia is an automaton created by optician Coppola and the 
professor Spalanzani.  Nathaniel witnesses them fighting over the doll so violently that its 
eyes come out and while Olympia’s “father” hurls the eyes at Nathanial in anger, Coppola 
carries the lifeless body of the doll away.  Again Nathaniel is driven into an attack of madness 
which lasts for some time.  Recovered some time later, Nathaniel seems to have returned to 
his normal self and forgotten both the Sandman incident of his childhood and the Olympia 
incident.  While in a tower overlooking the city with his fiancée Clara, Nathaniel uses his spy-
glass to look more closely at a walking figure who, it turns out, is the frightening Coppelius 
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from his childhood.  Taken by madness, Nathaniel attempts unsuccessfully to throw Claa 
from the tower before jumping over the edge to his death. 
 Where Jentsch’s interpretation of the story is grounded heavily on the figure of the 
automaton Olympia, Freud dismisses that as “quite irrelevant in the case of this more potent 
example of the uncanny” and reads the entire story through a psychoanalytic frme in which 
the leitmotif of eyes, vision, and spy-glasses is an indicator of castration anxiety, a connection 
Freud made in his earlier works and which continues to advance Freud’s assertion from the 
earlier section of the essay: that the etymologically circularity of he word heimlich is echoed 
in the psychology of the word.40  In the instant case, hanging the entire story on a theme of 
castration anxiety is both plausible and convincing (though not necessarily fully adequate, as 
other commentators have noted).  The frightening incident from Nathaniel’s childhood in 
which the dreadful Coppelius threatens to burn his eyes out for spying on his father and 
Coppelius, followed soon thereafter by his father’s death in an explosion, does have the taste 
of the Oedipal.   And throughout the course of the story it is the Sandman who disrupts 
Nathaniel’s love – for his father, for the automaton Olympia, and for his fiancée and her 
brother (Nathaniel’s best male friend).  Yet, interestingly, Freud returns o Jentsch’s focus on 
the living/not-living aspects of the doll, as if the idea itself hovers between the living and the 
dead, as the very reading that Freud himself is trying to repress keeps returning o the fore.  
As Sarah Kofman has astutely noted, Freud’s curt dismissal of Jentsch’s focus on death and 
then his own return to it multiple times in the essay suggests that “[e]verything takes places as 
if Freud could not bear the importance of his discovery concerning the death instincts and as 
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if “The Uncanny” with its successive validations, its tortuous procedure, is a last effort to 
conceal “the [real] return of the repressed [death].”41  
Using this story as a literary illustration of the uncanny, Freud asserts that the 
uncanny, then, does not simply mean new, novel, or unfamiliar; rather, it is the return of the 
repressed, the revivification of an earlier psychic stage or experience that touches upon 
familiarity but within an unexpected or novel context.   To explain more fully his 
understanding of the uncanny Freud proffers a number of other examples.  Primary among 
these is the double – figures who look or act alike, who identify with another, or who are 
psychologically or narratively twinned.  Again, though, Freud goes to great pains to establish 
that the uncanny nature of the double is not simply in duplication; the uncanny nature of the 
double emerges because the double is always a reoccurrence of the earlier infntile projection 
of a double as a guard against the power of death resulting from the primary narcissism of the 
infant or of the later perception of the double as a harbinger of death, once the infant has 
passed through the period of primary narcissism.  In other words, the double is a denial of 
death, a harbinger of death, a sign of immortality, and a defense against castration, which may 
be understood as a form of death, the double an ““energetic denial of the power of death,” and 
it seems likely that the “immortal” soul was the first double of the body.”42  This duality is not 
unlike the philology of the terms heimlich and unheimlich themselves, in which the definition 
of one eventually runs into the definition of the other.   The double can, similarly, be both the 
receptacle of all that is unacceptable and threatening to the ego and all that is wished and 
hoped for.  A second example is what Freud terms the “repetition of the same thing” as when 
one is lost and keeps floundering back to the same starting point or when identical numbers or 
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words crop up in ways that make it tempting to attribute their appearance to more than mere 
chance. 
 It is precisely Freud’s refusal or inability to adequately and finally define his terms, 
despite his lengthy investigation into the etymology of heimlich, that suggests the connection 
between the uncanny and queer.  Critics of Freud’s essay argue that it is too quick too 
universalize the uncanny and fails to take into account various personal, cultural, and 
historical locations from which the experience of the uncanny might be perceived quit 
differently.   Hélène Cixous is one such critic but her criticism of Freud’s universality is 
tempered by her recognition that Freud’s queer little essay, which might be ca egorized as 
literary criticism, as psychoanalytic theory, or as a mere “itemized topology of the weird,” is 
itself an uncanny piece.   
[Freud] keeps his text in these indistinct and libidinous regions where 
the light of law does not yet cast its logic and where description, 
plural hypotheses, and all the pretheoretical games are given free 
reign.43  
The essay itself is both uncanny and queer as “what is brought together here is quickly 
undone, what asserts itself becomes suspect; each thread leads to its net or to some kind f 
disentanglement.”44  The two terms, while not identical, draw on and are constituted by 
common elements.   Both the uncanny and the queer draw heavily on the defamiliarization of 
the familiar and the class of objects, events, and identities that is at once both known and 
unknown.  Too, each concept is connected to a place or space that is next to but not of, that is 
in opposition to, or that is nearby.  Queer exists in this relationship to the heteronormative, 
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touching on and drawing from the heteronormative but never identical with it.  Similarly, the 
uncanny emerges, as Freud demonstrates, from both the homely (heimlich) and the unhomely 
(unheimlich), both of which structure but neither of which is singularly sufficient to define the 
uncanny.   
 It is impossible to escape the gendered nature of Freud’s rendering of the uncanny, and 
that gendered approach has been the subject of much criticism not only of the essay on the 
uncanny but of Freud’s work as a whole.  Freud’s dismissal of Jentsch’s focus on the life-lif  
female automaton in Hoffman’s short story and his recasting the tale as hinging upon 
castration anxiety in the central male character (Nathaniel) is but one example of Freud’s 
masculinist focus as is his identifying the female genitalia and the womb as unc nny sites.  
Even the examples Freud offers from his own life demonstrate a similar bias.  While in Italy, 
Freud finds himself three times returning to the same red-light district: 
I found myself in a district about whose character I could not long 
remain in doubt.  Only heavily made-up women were to be seen at the 
windows of the little houses, and I hastily left the narrow street at the 
next turning.  However, after wandering about for some time without 
asking the way, I suddenly found myself back in the same street, 
where my presence began to attract attention.  Once more I hurried 
away, only to return there again by a different route.  I was now 
seized by a feeling that I can only describe as uncanny, and I was glad 
to find my way back to the piazza that I had recently left and refrain 
from any further voyages of discovery.45 
Some commentators, however, have approached this gender bias constructively by placing 
Freud’s short essay into the larger context of postmodern gender theory, effectively recasting 
(queering?) Freud’s gender biases in light of a hundred years of new thinking.  Steve Garlick, 
                                                          
45 Freud, The Uncanny, 144. 
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for example, applies the lens of the uncanny to the concepts of gender melancholia and gender 
performativity, as developed by feminist theorist Judith Butler.46  In Gender Trouble, Butler 
emphasizes that repetition can be a form of rupture as for instance in a drag performance.47  A 
drag performance, no matter how realistic, necessarily reminds us that something is being 
repeated and that in that repetition there is something askew, something that crosses the 
boundaries between perfectly familiar and not quite familiar.  The repetition itself raises 
issues similar to that of Freud’s theory of the uncanny, which as we learned above, inv lves 
both repetition (the “compulsion to repeat”) and doubling, separately and jointly.  Butler’s 
theory of gender melancholia posits a homosexual taboo that precedes (and to some degree 
replaces) Freud’s incest taboo.  An earlier homosexual attachment, disavowed because of the 
homosexual taboo, haunts the heteronormative subject by being incorporated as the “lost
other.”48  Connecting Butler’s “miming of the lost other” to the very repetition that Freud 
suggests is constitutive of the uncanny and even suggests that the etymological mve fro  
heimlich to unheimlich is echoed in the relationship between gender and (ontological) identity 
in which gender becomes the “home” or “housing” in which subjects nest their identities bu  
which, like the heim in heimlich/unheimlich is always haunted by its own precariousness:  
“gendered identities are the equivalents of haunted houses – melancholic structures in habited 
by the lost other.”49  Both work to focus attention not on the thing or event itself but on the 
difference or rupture between the thing/event and the thing/event to which it refers or from 
which it draws.  
 
                                                          
46 Garlick, Steve.  “Melancholic Secrets: Gender Ambivalence and the Unheimliche.” Psychoanalytic 
Review.  89.6 (2002): 861-876.    
47 Butler, Gender Trouble, 146-147. 
48 Garlick, “Melancholic Secrets,”  869. 
49 Garlick, “Melancholic Secrets,”  861. 
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Real, Truly Live:  The Queer Uncanny 
It is precisely Freud’s refusal or inability to adequately and finally define his terms 
combined with the refusal of the queer of queer theory to be detained or contained by 
definitional boundaries that lead me to extend nascent work on the queer uncanny.50  The 
essay itself is both uncanny and queer as “what is brought together here is quickly undone, 
what asserts itself becomes suspect; each thread leads to its net or to some kind of 
disentanglement.”51  And the queer of queer theory is not simply a descriptor but “a strategy, 
an attitude, a reference to other identities and a new self-understanding” that is continuously 
built in, on and around “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and 
resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s 
gender, or anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically.”52  
The two terms, while not identical, draw on and are constituted by common elements.   Both 
the uncanny and the queer draw heavily on the defamiliarization of the familiar and the class 
of objects, events, and identities that is at once both known and unknown.  The two ideas – 
the uncanny, the queer – both twisting back on themselves, both undulating, like a Mobius 
strip, difficult to stabilize. 
To suggest that “the uncanny is queer [a]nd the queer is uncanny” alerts us to precisely 
the way that the queer uncanny operates.53 If the uncanny is “what should have remained 
hidden” then the queer uncanny is that which should not, cannot, be hidden.  The queer 
uncanny is not the what but the how and when.  For Freud, the uncanny is in part a “reading-
                                                          
50 Jenzen, Olu.  “The Queer Uncanny.” eSharp.  9.  Spring 2007.  Jenzen does an astute job of naming 
and beginning to define the queer uncanny in the context of various theoreticsal paradigms.  
http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/esharp/issues/9/.  Accessed 10 February 2009. 
51 Cixous, “Fiction and Its Phantoms,” 526.   
52 Smith, “What is This Thing Called Queer?”, 280; Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky.  Tendencies.  London: 
Routledge, 1994.  8.   
53 Royle, The Uncanny, 44. 
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effect.” In other words it is not only something “in” the text that the reader locates or connects 
but also the very experience of reading that text.  The queer uncanny extends the notion of the 
text, understanding text broadly, queering all of life into a text to be at once writt n and read.  
Olu Jenzen has already begun the work of developing the theory of the queer uncanny in her 
essay of the same name in relation to boundaries between the human and non-human and in 
relation to “the closet,” the metaphor used most often to describe the situation in which gay 
men and women find themselves hidden or unable to live their lives openly.54  
 Moving beyond the notion simply that gender is a performance and that identity might 
be structured on and around the lost other requires us to consider that perhaps what we are 
really discussing is ontological in nature – that is, a question what it means to be or exist at 
all, as Jenzen recognizes by referencing Sue-Ellen Case’s foudational essay, “Tracking the 
Vampire,” in which Case asserts that “queer theory … works not at the site of gender, but at 
the site of ontology, to shift the ground of being itself.”55  Case situates queer within the 
category of non-reproductive unlife and at the borders of the living/non-living.  In similar 
fashion, Judith Butler has also explored the ways in which gender affects whether a subject i  
intelligible indeed in later work posits that to “stray outside of established gen er is in some 
sense to put one’s very existence into question.56  I  other words, it is not simply that “men” 
and “women” exist and that those who are not fully or recognizably men and women do not 
exist; rather it is that the system of gender as organized in a heteronormative context “delimits 
the very field of description that we have for the human.”57  
                                                          
54 Jenzen, “The Queer Uncanny,” n. pag. 
55 Case, Sue-Ellen.  “Tracking the Vampire.”  Writing on the Body: Femal Embodiment and Feminist 
Theory.  Ed. Katie Conboy, Nadia Medina, and S arah Stanbury. New York: Columbia Univ Press, 
1997: 380-400.  382. 
56 Butler, Gender Trouble, 33; Butler, Judith.  Undoing Gender.  New York: Routledge, 2004.  27. 
57 Butler, Undoing Gender, 99. 
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 I extend these arguments in a different direction with the notion of the queer uncanny.  
Moving away from conceptualizations and meditations on the nature of threshold states 
between the living/non-living, I focus on the epistemological possibilities of the queer 
uncanny, most especially through the elements of doubling, the return of the repressed, the 
repetition compulsion, and dislogic.58  Part of the queer uncanny is an interpretive process, a 
way of looking and reading that works to not privilege any one interpretation over another, 
based only on immediacy or likelihood.  Rather, reading with the queer uncanny eye means 
locating those places where the repressed returns, where elements are repe t d, where doubles 
appear, and blending them together to move beyond “an” instantiation of the uncanny and into 
the realm multiple instantiations at the same moment, some or all of which fold back into 
upon one another and upon themselves so that what is uncanny in the first order is doubly 
uncanny in the second.  The queer uncanny is not just a moment or instantiation of the 
uncanny; nor is it simply non-heteronormative.  It is an amalgamation.  The queer uncanny is 
the merging of an instantiation of the uncanny with the personal and political potential of 
queer resulting in a new way of connecting and understanding the way that gender and 
sexuality inflect human experience.   
It is the queer context in which an uncanny instant takes places and the queer context 
in which it is interpreted and the way in which it is understood.  The queer uncanny disrupts 
normative expectations and behaviors.  In standard dominant readings (whether or those
artifacts we designated as “texts” or those experiences we designat as “real life”), we 
                                                          
58 The literature on threshold studies is immense, ranging from Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto” 
to Martha Nussbaum’s work on species membership to Derrida’s late lectures on sovereignty.  
Derrida, Jacques.  The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. 1.  Trans.  Geoffrey Bennington.  Chicago: Univ 
of Chicago Press, 2009; Haraway, Donna.  "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century." Simians, Cyborgs and Women: Th  Reinvention of Nature.  
New York: Routledge, 1991: 149-181; Nussbaum, Martha.  Frontiers of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality, Species Membership.  Cambridge MA: Belnap Press, 2006. 
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forcefully, willfully, seductively succumb to the temptation and pressure to choose (see, feel, 
highlight, discuss) those clues, moments, symbols, images, memories, et cetera hat support as 
bulwarks the reproductive futurity to which we are told and asked and ordered to subscribe.  
Thus, we somehow create a sense of the uncanny (isn’t it funny how the good guy always 
wins…? isn’t it something how the two lovers always meet…?) in that we perpetuate the 
artificial repetition of recognition, which we then disclaim as proof of the way things are or 
are supposed to be.  Anomalies, oddities, queer bits, the unfamiliar among the familiar is cast 
aside, flattened out, ignored.   The uncanny which we might individually and collectively 
experience is flattened out, reduced to anomaly which therefore requires no further 
explanation than a pert “how uncanny!”  The queer uncanny defies this, runs against it, ask  
instead that before we give birth to a reading or understanding that replicates wh t we already 
know or want to know – even in the face of contrary evidence – as in the dislogic that 
underlies the final scene of The Wizard of Oz, which I will discuss more fully later – that we 
give pause, that we attend not to seaming together elements that extend the heteronormative 
farther but that we attend to the cracks and the fissures. 
 In the follow chapters I attempt to lay out the parameters of the queer uncanny more 
clearly using three different texts: a film, a novel, and a municipal ordinance.  I  the first 
chapter I analyze the popular 1939 film The Wizard of Oz.  My aim in beginning with such a 
ubiquitous text is to rely on readers’ familiarity with the film for introducing the disruptive 
interpretive potential of the queer uncanny in several of its manifestations: the compulsion to 
repeat, doubling, and dislogic -- as elements themselves and as located in specific characters 
and scenes in the film.  The second chapter takes us further into the queer uncanny as I focus 
on Scott Heim’s novel, Mysterious Skin, which is a less-known and far more troubling text 
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than The Wizard of Oz.  Read by most as a tale of redemption in light of childhood sexual 
molestation, the novel is fertile ground for demonstrating the ability of the queer uncanny to 
broaden not only the available interpretative range vis-à-vis characters and scenes but to 
evoke rethinking of the cultural discourses surrounding so-called traumatic events.  The final 
chapter takes us out of the realm of film and literature and into the law as I apply the lens of 
the queer uncanny to a municipal domestic partnership registry ordinance that by its own 
terms provides no rights to registrants but which upon further analysis turns out to offer 
evidence of the performative potential of the queer uncanny.  
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Chapter One 
“Home is No Place: Moments of the Queer Uncanny in The Wizard of Oz” 
 
 
It is hardly necessary to sketch even briefly the story of this now-classic American 
film, given how broadly and deeply it has become a part of what we might call American 
culture.   The life of the film extends far beyond the actual celluloid on which it is preserved 
and has entered the vernacular in myriad forms:  from clothing and collectible figurines to 
now well-worn clichés reminding us that ‘we aren’t in Kansas anymore’ or that ‘there’s no 
place like home.’ Yet this film for all of its nostalgic and even banal deployment in the 
vernacular remains for me and many others a troubling, haunting, and disturbing film, rather 
than a welcome and comforting yearly tradition.  I am not referring so much to the camp 
elements of the film as they have been worked and reworked in any number of drag or parodic 
renditions of the “Over the Rainbow” or in any number of readings that posit the film as the 
great gay coming out story.   Rather, I’m referring to the way that the film vokes an uncanny 
world, produced from and speaking back to the psyche of the young Dorothy, mirroring for a 
slight few of us the trouble and troubling past.   
It seems almost impossible to avoid reading sexuality into the film even though many 
of my own friends and family disclaim the film as anything but wholesomely neuter, decrying 
any recognition of sexuality in the film, whether they have seen it once or a hundred times.  
There is a bit of truth to their resistance, and perhaps the first item to note about The Wizard 
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of Oz is that there is little if any heterosexuality in the film at all.59 Every other character in 
both Kansas and Oz is ostensibly divorced from sexuality of almost any kind, except of 
course the heterosexuality implicit in the worldview of the farm and the future.  Yet of course, 
the film is not all neuter, and is instead awash in sexual energy as commentators before me 
have noted convincingly.  I extend these prior analyses in this chapter beyond “sexual
identity” or “sexual development” and the question of Dorothy’s burgeoning sexuality, 
whatever her orientation, and instead insist that alongside other readings of the film, is my 
reading: a tale of Dorothy, a subject on the cusp and a traveler whose journey is not to a
fantastical magical land and back but to a quite different place that exists between Kansas and 
Oz: the space of the queer uncanny, in which both worlds exist overlapping.  I read the film as 
a representation of Dorothy’s psychic experience, conscious and unconscious acts and 
attitudes that open to her the position of the sinthomosexual within the traditional framework 
of both narrative and reproductive futurity, a futurity that Dorothy in the end turns up on itself 
by declaring that indeed there is “no place like home.” 
It is perhaps the dislogic of the film as a whole and in individual scenes that gives the 
film its queer and uncanny character.  My aim in beginning with such a ubiquitous text is to 
rely on readers’ familiarity with the film for introducing the disruptive nterpretive potential 
of the queer uncanny in several of its manifestations: the compulsion to repeat, doubling, and 
dislogic -- as elements themselves and as located in specific characters nd scenes in the film.  
From the beginning as Dorothy disavows Hunk’s simple, logical, and commonsensical 
direction to take a path that does not include Miss Gulch’s garden to the concluding moments 
                                                          
59 The only heterosexuality present in the film would be the implicit heterosexual union between Aunt 
Em and Uncle Henry, if we presume that they are married and not – perhaps – brother and sister.  The 
novel makes it clear that the two are married; the film leaves that to the viewer to decide.  I am 
grateful to Ann Schofield for mentioning this possibility.  
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when Dorothy asserts that there is “no place like home,” the film defies normative p hways 
of logic (unless, of course, they are forced onto the film, as I argue they have been). Most 
viewers of the film gloss over these fractures in what has coalesced into a collective though 
perhaps not conscious effort to stabilize the film within a socially sanctioned and culturally 
necessary framework of sentimentalized conceptualizations of home, security, fam ly, and 
self-discovery. 
 
The Text That Returns: 100 Years of The Wizard of Oz 
The Wizard of Oz was a book before it was a film, and had already experienced wide 
circulation in that form, along with thirty-nine other Oz books, for some four decades before
the film version came into being.60  It is no small item to note that L.  Frank Baum’s The 
Wonderful Wizard of Oz shares its year of publication with several other iconic texts.  
Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, and O.  Henry’s “The Four 
Million” offered readers rather sordidly realistic views of the gritty side of American urban 
life while Sigmund Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, Thorsten Veblen’s Theory of the 
Leisure Class (1899), and William James’s forthcoming Varieties of Religious Experience 
(1901), opened the minds of readers to the inner workings of their psyches and to the outer 
institutions like religion and capitalism that structured life in the modern world.  Though no 
presumption can be made that any broad audience read each of these books or, if they did, that 
they made any connections among them, it is no leap to suggest that the cultural ontext in 
which Baum’s book was published was, indeed, a fertile turn-of-the-century period.  Baum’s 
fairy tale was the best-selling children’s book for two years running, earning Baum and 
                                                          
60 There were fourteen Oz books penned by L.  Frank Baum (and another nineteen penned by Ruth 
Plumly Thompson, at the behest of Baum’s publisher after Baum’s death in 1919).  The film is drawn 
almost entirely from the first novel with which the film shares its name, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.   
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illustrator William Wallace Denslow each nearly $4000 in the first year of publication 
(approximately $100,000 in today’s dollars and a fairly incredible amount in the publishing 
industry of the early 1900s) and was praised for blending American themes and values into 
the traditional fairy tale narrative, with sufficient philosophy and satire to attract adults as well 
as children.61  
The popularity of the book almost immediately spawned adaptations for the stage and 
screen, including a 1902 stage performance running on Broadway for nearly 300 
performances and a 1910 silent film version.62  It seems almost prophetic that advancement in 
film technology (e.g., Technicolor, which had been in development and use as early as 1916 
but which only reached fruition in the late 1930s with the release of Disney’s first, full-length 
animated feature Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs) would keep Baum’s fanciful novel on 
the short list of possible adaptations given Baum’s highly visual narrative style, which 
featured color-coded districts in the land of Oz and vibrant descriptions of scenery and vistas.  
It was in fact the Walt Disney Company, sailing on the phenomenal success of Snow White, 
which sought the film rights to Baum’s novel intending at one point to produce an animated 
version of the book featuring Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and others from the Disney 
stable.  Baum’s widow Maud repeatedly refused Disney’s offers for reasons that remain 
unclear and instead authorized her son to sell the film rights to cofounder of MGM Samuel 
Goldwyn for what in today’s dollars would be about $650,000.63  MGM executives originally 
had ten year-old child star Shirley Temple slated for the starring role of Dor thy Gale; the 
                                                          
61 Baum Bugle, 19 (Autumn 1975): 14; Hearn, Michael Patrick, ed.  The Annotated Wizard of Oz 
(Centennial Ed.).  New York: W.W.  Norton, 2000: 11, 33-34; and Hearn, Michael Patrick, ed.  Th  
Wonderful Wizard of Oz.  Critical Heritage Series.  New Hork: Schocken Books, 1983.  136. 
62 Riley, Michael O.  Oz and Beyond: The Fantasy World of L.  Frank Baum.  Lawrence KS: Univ 
Press of Kansas, 1997.  78. 
63 Schwartz, Evan I.  Finding Oz: How L.  Frank Baum Discovered the Great American Story.  New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009.  304. 
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switch to sixteen year-old Judy Garland for the leading role inaugurated what would become a 
long list of casting and production crew changes before the film was finally completed and 
released in 1939.  The list of producers, directors, screenwriters, and other members of the 
production crew is both convoluted and well-documented enough to cause Salman Rushdie to 
question “[w]ho … is the auteur of The Wizard of Oz” and then answer that the film “is as 
near as you will get to the that will-o’-the-wisp of modern critical theory: the authorless 
text.”64  
Initial reviews of the film were generally quite negative.  The New Yorker castigated 
the film for showing “no trace of imagination, good taste, or ingenuity” while Th  New 
Republic lauded the film for trying to rival Disney’s Snow White but ultimately cast it as a 
humorless and “painfully literal” failure wrongly featuring as its starthe near-adult Judy 
Garland whose “thumping, overgrown gambols” were characteristic of the film overall.65 
Other reviews read similarly, finding much to dislike about the film from its overly 
Broadway-esqueness to its overly sentimental ending, although arguably the mos influential 
review (from The New York Times) was favorable.66 Critical reviews aside the movie-going 
public of 1939 went to the film in droves due in part to the tremendous amount of publicity 
the film received upon its release and the attendant packed film theaters it played in, but it is a 
fact that Oz failed to be profitable until nearly ten years after its release.  Much of the
financial failure of the film can be attributed to the extraordinarily high production osts, the 
                                                          
64 Rushdie, Salman.  The Wizard of Oz.  London: BFI, 1992.  95.  Victor Fleming, the last of several 
directors (including George Cukor and King Vidor), is the one generally credited as the auteur/director 
of the film. 
65 Harmetz, Aljean.  The Making of the Wizard of Oz.  New York: Knopf, 1977.  20-21. 
66 Harmetz, The Making of the Wizard of Oz, 21-22. 
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vastly expensive publicity campaign promoting the film, and the fact that the bulk of the
audience for the film paid children’s admission prices.67 
It was not until the mid-1950s that the film began to take its place most firmly in the 
American imagination, due in no small part to the development of and widespread ownership 
of television.  CBS’s 1956 broadcast of the film reached forty-five million viewers, most of 
whom were only able to see it on their black and white television sets; beginning with the 
1959 broadcast, the film was aired annually.  Over the past century since the novel’s first 
publication and the seventy years since the release of the film, the recreations and adaptations 
have continued and have spawned theater, film, musical, comics, art installations, 
performance pieces, and books that tell, retell, or extend Baum’s original tale nd the film in 
often dramatic ways.68 Two of the most popular include The Wiz, which began as a Broadway 
musical in the 1970s before being released as a film in 1978.  Though generally panned by 
critics and failing to make much of a mark at the box office, the film did earn four Academy 
Award nominations and when viewed today is actually a remarkably creative revisioning of 
the 1939 classic featuring an all African-American cast and reimagined in an urban setting.   
A second and wildly successful extension of (or, more aptly, prelude to) the 1939 classic is 
Geoffrey Maguire’s 1995 novel Wicked: The Life and Times of the Wicked Witch of the West, 
which provides back story to the lives of the Wicked Witch of the West and Glinda the Good 
Witch (Galinda in the novel and musical) and which inspired the Broadway phenomenon, 
Wicked.69  
                                                          
67 Schwartz, Finding Oz, 309. 
68 For an extensive though not exhaustive listing, see “Adaptations of The Wizard of Oz.”  Wikipedia, 
the Free Encyclopedia.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptations_of_The_Wizard_of_Oz.  Accessed 
12 January 2011. 
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With widespread viewership comes increased opportunity for negative criticism and it 
was not long before debates began to be waged over the appropriateness of the film for 
children and over the supposedly anti-Christian and anti-capitalist sentiments of the film and 
the books on which it was based.  School districts banned Baum’s books from their curricula 
and school libraries as unwholesome, religious groups decried the witches and the secular 
message of self-reliance, and politicos labeled the books socialist.70  The film, however, 
continues to play on broadcast and cable television year round and has been released on VHS 
and DVD almost continuously since 1980 when it was the first videocassette film released by 
MGM/CBS Home Video.  It is the 1939 MGM film that is most often cited as “the” Wizard of 
Oz, the “authoritative work to which all other telling, even the original one, must answer.”71 It 
is most definitely to the film that most people refer when referencing the yellow brick road, 
ruby slippers, Dorothy and Toto, Kansas or any of the now colloquial taglines, for in the novel 
the shoes are silver, Kansas merits just barely a hundred words of description, and Dorothy
never specifically states that there is no place like home.    
 Although many find the film to be “in most respects, faithful to the original book,” 
many fans of L.  Frank Baum’s book series were and remain critical of the film version and 
charge the film with having evacuated Baum’s child-focused literary vision n favor of a 
hyper-romanticized film version.72  Such charges are not far astray from the sorts of 
contention that always exists when written works are adapted for the visual screen and that are 
often at base conflicts or misunderstandings about the production and aesthetic values 
attendant to two very different media.  But the charges are also not completely unfounded.   
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The film version draws on but is not faithful to Baum’s The Wonderful Wizard of Oz and 
alters the story in significant ways.73  Katharine Rogers notes of the novel, for example, that it 
places all characters at the height of six year-old Dorothy and that itdeta ls the entire 
adventure as from the point of view of a child, both of which give the novel an entirely 
different flavor and appeal than the film.74 Perhaps the most relevant charge against the film is 
Rogers’s assertion that while the novel treats Dorothy’s journey as an actual trip in which the 
house moves, the film turns her travels “into a dream, a ereprojection of her wishes and 
fears that could not possibly be mistaken for reality” and that the film version is “false to 
Baum’s view that the world of imagination … has its own validity.”75  This note of 
dissatisfaction is the ending note of Roger’s finely detailed biography of Baum and is
expressed even in her final footnote in which she laments that upon seeing the film for the 
first time at the age of seven she was “deeply disappointed … because it did not literally
follow the book, but in retrospect I think I sensed and was hurt by its refusal to take Baum’s 
story seriously.”76 
 It is precisely Rogers’ disappointment with the refusal of the film to take Dorothy’s 
journey seriously, as anything more than a “mere” dream, that serves as the springboard for 
my own thinking about the film.  But where Rogers’ disappointment seems from some 
allegiance to Baum’s supposed approach to the imaginations of children, my concern is far 
more extensive.  I lay the blame squarely at the feet of reviewers and viewers of the film over 
                                                          
73 A listing of some of the main differences between the novel and the 1939 film can be found at “The 
Wizard of Oz (1939) Film.”  Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia.  
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43 
 
the past seventy years and find that the real quandary is not about the Baum and his fith in 
children and their imaginations but about the ways by which our interpretations of this and 
other texts, including our own “lived experiences,” is shaped and delimited by the Symbolic 
episteme in which we find ourselves living.    
 
So Many Interpretations, So Little Queerness 
 Perhaps best to first remind us of the basic plotline.  Young Dorothy Gale rushes 
home, frantic because her little dog Toto has yet again run through spinster Gulch’s yard.  
Orphaned and in the care of her Uncle Henry and her Aunt Em, Dorothy’s concerns are side-
stepped by everyone on the family farm as there is bad weather afoot and work to be done.  
As Dorothy runs off determined to find a better place in the world, a cyclone threatens the flat 
Kansas landscape and by the time Dorothy makes it back to the farmstead proper it is too late: 
everyone is in the root cellar with the door tightly closed against the raging winds.  Dorothy 
rushes into the farmhouse, where she is hit by a dislodged window and transported to Oz.  
Dorothy emerges from the black and white of Kansas into the Technicolor wondrousness of 
Oz, where she is celebrated as the hero ‘who fell from the star named Kansas’ and whose 
house has landed squarely on the Wicked Witch of the East, freeing the Munchkins from 
dictatorial rule and causing a pair of sparkling ruby pumps to disappear from the wizened legs 
of the dead witch and to appear magically on Dorothy’s young feet.  To return to Kansas, 
Dorothy must travel to see the great and powerful Wizard of Oz, who will be able to tell her 
how to return home.  Along the way she meets Scarecrow who is in need of a brain, Tin Man 
who is in need of a heart, and Cowardly Lion who is in need of courage.  Their journey is 
interrupted and slowed by the Wicked Witch of the West, who wishes to avenge her sister’s 
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death and to nab the ruby red slippers that now rest on Dorothy’s feet.  The foursome (and 
Toto) kill the Wicked Witch only to find that the great and powerful Oz is in reality just a 
little befuddled professor from Omaha who is also trying to get back home.  He offers t  take 
Dorothy and Toto with him in his hot air balloon but at the last minute he lifts off without 
them.  As Dorothy despairs, Glinda returns and instructs Dorothy that “[y]ou don't need o be 
helped any longer.  You've always had the power to go back to Kansas” and tells her to tap 
her heels together and think to herself that “there’s no place like home.”  In the closing scene 
of the film, Dorothy awakens back in black and white Kansas surrounded by her aunt, uncle, 
and the farm hands and trying desperately to assure them all that “it wasn’t a dream.  It was a 
place.  And you, and you, and you, and you were there.” 
 It is precisely because the 1939 film The Wizard of Oz is so beloved and so highly 
esteemed as the quintessential American fairy tale that I find it valuable as the entry point in 
advancing my thesis.  While I am fully in accord with those who view the cultural productions 
of marginalized individuals and groups as offering new epistemological and experiential 
avenues for viewing and existing in the world, my personal interest runs to texts and cultural 
sites that are ubiquitous and circulating (as is the case with The Wizard of Oz) and to the 
perhaps less mainstream but still widely available (as with the novel Mysterious Skin in the 
next chapter).  A performance piece that takes place in a basement bar in the West Villag  of 
New York City once certainly holds politically progressive potential just as a decidedly elitist 
text like Jean Genet’s Notre Dame des Fleurs can influence a cadre of academic scholars; my 
interest, however, is to take the already widespread, the already colloquial, the already 
ubiquitous, the widely available and to submit it to renewed examination.77  Why this 
                                                          
77 Although I am not a firm adherent to the myth and symbol school of American Studies and it focus 
on a singular American mind, there is much to be said for how popular cultural forms speak to and of 
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particular film remains so popular among casual viewers and cultural studies, popular 
cultural, and film theorists alike hints at something that may perhaps transcend (though never 
fully) elements of race, class, and gender: the notion of looking for something and findi g it 
back at the beginning, at home.78  Whether or not home is a place of comfort or anxiety, there 
can be little doubt of the ideas place and permanency as it circulates in myriad ways in our 
culture. 
 The film has been the subject of interpretation almost since before it was even 
released, and the interpretations range from the banally sentimental and straight-forward to 
the almost unbearably forced and frankly unsupportable readings in which the filmic 
treatment of Kansas is described as “upbeat” and “cozy” with “farms … comfortably enclosed 
by fences, and [the] life on these farms is not such a singular endeavor (e.g., Dorothy’s aunt 
and uncle have three jovial farmhands around to help them).”79  My purpose in this project is 
not to disprove any of these interpretations; working in a postmodernist milieu, my project 
recognizes the multiple ways in which these interpretations adhere as authorit tive without 
being authoritarian: as stepping stones in the development of newer and perhaps more 
complete or nuanced interpretations, as integral to and viable within certain theoretical r 
historical contexts, and as indicative of the potential of any text to proliferate meaning.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the character of any group.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., captures the sentiment aptly when he observes that 
“[w]hat succeeds at the time in movies, what is remembered later (of n two separate things) 
obviously offers the social and intellectual historian significant clues to the tastes, apprehensions, 
myths, inner vibrations of the age… The fact that film has been the most potent vehicle of the 
American imagination suggests all the more strongly that movies have something to tell us not just 
about the surfaces but about the mysteries of American life.”  Schlesinger, Arthur M.  “Foreword.”  
American History/American Film: Interpreting the Hollywood Image.  Ed. John E.  O’Connor and 
Martin A.  Jackson.  New York: Ungar Publishing, 1979.  x-xi. 
78 I recognize that Schlessinger, writing over thirty years ago, is veering dangerously close to the 
approach of the myth-and-symbol school of American studies, in which the search for “the” or “an” 
American mind tended to place great emphasis on the works and lives of white male Americans like 
Whitman, Melville, and Thoreau as elucidating quintessentially American values. 
79 Billman, “I’ve Seen the Movie,” 242. 
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Though my project diverges from these prior interpretations in ways that will become 
apparent in the pages that follow, my thinking is informed by these other prior representative 
readings of the film. 
 One of the dominant interpretations of the film originated in the mind of high school 
educator Henry Littlefield, who saw Baum’s books (and most especially the first book on 
which the film was based) as a “Parable of Populism.”80  Littlefield’s inspired interpretation 
saw the Tin Man as the factory worker of the east, the Scarecrow as the ranc r of the 
Midwest, the Yellow Brick Road as the gold standard, and the Wizard as President McKi ley 
living in the City of Emeralds, Washington, D.C., an historical-allegorical reading that 
continues to be reexamined and revisited today.81  While there is no evidence that Baum 
intended his story in this way, the interpretation continues to spawn interest.  A more 
generally acceptable because seemingly timeless interpretation is that t is an “inspiring 
message of a girl of the prairies facing a crisis, extending true friendship to those in need, 
surmounting obstacles to personal development, overcoming those obstacles, and then finally, 
having deserted the family farm in a self-pitying attempt at rebellion, returning home to it 
with a promise never again to leave.”82  Such an interpretation manages to fit both the 
sentimental needs of some viewers and the self-actualization needs of others.  
As one might expect, many of the interpretations of the film in the past couple of 
decades have focused on the sexual undertones of the film, or to be more precise the issu s of
gender and sexuality that seem to infuse the film, supporting the narrative framework in ways 
                                                          
80 Littlefield, Henry.  “The Wizard of Oz: Parable of Populism.” American Quarterly.  16 (Spring 
1964). 
81 See, for example: Geer, John G., and Thomas R.  Rochon.  “William Jennings Bryan and the Yellow 
Brick Road.” Journal of American Culture.  16.4 (1993): 59-63. 
82 Hamelman, Steven.  “The Deconstructive Search for Oz.” Literature-Film Quarterly.  28.4 (2000): 
312-319.  313. 
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both subtle and obvious, depending on the point of view of the interpreter.  While these 
interpretations seem at least as plausible as Littlefield’s populist parable reading, many who 
hold the film dear see such interpretations as “a form of literary child abuse.”83  That rings a 
tad hyperbolic and more than a little out of touch with current understandings of both child 
abuse and child sexuality, although one cannot but recognize that to interpret through the lens 
of sexuality a film that has for nearly three-quarters of a century been viewed, discussed, and 
held up as a paragon of innocence in the face of evil and of wholesomeness in the face of 
wickedness is indeed to risk the tincture of illicitness.   
 Psychoanalytic and feminist interpretations of various stripes have ranged from the 
laudatory to the lamenting, many focusing on the erotics between or among various
characters.  Harvey Greenberg psychoanalyzes Dorothy as the “Little Girl Lost – and Found,” 
suggesting that the romance in the story was to be found between Dorothy and Farmhand 
Hunk, provided that Dorothy could move past her powerful psychic connection to Aunt Em.84  
Salman Rushdie suggests that the focus of energy in the film is among Dorothy and the two 
witches -- Glinda of the East and the unnamed Wicked Witch of the West -- but fails to take 
note of how this might be read as anything more than woman-centric and ignores the potential 
lesbianism of such a triangle.85  Linda Paige’s feminist reading situates Dorothy as a failed 
heroine who “succumbs to the patriarchal voices of her subconscious, and thereby represses 
her imagination and wastes her powers.”86 Similarly, Bonnie Friedman recognizes the obvious 
woman-centric erotics in the film, an erotics she locates among Dorothy, Auntie Em, and the 
                                                          
83 Schwartz, Finding Oz, 311. 
84 Greenberg, Harvey.  “The Wizard of Oz: Little Girl Lost—and Found.” The Movies on Your Mind.  
New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975.  Pages 13-32. 
85 Rushdie, Salman.  The Wizard of Oz.  London: BFI, 1992. 
86 Paige, Linda Rohrer.  “Wearing Red Shoes: Dorothy and the Power of the Female Imagination in 
The Wizard of Oz.” Journal of Popular Film & Television.  2.4 (Winter 1996): 146-153.  146. 
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Wicked Witch of the West, but ultimately reads the film within a heterocentri framework in 
which Dorothy returns to Kansas to assume the heterosexual homemaking role that th aging 
Aunt Em is sure to soon relinquish, leaving Uncle Henry and three farmhands without the 
civilizing and disciplining influence of the feminine.  Friedman laments that “[t]his is a story 
about who owns what, as any archetypal story about women must be.  It is about kidnapping 
and re-kidnapping and ultimate possession.  Merged with our mothers, unsure of our 
boundaries, women’s drama often enacts the story of the self in jeopardy, the self tat has 
been absconded with – raped, ravished, invaded, and annexed – and the struggle to get that 
self back.”87 
  
Both Here and There: Kansas and Oz 
Katharine Rogers’s criticism of the film for reducing Dorothy’s journey into a mere 
dream is certainly well-founded; most viewers understand the entire Oz sequenc as the result 
of an extended hallucination resulting from the blow to the head Dorothy receives.  Some 
slightly more nuanced readings of the film see “dream” as a bit more symbolic, as the battle 
of two dreams: a dream of escaping to someplace “over the rainbow” and a dream in which 
there is “no place like home.”  The two dreams seem at first glance to be antith tical and ripe 
with conflict for the plot, for how can one both desire escape and also desire to return home? 
There is a certain legitimacy to either sense of the word “dream” as there is ample evidence 
that lead screenwriter Noel Langley was familiar with Freud’s developing body of writings, 
including The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and related works by Freud and others that 
                                                          
87 Friedman, Bonnie.  “Relinquishing Oz: Every Girl’s Anti-Adventure Story.”  Michigan Quarterly 
Review.  35.1 (1996): 9-28.  15. 
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followed.88  Perhaps the best example of the influence of Freud on Langley’s script is the 
opening sequence set in Kansas, which in Baum’s novel merits but a few hundred terse words 
but which in the film is not only a central tool in setting the story but also takes up a full fifth 
(20 minutes) of the total running time (100 minutes).  The black and white opening is almost 
insistently superego-esque with its harsh lines reminiscent of German Expressionist film (e.g., 
The Cabinet of Dr.  Caligari), the curt responses of the adult characters to Dorothy’s 
dilemma, and its punishing cyclone.  These elements, combined with Dorothy’s troubles with 
the stern, angular Miss Gulch, are counter-posed to Dorothy’s plaintive wish to be somewhere 
over the rainbow.  When the journey begins, it is indeed difficult not to understand Dorothy’s 
journey as being a dream because of the stark juxtaposition of bleak Kansas with brilliant Oz 
and because of the way that elements of her ‘real life’ appear in Dorothy’s journey through 
Oz.  In his extended essay on the film, Salman Rushdie interprets the film using precisely this 
rubric and determines that in the final analysis it is the dream of escape that controls both the 
film and Dorothy.89  The concept of the queer uncanny, though, allows us to express and live 
out both dreams at once as co-existent rather than conflicting realities because the queer 
uncanny relies not on different topographies or geographies for its power but rather on  
mental agility to recognize at one and the same time a familiar/unfamiliar quality to each 
moment and space.  Early in the film, Dorothy seems to be attempting just such a ‘queering’ 
by attempting to read her life within a much more dynamic epistemological framework than 
her aunt, uncle, and the farmhands would allow; hence her response of exasperation and 
dissatisfaction at Hunk’s suggestion that she simply take a route that bypasses Miss Gulch’s 
garden: “Oh, Hunk, you just won't listen, that's all.” She is explicitly not suggestin  that Hunk 
                                                          
88 Schwartz, Finding Oz, 305. 
89 Rushdie, The Wizard of Oz, 12, 23. 
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has simply misheard her; she is insistent that he is listening to her words facially nd 
surficially and not to their emanations and deeper meanings.  She is not seeking a solution; 
she is invested in the process and in the flow of the discontent and in the contentment that the 
state of discontent ironically provides.  In other words, she is not seeking the normative 
conflict resolution process; she finds pleasure (jouissance) in the symptom itself. 
What makes Dorothy’s home so interesting is that it is so harsh and so far removed 
from the Midwest and small-town America of the cultural imagination, which focuses on “a 
street, lined with three or four-storey red-brick business blocks….  This is Main Street….  
And around it lays a prosperous farming country dotted with handsome farmhouses and big 
red barns.”90 The Kansas where Dorothy lives is nothing like this; although the farm on which 
Dorothy lives is surely near a small town (for it is from the small town that Dorothy is 
walking when we first meet her and the errant Toto), the farmstead is hardly prosperous or 
handsome.  It is imperative to note that the film is not black and white initially but rather 
shades of gray.  This is not simply a comment on the visual elements of the film; our 
description of the visual is an analogue to how we will imagine other elements of thi film: 
not as black or white but as shades of gray, drawing out the subtle gradations of color, 
meaning, and possibility from a film that has been routinely and firmly situated in a particular 
genre and interpretative framework. 
 Munchkinland is in distinct contrast to the geometric and linear face of Kansas.  The 
two landscapes seem to be polar opposites; but closer inspection reveals that these two locales 
may be doubles, not because they are opposites but because they are mirror reflecti ns but 
with a difference.  The first indication of this is Dorothy’s quizzical expression as she 
                                                          
90 Meinig, Donald.W.  “Symbolic Landscapes.”  The Interpretation of Ordinay L ndscapes: 
Geographical Essays.  Ed. Donald .W. Meinig.  New York: Oxford Univ Press, 1979.  164-191.  167. 
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ventures out of the farmhouse and into Munchkinland, commenting, “Toto -- I've a feeling 
we're not in Kansas anymore.” Her first comment is not “Look, Toto! It looks so strange” or 
“Toto, we’re lost” but “I’ve a feeling….” This alerts us that we are in a moment of the queer 
uncanny because Dorothy is not focusing on empirical knowledge (what she sees or h ars) or 
on certainty but on feeling, the sense that all is not what it was.  Yet Dorothy does not sem 
unduly frightened or undone; her gaze is cast around in a manner that seems full of wonder 
rather than fear.   
To the eyes Kansas and Munchkinland could not be more distinct.  Kansas was gray 
and linear and flat, including the people, and the only roundness the undulating spinning 
cyclone flying across the land is the force of destruction.  In Munchkinland everything is 
brilliantly hued, rounded, undulating, including the Munchkins themselves, and it is the sharp 
black pointed line of the Wicked Witch that is the disruptive force as she flashes into the 
scene.  In Munchkinland the types, sizes, and colors of the flora suggest a fecund abundance 
in contrast to the dusty bare Kansas landscape and farmstead but we look closer we son see 
that both Kansas and Munchkinland operated within a very queer uncanny space of “artificial 
naturalism” or “natural artificiality” for the flora in Munchkinland is plastic, foam, and 
rubber, not at all real yet not not-real, growing and thriving as we would expect plant life to 
do.  Similarly, in Kansas where we would expect trees, grass, and crops to grow while birds 
and critters multiply, there is a marked absence of natural reproduction.  The landscape shows 
but a few trees, the yard is dust, the creek nearly dried up; the animals who are reproducing 
(which doesn’t include the humans, apparently, as Aunt Em and Uncle Henry appear 
childless, Gulch is a spinster, and the farmhands make no allusions) are ones who are forced 
to do so under the watchful eye of the calculating, scheduling farmer as baby chicks are 
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shipped in to be counted and used and as the pigs are corralled or separated depending on 
whether it is rutting season or not.  In other words, the very ideas of reproduction, fecundity, 
natural, and artificial rest easily in neither Kansas nor Munchkinland.  This suggests not only 
the constructedness of the heterosexual and reproductive matrix (a la Judith Butler et al) but it 
also harkens to Edelman’s regime of reproductive futurity, in which a collective hallucination 
of the figure of the child is projected into the future and then cast back to draw us forth.  The 
construction of the things that seem natural highlights the constructed (and hence partial, 
unformed, never complete) psyche of the human subject.  That Dorothy feels not the fear of 
the unknown in Munchkinland but rather a curiosity tells us that the two worlds are mirrored 
and doubled as such things always are in the realm of the uncanny, which is a realm of feling 
rather than certainty and which is always a realm where the borders and edges are the sites of 
knowledge.   
 Some have pushed the analysis further.  Mark Dietrich Tschaepe has read the 
dislogic of the film through the lens of “folk explanation,” which he defines as “answers to 
why-questions that connect mental behavior to physical behavior [and which are] based on the 
claim that psychological states, such as mourning or desire, have important cntent and cause 
us to behave in some ways and not others.”91 In other words, according to Tschaepe, the film 
avoids mechanistic and logical explanations in favor of emotional motivations and solutions 
based on “pragmatic considerations” (i.e., “what is problematic or what is desirabl  in an 
issue at hand [given the] knowledge, assertions, and beliefs” at hand).92 When Professor 
Marvel wants to encourage Dorothy to return home, he relies not on a logical argument (e.g., 
                                                          
91 Tschaepe, Mark Dietrich.  “Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Curtain!” In The Wizard of 
Oz and Philosophy: Wicked Wisdom of the West.  Ed.  Randall E.  Auxier and Phillips S.  Seng.  Peru 
IL: Open Court Publishing, 2008.  Pages 95-106.  97. 
92 Tschaepe, 97. 
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you have no money and no job skills) but on the emotionally-charged imagery of Auntie Em 
clutching her heart and crying.  But this emotion-infused explanatory and persuasive process 
is not coldly emotional, recognizing instead that the approach much be rooted firmly in what 
will appeal to the listener or appellee and in the end “convinces each individual that heor she 
does not want what they think they want because they already have something equivalent (or 
even better).”93 
 
Breaking Down the Queer Uncanny: Accidents, Doubles, and Dislogic 
 An element of the uncanny that deserves some attention is the compulsion to repeat.  
Freud includes this “constant recurrence of the same thing” as an element of his 
understanding of the role of the death drive in the uncanny.  Though he makes short work of 
this subject in the essay (instead referring readers to his other work on the mat er), Freud does 
write that “[i]n the unconscious mind we can recognize the dominance of a compulsion to 
repeat, which proceeds from instinctual impulses.”94 In his essay on “Freud and the 
Sandman,” Neil Hertz notes that the “feeling of the uncanny would seem to be generated by 
being reminded of the repetition compulsion, not by being reminded of whatever it is that i  
repeated.95 Hence, Dorothy’s chastising Hunk for “just not listening.” Dorothy is not 
concerned about the behavior she is repeating (walking by Miss Gulch’s, knowing that Toto 
will get into the garden) but about the repetition itself.   
 But there is more to it than this.  As Robert Pfaller has noted in his work on comedy 
and the uncanny, both comedy and the uncanny depend on success – or what we might more 
                                                          
93 Tschaepe, 96. 
94 Freud, The Uncanny, 145. 
95 Hertz, Neil.  “Freud and the Sandman.” The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the 
Sublime.  New York: Columbia Univ Press, 1985.  113-134.  121. 
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aptly term over-success.96  For example, when in romantic comedy a pretend-romance is used 
to cover for the real liaison but ends up being just as authentic, this is a form of success (or 
over-success) that produces comedic results because it requires the protagonist o balance, 
explain, and choose between or among desirable options.97  I  Freud’s essay this sort of 
success can take two forms.  Sometimes such success is wished for, though not in earnest, and 
the result is a form of symbolic causality – that is, the idea that one somehow caused 
something merely by longing for it, that though one did not wish for something in earnest or 
take any steps to effectuate the end result, the end results all the same.98  This is the case in 
the tale of Freud’s patient who on his first stay at treatment facility had a choice room, but on 
his second admission discovered that the desired room was already occupied.  The patient 
wishes that the occupant “be struck dead” and sure enough within a short time the occupant is 
dead.99  In the case of Polycrates, Freud notes that every wish of Polycrates is granted, 
although Polycrates did nothing to earn this advantage.  In other words, Polycrates “simply 
lives in a world that conforms to his wishes.”100  
 Consider the episode that seems to spawn the entire film, an apt illustration of this 
principle of over-success and which demonstrates as well the way that the queer uncanny 
refuses to be restricted to a purely optimistic or pessimistic state.  Toto has gotten into Miss 
Gulch’s garden, Miss Gulch has whacked Toto over the back with her garden rake, and 
Dorothy is afraid that Miss Gulch will cause Toto further harm.  Simple misdeeanor of 
                                                          
96 Pfaller, Robert.  “The Familiar Unknown, the Uncanny, the Comic: The Aesthetic Effects of the 
Thought Experiment.” Lacan: The Silent Partner.  Ed. Slavoj Žižek.  London: Verso, 2006.  198-216.  
204. 
97 The contrast would be in tragedy in which failure serves as the mechanism, when the result is not an 
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Othello.   
98 Pfaller, 203. 
99 Freud, The Uncanny, 146. 
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similar nature have certainly been sufficient to sustain other films, but the view r soon learns 
that Toto’s indiscretions occur regularly -- “once or twice a week” – when Dorothy passes 
Miss Gulch’s home on her way back to the farm.  When Dorothy tries to excite folks on the 
farm with her fears for Toto’s safety, she is shushed and only commonsensical farmhand 
Hunk half-listens, only to tsk-tsk Dorothy for not using her head about the situation:  “When 
you come home, don't go by Miss Gulch's place.  Then Toto won't get in her garden, and you 
won't get in no trouble.  See?” A fair answer, to which one might expect the teen-ag d 
Dorothy to reply that the fastest or safest way home is by Miss Gulch’s place; but instead 
Dorothy gives the queerest answer:  “Oh, Hunk, you just won't listen, that's all.”  Dorothy is 
clearly unable to articulate why exactly it is she does not resolve the issue herself with some 
good Midwestern commonsense (other available options being to put Toto on a leash or to 
carry him past Miss Gulch’s garden so that both dog and garden are unmolested).  We could 
read this stemming from the typical self-centeredness of a child eager to garner attention for 
what the adult world surely considers a petty irritant, but if we peer closely at Dorothy’s 
action through a different lens we find that these regularly occurring accidents may be a queer 
subject revealing in the sinthome – a teenaged sinthomosexual seeking not a solution to a 
problem, as it is interpreted by the adults in her life, but simply reveling in the problem itself, 
reveling in the drama of the conflict, repeating it not because she cannot imagine or discern a 
solution but repeating it because she can and must.  In what might be a slip of the tongue, 
Dorothy even admits that perhaps she wants Toto to get into Miss Gulch’s garden: “Please, 
Aunt Em, Toto didn't mean to.  He didn't know he was doing anything wrong.  I'm the one 
that ought to be punished.  I let him go in her garden.  You can send me to bed without 
supper.” In the repetition, Dorothy finds neither pleasure nor pain but the complex 
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interweaving of the two, which Lacan has termed jouissance.  Of course, the over-succ ss of 
her repetition has now nearly cost Toto his back and Miss Gulch has promised to contact the 
sheriff and to have Toto not merely put down or put to sleep but “destroyed.” 
 This accords with Dorothy’s compulsion to repeat certain behaviors that she then 
understands as accidents but which result in the death of two people: the Wicked Witches of 
the East and West.  After killing each of the witches, her immediate response is that it was an 
accident and she did not mean to commit the murders.101  It is likely that Dorothy did not have 
the mens rea required to make her certainly guilty of either murder; yet through the lens of the
queer uncanny we find that Dorothy’s anger toward Miss Gulch (“Oooh, I'll bite you myself! 
You wicked old witch!”) is repressed as it should be in a good little girl living in a good 
Christian home but it returns as the repressed for Miss Gulch’s death, not once but twice 
within the film.  In the first instance the house (not Dorothy) lands on and kills the Wicked 
Witch of the East.  This witch is revived in the form of the Wicked Witch of the West, almost 
as if the murder of the first witch was but a practice attempt for Dorothy, a practice accident 
of sorts in which Dorothy can disclaim knowledge or responsibility but for which she can t st 
the waters and received her accolades as heroine to the Munchkins.  What is more, the Glinda 
the Good Witch and the Munchkins mistake Dorothy herself for a witch, suggesting a psychic 
interplay of (dis)identification with the unerringly focused Miss Gulch for what kind of a little 
girl “lets” her dog repeatedly wander into harm’s way? Having practiced on the first witch, 
the repressed erupts again, blossoms into the narrative drive of the film as Dorothy pursues 
and finally murders the Wicked Witch of the West, only to return to Kansas where we can 
                                                          
101 After her house lands on the Wicked Witch of the East, Dorothy assures the menacing Wicked 
Witch of the West “It was an accident! I didn't mean to kill anybody! Really I didn’t!” And after 
dousing the Wicked Witch of the West with water and killing her, Dorothy again exclaims, “I, I didn't 
mean to kill her.  Really I didn't!”  
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only assume that Miss Gulch will be pedaling furiously back to the farm to find Toto and t 
again take him away to be destroyed.102 
 Continuing this idea of the return of the repressed being combined with a doubling 
effect (Miss Gulch – W.W.  of the East / Dorothy – W.W.  of the West / Dorothy – Miss 
Gulch) is the Wicked Witch of the West’s clear insight into Dorothy.  When Dorothy denies 
liability to the Wicked Witch for the death of her sister-witch (“It was an accident! I didn't 
mean to kill anybody!”) the Wicked Witch responds, “Didn't mean it, eh? Accident, eh? W ll, 
my little pretty, I can cause accidents, too.” Here, then, is a figure who challenges the 
conventional logic, asserting that she can ‘cause accidents’ and declaring a knowledge of 
Dorothy that neither Dorothy nor those others around her seem to have.  I explore the Wicked 
Witch of the West in more detail below, but for now let us suggest she may be the 
sinthomosexual par excellence and whether she actually exists or exists as a projection of 
Dorothy’s own desires, she is the crux on which the psychic energy of the film centers. 
 In addition to the purposeful accidents that represent within the queer uncanny 
Dorothy’s compulsion to repeat, the film is rife with doubling, most especially of its
characters. Freud contends that in the past the double “had a more benign significance” and 
was perhaps welcome and even comic while today it is “a thing of terror.”103 The queer 
                                                          
102 Our certainty that the Wicked Witch of the West is a queer, firmly planted in the position of the 
sinthomosexual is evident not only in her own intense focus on obtaining the ruby slippers for no 
apparent reason than to satisfy her own desire for them but also in the Munchkin song about her 
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queer who does not reproduce and who operates “outside the consensus by which all politics confirms 
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uncanny understands both of these as co-existent, not in competition or opposition.  For 
Dorothy, Hunk may be the locus of the initial stirrings of sexual desire.  The very name Hunk 
gives some credence to the idea that these stirrings may not be of a purely physical nature for 
“hunk” in the vernacular generally refers to a masculine, muscled male form, yet in the film 
Hunk is a rather scrawny and lanky man, suggesting that “hunk” is a descriptor signifying ot 
a muscled man, perhaps not even a “man,” but something not full or complete, a hunk of man 
but not the full man.  But he is as yet still strange, a man, the object of desire that s not fully 
known.  He is as well off-bounds because he is significantly older and he is of a different 
class.  Dorothy is still a schoolgirl while Hunk is an adult; Dorothy lives in the big house 
while Hunk sleeps in the barn.   
The doubling of Hunk in the figure of the Scarecrow, who is literally a straw man, not 
quite whole, a “hunk” of potential, erases many of the barriers to Dorothy’s developing sexual 
desire.  Not only is he not-quite human but in Oz the age of the Scarecrow is indeterminat  
(except perhaps that he has been hanging in the cornfield for quite some time) and Dorothy 
encounters him as a friend, rather than as an inferior: “Well, we haven’t really met properly, 
have we,” Dorothy asks of the Scarecrow, indicating that the differences that eparated them 
in Kansas have no purchase here.  Dorothy meets the Scarecrow first of the men who are 
doubled from Kansas to Oz, and at the end of the film it is to Scarecrow that Dorothy admits, 
“I think I’ll miss you most of all.” While we could read this through the lens of direct 
sexuality – adolescent Dorothy desires farmhand Hunk and projects this forbidden desir  into 
the figure of the straw scarecrow, a less threatening because less human entity – in the lens of 
the queer uncanny, Hunk/Scarecrow functions as the limit of Dorothy’s desire, as both the 
nascent inaugural locus and the straw automaton friend-only figure.  The Scarecrow meets 
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both elements of the uncanny for Dorothy.  He is a friendlier, less sexually volatile version of 
Hunk but at the same time he is “the last straw,” the last barrier or limit before Dorothy either 
succumbs to the heteronormative push of a linear sexuality or manages to free herself of its 
time and space limitations.  When she says she will “miss” him, she means not only in the 
sense of missing his company but also of missing the comfort and certainty that a life of 
invested in the heteronormative path of reproductive futurity would offer, the comfort of the
constant busy work of daily, hourly, moment by moment rebuilding the bulwarks that support 
the future: “There goes some of me again.  I just keep picking it up and putting it back n 
again,” says the Scarecrow as his straw, his substance, his solidity keeps slipping out of him.  
Dorothy is the acorn that misses becoming the oak tree and instead sprouts wings.  It seems 
that she is moving more firmly than ever into the position of the sinthomosexual. 
The only character not arguably doubled is Toto, Dorothy’s dog.  It would be remiss to 
overlook Toto, as many prior interpretations have (see, e.g., Littlefield) for heis t  nexus of 
conflict, the very reason that Miss Gulch and Dorothy cross each other’s paths in the first 
place, the one who reveals the Wizard as a shyster, and also the one who causes Dorothy to 
miss her flight home in the hot air balloon. The name Toto is related to a number of Latin 
terms – totum, factotum, in toto, pars pro toto  – all of which refer to the ‘whole’ or ‘total.’  
This suggests that Toto is in some way the ‘whole’ of something for Dorothy.  It is possible to 
see Toto in this way as he does seem to be an externalized expression of Dorothy’s wn 
desires or the mechanisms by which those desires might be explored, a more complete r 
‘whole’ version of desire than the actual Dorothy is willing to admit to.  Other commentators 
have phrased this differently as in Samuel Bousky’s Christian reading of the film in which 
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Toto is the physical body extending out from Dorothy who is understood as the spirit.104  In 
less overtly religious language but still firmly with the self-help realm, Darren John Main 
understands Toto as that part of ourselves that is creative but rather too unbridled, lea ing us 
too often into conflict and dilemma.105  In this case it is actually the Christian-based reading 
more in accord with queer theory than the supposedly irreligious self-help reading because 
rather than understanding “conflict and dilemma” as something to be avoided or gotten rid of, 
my queer theoretical approach understands both as productive, as the nexus of what it is to be 
human. Toto may very well then be an extension and queer-double of Dorothy insofar as 
Dorothy feels deeply connected to Toto and may be using the animal to force upon herself the 
very problems she wishes not to solve.  In other words, Toto is a double with a difference, an 
extension but not a duplicate of Dorothy and she admits as much:  “Please, Aunt Em, Toto 
didn't mean to.  He didn't know he was doing anything wrong.  I'm the one that ought to be 
punished.”  We could interpret Dorothy’s plea to mean simply that she failed to keep Toto in 
check, but with the queer uncanny and its notions of doubling and of the repetition 
compulsion, an interpretation that reads Toto as an extension of Dorothy, a extension that 
“completes” her or makes her “whole,” begins to make a great deal of sense.  As a final 
recognition of how vital Toto is to her own sense of her self, how central the dog-as-exten ion 
is to her psyche, Dorothy even threatens Miss Gulch:  “Oooh, I'll bite you myself!” 
There may be more yet to little Toto.  Dorothy allows Toto to run though Miss 
Gulch’s garden and yet wails when Miss Gulch takes him away could be read facially as 
exactly that – a child too careless to be a “responsible pet owner” yet who sees the little 
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animal as her best friend and confidant. Of course, we might at first imagine that the very 
notion of “responsible pet ownership” is much in line with a heteronormative take on the 
world.  Nevertheless, in the larger cultural sense, one can see the queering of the cult of the 
child in the surge of sentimentalism surrounding companion animals like dogs and cats. In 
just the past decade these animals have gone from being “family pets” to being “part of the 
family,” entitled often to the same medical, nutritional, and lay comforts as the humans in the 
house in which the animal lives.  This has extended beyond mere medical and nutritional 
issues, however; companion animals are now not only covered by health insurance and fed 
“human-grade” refrigerated food but are now being addressed as and treated as children, 
explicitly and with great evident enjoyment and psychic investment.  How does this impact 
our thinking about Edelman, when he asks “What…would it signify not to be ‘fighting for 
children’?  How, then, to take the other ‘side’ when to take a side at all necessarily constrains 
one to take the side of, by virtue of taking side within, a political framework that 
compulsively returns to the child as the privileged ensign of the future it intends?”106  Is this 
the Cult of the Child writ larger, expanding out to encompass companion animals?  It would 
seem not, under the rubric of the queer uncanny.  In fact, it would seem that quite the opposite
is true when responding to Edelman.  With companion animals there can be little projection 
into the future, given that most companion animals are likely to live no longer than twenty
years (and more likely to live just ten).  It would seem that the sentimentalization and 
anthropomorphism of the companion animal can be quite queer and is so for Dorothy Gale; it 
is a willful dis-recognition of the future as a projection, mechanism, or time by which to 
structure one’s current psychic and political investments.  Knowing that the companion 
animal with whom one identifies, whom one treats as a “member of the family” or as a “best 
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friend,” will most certainly die before oneself, that it will not produce off-spring (or, in the 
case of those animals who do reproduce, the off-spring will likely not “advance” or “further” 
the dreams, political or otherwise, of the companion animal or its human), and has little if no 
agency to affect any change on the future.107  Indeed, for many companion animal lovers like 
Dorothy, the value of the companion animal is precisely its present-ness. Dorothy has no 
interest in the rutting pigs or the chicks that will one day produce eggs and likely end up in the 
skillet.  The companion animal does not deny the future or embrace it; it simply does not 
recognize the future in any meaningful way.  This future-innocence of the companion animal
then enables the human to mark off a very particularized and limited domain of time.  This is 
very similar to the way that Edelman understands the place of the queer in the regim  of 
reproductive futurity: unimportant, irrelevant, and unrecognized, except as that which is to be 
avoided.  Is the growing love of companion animals evidence of an embrace of the queer by 
proxy, a co-optation of the present-centeredness of the sinthomosexual without the complete 
evacuation of an attendant future?  For Dorothy Gale, this is precisely the role Toto fills.  He 
is Dorothy, but less confined to human rules, less subject to the reproductive arc of the farm 
and of Dorothy’s own developing body.   
Finally, we reach a point of our survey that deals with dislogic, an element of both the 
uncanny and queer.  We are referring of course to an dislogic that is only illogical according 
to the criteria of normativity and, more particularly, reproductive futurity, a logic that 
demands that things be one thing and not another, that we see the world in binaries and that 
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we privilege one half of the binary over the other, that we see the world as linear and 
progressing toward an horizon.  An element of this, implicit in the definition but oft 
overlooked in application, is that whatever is perceived as the queer uncanny might have been 
experienced before.  Nicolas Royle lauds Kaja Silverman for sharply addressing this point in 
her early work on Freud’s “Fetishism” essay.  Responding to Freud’s assertion that most 
males experience castration anxiety at the sight of the female genitals, Silverman aptly notes 
that 
According to the terms of Freud’s own argument, if the spectacle of 
female castration strikes the male viewer as ‘uncanny,’ he himself 
must already have experienced castration; far from functioning 
merely as an ‘innocent’ (albeit horrified) onlooker, he too inhabits the 
frame of the unpleasurable image.  In other words, the recurrence of 
the word uncanny in the essay on fetishism reminds us that even 
before the so-called castration-crisis, the male subject has an intimate 
knowledge of loss – that he undergoes numerous divisions or 
splittings prior to the moment at which he is made to fear the loss of 
his sexual organ.108  
Though writing in a different vein, Silverman’s holding Freud to the “terms of his own 
argument” is instructive for my analysis as well, as is her conclusion that the subject 
“undergoes numerous divisions or splitting prior to the moment” in which the uncanny arises.  
In Oz, it is certainly clear to the viewer that the main characters – the Witch, the Lion, the 
Scarecrow, and the Tin Man and the Wizard – have referents in Kansas, so why is it that
Dorothy does not instantly make or acknowledge the connection between these two worlds? 
She does not see the Scarecrow, Tin Man, Lion, the Wicked Witch of the West, or the Great 
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and powerful Oz as doubles or doppelgangers of people in Kansas, although she does several 
times allude to feeling like she has known her traveling companions for a long time.  
Kansas is not her fully realized and specific frame of reference in Oz; instead, her 
experience of Kansas collapses in upon and – uncannily – reemerges as that which must be 
sought after, as the spatial desire-object which serves as a synecdoche for a range of affective 
and physical experiences, as a (re)presentation of itself.  Dorothy loses Kansas as a specific 
frame of reference or as an experience-structuring framework; instead Kansas becomes a 
fetishized object, the place to where Dorothy wants to return but which she discovers she had 
in herself the entire time.  Kansas, then, is not simply a place (although it most certainly that); 
it is also a subject position. 
 Although Dorothy does to some small extent experience the uncanny when she 
acknowledges feeling that she somehow already knows the Scarecrow, Tin Man, and Lion, it 
is on her return to Kansas that the queer uncanny strikes: ”And you -- and you -- and you -- 
and you were there.” The element of fear and death which often characterizes the uncanny for 
Freud (and which he understands as the fear of castration in his analysis of Hoffmann’s 
“Sandman”) is found in the bewildered refusal of the farmhands to acknowledge their 
presence in Oz and a refusal to allow Dorothy to claim her time in Oz as authentic.  Dorothy’s 
frantic assertions that Oz was indeed a quite real place are met with respons  that bewilder 
her.  She is, in essence, looking around her bed and remembering Oz in the eye of her mind 
and experiencing the castration of both, feeling at once both deeply connected and deeply 
estranged from them all.  But as in Silverman’s observation, Dorothy is not looking upon the 
scene as an “innocent” onlooker but rather with an “intimate knowledge” of her own.  The 
castration of Dorothy’s experience with Oz is not surprising, and even though it seems based 
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in an authentic disbelief on the part of the farmhands and relatives gathered around he bed,
such disbelief does not lessen the severity and the integrity of the heterosexual schema at 
work in the scene, insisting that Dorothy give up what she knows is true in favor of the 
collective denial of the power of her own knowledge in favor of the collective acceptnc  and 
upholding of the authoritarian framework of the worldview we know as reproductive futurity. 
 If in the standard sense of the uncanny, dolls and automatons can produce this 
feeling, then certainly we can understand the Scarecrow and Tin Man in this vein.  And it is 
not much of a further stretch to understand the Cowardly Lion as something “not quite 
human” because he is an animal with very human-like qualities, the Wicked Witch of the 
West similarly because as a witch her status as human is suspect (in much the same way as a 
vampire, zombie, or alien), and the Great and Powerful Oz because he is a projected 
disembodied head.  Each of these five is in some way “other than” human and hence likely to
produce feelings of the uncanny.  The queer uncanny is the extension of this feeling, th  
turning it on itself in the closing scene in which the people who surround Dorothy while she 
comes back to consciousness in Kansas become the “less than humans” because they look like 
familiar, friendly, known entities but they refuse to believe her story or to grant her agency 
and in this way become quite inhuman.  Where we  might typically locate the uncanny in the 
Oz sequences in which the viewer and to a lesser extent Dorothy feel that they somehow 
already know these characters, it is not until the closing scenes back in Kansas that the queer 
uncanny erupts, replicas of replicas, experiences of experiences. 
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The Girl and the Witch 
 It must be remembered that in the film, Dorothy is a child, and children are largely 
understood as unformed and in process toward adulthood.  This currently popular 
understanding of children fits most popular interpretations of The Wizard of Oz as the tale of a 
little girl lost who matures into adult via a fantastical journey.  Bruhm and Hurley also point 
us to the possibility that Dorothy is a queer child, not simply a happy heterosexual farm girl 
coming of age with only her aging relatives and three mature male farmhands through which 
to negotiate her burgeoning sexuality.  As a queer child, Dorothy straddles the line b tween 
immaturity and maturity, between normalcy and queerness, much as she straddles he fence 
between the pig sties and ends up falling.  “What is the effect of projecting the child into a 
heteronormative future? One effect is that we accept the teleology of the child (and narrative 
itself) as heterosexually determined… The very effort to flatten the narrative of the child into 
a story of innocence has some queer effects.  Childhood itself is afforded a modicu  f 
queerness when the people worry more about how the child turns out than how the child 
exists as a child.”109 Although in the text and illustrations for the novel, Dorothy is a pre-
adolescent twelve year-old, Dorothy’s age in the film is unclear.  Clearly she is supposed to 
be a child (otherwise, at this time in American history, it is likely she would be married and 
on a farmstead of her own), but the ample bosom and hips of the adult actress (Judy Garland) 
betrays that, suggesting perhaps that not only Dorothy’s psyche but her body are being 
queered.   
 I focus on Dorothy not only because she is the main character in the film but 
because she seems to be struggling between the position of reproductive futurity that l fe on 
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the farm, surrounded by the monthly and yearly cycles of reproduction, by the parental rol s 
of Uncle Henry and Aunt Em, and by the potentially fertile masculine energies of the three 
hired hands (but most especially of the tellingly named Hunk) and the position of the 
sinthomosexual which she seems rather to cotton to, due in part perhaps to her youthful 
exuberance or in part to her isolated rural situation.   For all the fecundity represented by the 
rutting pigs and the baby chicks, Kansas is portrayed as startlingly sterile and barren: only a 
couple of scrawny trees, a dry creek bed, a front yard in name only but really just dirt 
separated from other dirt by a fence.  The reproductive cycles of the farm do not emerge from 
the land itself or from nature but from the postman who delivers baby chicks that must be kept 
alive and from the sties that keep the hogs and boars separated until rutting time.  Kansas is 
presented as flat and filled with sharply geometric angles – the angles of the fences, the angle-
ridden shot of the tree in the foreground as Dorothy arrives home, the straight juts of the 
electricity poles shooting into the sky while advancing into the horizon, all laid out on a 
landscape that is as sharply divided between sky and ground as any lesson in artistic 
perspective would be.  Even Auntie Em and Uncle Henry are linear and angular.  This 
geometry, as Salman Rushdie has noted, is accompanied by a mathematical theme in t 
counting of baby chicks, suggesting that life here in Kansas is ordered, précised, on a tight 
schedule.110  
 This geometric-mathematic preciseness is radically disrupted by the Dorothy 
herself, a rather rounded and fecund example of femininity with her plump cheeks, ample 
bosom, and rounded body, and by the swirling, twirling cyclone itself.   Both Dorothy and the 
cyclone are disruptive forces on the ordered, parse farmstead.  Both distract people from what 
needs to be done, both are forces of nature that seem uncontrollable, both are in some sense, 
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unpredictable, flying about the farm, rustling up dust and distraction.  This is bet een in 
Auntie Em’s admonition to Dorothy to “help us out today, and find yourself a place where
you won't get into any trouble” for Dorothy is a pest, running around the farmstead, disrupting 
the ordered and future-oriented work of the farm -- the counting of chicks, the repairing of 
fences, the sheltering of farm animals in the face of coming bad weather.   Dorothy does not 
seem to have any chores to do and she exhibits little desire to be a part of the ritualistic life of 
the farm; indeed she seems to disrupt it at every turn, often without apparent intent, so 
focused is she upon her own concerns over Toto and his transgressions into the garden of 
Miss Gulch. 
 Indeed, Dorothy’s behavior is an aggression against the workaday farm doings, not 
simply asserting her own concerns over Toto and the threatening Gulch but to actually
interrupt and disrupt the work of the farm, first by taking baby chicks out of the batch to be 
counted and then by balancing on the fence between two pig sties and losing her balance, 
upsetting both the pigs and the farmhands.  Her responses to her aunt and uncle and to the 
farmhands might simply be youthful cheek but are also be read as the assertive dismissal or 
displeasure of a sinthomosexual seeking something that those around her unknowingly refuse 
to provide.  Let us be clear, though.  The sinthomosexual is not always of the Ebenezer 
Scrooge sort, misanthropic and hermetic; Dorothy is nothing if not social, as she scurri s 
around the farm attempting to solicit the attention of anyone who will listen and clearly, loved 
even if she is in the way.  Unlike Ebenezer Scrooge, before his multi-ghost conversi 
experience, Dorothy is determinedly social, deliberately connected to the people and beings in 
her environment.  This suggests that queer is not necessarily anti-social in the se se of being 
alone, solitary, or separated out but may be anti-social in the sense of using connections with 
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other beings in multiple ways, one of those ways being in the advancement of a non-futurity 
worldview, among but not of.  Even as Dorothy strolls around the farm yard aching for 
attention to be paid her distress, she is still quite relaxed and her behavior insouciat.  Both 
her body and her words belie her desperation, as she lounges next to the chick incubator, 
whimsically teeters on the fence, and casually complains, “Just because Toto chases her old 
cat…” before eventually leaning against a plow and launching into the wistful ballad, “Over 
the Rainbow.” 
 An interesting take on childhood and the notion of “growing up” is Kathryn Bond 
Stockton’s notion of “growing sideways,” a phrase Stockton uses to indicate the possibility of 
avoiding the standard cultural teleology of birth, maturation, marriage, reproduction, death 
and instead focusing on the multiple ways that children (and actually a human of any age) 
might meander, move backwards, linger, or delay.111 Stockton indicates that this growing 
sidewise may be endemic to childhood itself as the human mind develops but is also both the 
motivation for and the result of societal restrictions on childhood.  Dorothy in many wys 
physically embodies this growing sideways as her form seems to fill out rather than up, as her 
concerns seem other-based rather than farm-focused.112  
 Some commentators have suggested that the tornado is the result of Dorothy’s 
having witnessed the primal scene – that is, that Dorothy walked in on Auntie Em and Uncle 
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Henry in the midst of coitus and deals with the trauma of this unexpected sighting by creating 
the twister as a “remarkably apt representation of the paternal phallus in its wollen, twisting, 
penetrating state, which is part of the primal scene.”113 Miss Gulch on her bicycle and the 
Wicked Witch of the West on her broomstick then become “phallic mothers” who while 
troubling are more easily psychically manageable than the “enormous and persecuting phallic-
like column [the tornado] seen earlier making its way toward Dorothy’s house.”114 While this 
would certainly fit within a Freudian framework of psychosexual development, the film does 
not provide the viewer adequate evidence to support this interpretation.  While in the Baum 
novel, Dorothy shares a one-room shack with her family, in the film it is apparent that the 
farmhouse is sufficiently large to offer Dorothy her own bedroom and there is little overt 
evidence that any such sighting has occurred, either literally or figuratively, and more 
germane to the analysis at hand is that it situates the film within an heterocentric ontext in 
which Dorothy’s task is development as a fully sexualized heterosexual. 
Let us also take a long hard look at this Wicked Witch of the West, with her bony 
hands and face, her sharpened nails, her distressingly severe black couture and her shockingly 
green skin.  She is a far cry from good old domestic Auntie Em in her suitable pocketed apron 
and hair done up in an out-of-the way bun; this Witch is female but not necessarily a woman.  
Alexander Doty suggests that the witch is a big butch dyke, and the moniker is apt when we 
consider the historical studies linking lesbianism (or at least a non-heterosexual uality) 
with witchcraft.115  I depart from Doty in a significant way, not so much in the form of 
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disagreeing with his brilliant and creative analysis, but in applying a different theoretical 
parameter to the film.   Where Doty sees Glinda and the Wicked Witch as opposites in a 
“division of lesbianism into the good femme-inine and the bad butch,” I read this divide much 
more divisively and from a more decidedly queer theoretical approach in which the two 
witches are not simply lesbian options between which Dorothy must choose as she develops 
her own lesbian identity.116 Rather the choice is between the reproductive futurity represented 
by Glinda or the non-reproductive a-futurity of the Wicked Witch of the West 117 
It is the Wicked Witch who stands out; it is the Wicked Witch who proclaims her own 
‘beautiful wickedness’ and is never muddled in either her desire for the ruby slipper  or the 
avenues that she will pursue to obtain her prize.  In this way, the Wicked Witch is not simply 
challenging patriarchal power by being a woman who knows; she is challenging reproductive 
futurism, invested in her own beautiful wickedness, intent on her goal, willing to sacrifice all 
without any apparent engaging in the fantasy of a future.  It may of course be said that she is 
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invested in some sort of future, elsewise why care about the ruby slippers? But the film does 
not tell us what the shoes do or what ends they might achieve and we are left with the 
possibility that the Wicked Witch wants them simply for the sake of having them.  The ruby 
slippers are symbols for Dorothy’s genitals, Dorothy’s youth, Dorothy’s vitality, but the 
Witch never declares what use-value she finds in the slippers and we can only assume that she 
desires them for no other reason than because she desires them.  But even should the Wicked 
Witch have a purpose for the shoes, this does not place her into the linearity of reproductive 
futurity because the shoes seem to be useful only in furthering her own “beautifully w cked” 
goals, which do not seem in any way to be connected to a politics or a desire-system outside 
of her own aims.   
 Such single-sighted pursuit of pleasure cannot be simply ignored but, if the social 
order is to stand and is to continue to make sense, must not be ignored.   It must be confronted 
and either converted (as is the case with Ebenezer Scrooge) or destroyed (as with the Wicked 
Witch).   In much the same way that A Christmas Carol is read or recited annually as an 
affirming message of the value of “God bless us every one,” so too is The Wizard of Oz 
shown annually on television and celebrated annually at multiple sites around the countryand 
rereleased on the big screen or in collector’s editions as the sine qua non of the 
quintessentially American film.  But unlike A Christmas Carol, which is trucked out annually 
to coincide with the perversely insistent command that we “keep Christmas well,” Th  Wizard 
of Oz is a-seasonal, brought forth anytime we want to reaffirm that there’s no place like home.  
But just as Ebenezer Scrooge’s refusal to participate in the genealogical cycle of family and 
children earns him the scorn of his nephew and his employee and a rather long and sleepless 
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night, so too does the Wicked Witch earn our collective derisive focus and our  collective 
fascination with her ultimate demise. 
 Almira Gulch and the Wicked Witch of the West are cut of the same cloth, beholden 
not to family or children or the pursuits of the common person but rather to keeping 
Christmas in their own way, steering quite clear of the warm-blooded, earthy vitality of the 
farm, of the hearth, of the family structures that are so central to the story.  Miss Gulch is the 
sinthomosexual in what we can fairly imagine to be a world of insular families in this Kansas 
landscape, and her bike, her basket, and her bank account are her own.  As farm hand Hickory 
advised Dorothy “She's just a poor sour-faced old maid that -- she ain't got no heart left.  You 
know, you should have a little more heart yourself, and have pity on her.” In other words, 
Miss Gulch is less than fully human, quite queer, and Hunk warns Dorothy that she too is 
veering too far in that direction and should take care.  In the opening scene, the sheriff to 
which Miss Gulch appeals and the writ he issues to confiscate Toto are the Name-of-the-
Father but it is Miss Gulch who is the less than human vessel and avenue by which the law is 
applied.  She represents the law but the harsh cold letter of the law, a law that signifies solely 
for the purpose of signifying, insisting upon itself to such an extent that it questions and 
nearly disrupts the entire Symbolic order, which depends for its existence on a certain 
relationality, a certain relativism of connection, a reiterability.   Gulch is t e double of the law 
that one normally encounters, law which rests on reason and that has a purpose; Gulch’s law 
is castrated of any purpose other than insistent application.   The cold logic of this application 
of the law leaves no room for affect, no room for the accident or the excuse, no room for 
anything but its own insistent self-pleasure.   In a sense then this application of the law itself 
is sinthomosexual-like in that it insists upon itself, a logic so cold and insistet self-
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aggrandizing that it reeks of nonsensicality, a nearly irreverent jouissance in its own 
unavoidable logic.   Indeed, Aunt Em recognizes this most dramatically when she tell  Miss 
Gulch: “Almira Gulch, just because you own half the county doesn't mean you have the 
power to run the rest of us! For twenty-three years, I've been dying to tell y u what I thought 
of you!  And now -- well, being a Christian woman, I can't say it!” So fraught wit  the un-
understandability of the almost joyful way that Gulch imposes her will and takes no account 
of the feelings of a child, of an orphan no less, Aunt Em can do nothing in the face of such 
sheer, inexorable joy except stutter and rebuff herself from saying that which ould wreck the 
Christian sanctity of the tiny, well-kept farm and family. 
 
There Is No Home: Dislogic in the Final Scene  
The power of the queer uncanny and its epistemological implications is felt most 
powerfully at the conclusion of the film and the final scenes as Dorothy prepares to leave Oz 
and return to Kansas and as she awakens back in the bedroom of the farmhouse.  These two 
scenes are regularly read sentimentally and in a manner that supports a heteronormative 
approach to reproduction and kinship.  But the film itself does not so easily bend toward such 
a reading; in fact, the film itself is quite queer and the concluding scenes do not flow naturally 
or automatically from the preceding narrative events but are instead quite illogical, evincing a 
return of the repressed even in these final moments of the film. 
The ultimate deviation from the Baum novel is the concluding sequence when 
Dorothy is back in her bedroom in Kansas, surrounded by her aunt and uncle and the 
farmhands.   In this scene Dorothy, though insisting that Oz was a real place, also seems to 
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affirm that home is the best place to be.118 The concept of home and the sentiments 
surrounding this word are rarely out of vogue but never so much in vogue than during times 
of national and international strife.119 
One of the central themes of The Wizard of Oz is surely home: a desire to run away 
from home, actually leaving home, and wanting to return home.  The notion of home is 
complicated and can refer to multiple ideas, including the brick and mortar dwelling in which 
one lives and sleeps, the base camp for daily life, but also of physical or political lands, cities, 
nations, or planets.  But home also refers to a complex system of ideas about being and 
belonging, about self and others, about familiarity, about past, present, and future, about place 
in the most epistemological of ways.120 Home is a through-line in American cultural thought.  
Some have argued that the notion of not having a home, being homeless or rootless, is akin to 
being “unsound, and, worse, unreliable, unsavory.”121  While this may be true when applied to 
the truly homeless and the truly rootless, it is more complicated in American culture when we 
                                                          
118 Critics of the film rightfully cite this closing sentiment as being n direct opposition to Baum’s 
novel in which ‘home’ is not necessarily seen as the best place to be or stay for in the novel, Dorothy 
not only stays in Oz but brings Uncle Henry and Aunt Em into Oz too. 
119 Part of the reasoning for this rather maudlin conclusory sentiment in the film is likely the time 
period in which the film was made, in the years of the Great Depression.  (For exampl , in Meet Me in 
St.  Louis (1944; Vincente Minelli), released just five years after Oz, main character Esther Smith 
played by Judy Garland ends the film by observing that “I can’t believe it, righ  here where we live, 
right here in St.  Louis!” Similarly, in Gone with the Wind (1939; Victor Fleming), released the same 
year as The Wizard of Oz, Scarlett O’Hara closes the film swearing her undying devotion to her quest
to return home to Tara: “After all, tomorrow is another day.”   
120Among others, see Darke, Jane.  “Women and the Meaning of Home.”  Housing Women.  Eds. 
Rose Gilroy and Roberta Woods.  London: Routledge, 1994.  9-25; Després, Carole.  “The Meaning of 
Home: Literature Review and Directions for Future Research and Theoretical Development.” Journal 
of Architectural and Planning Research 8.2 (Sum 1991): 96-115; Mallett, Shelley.  “Understanding 
Home: A Critical Review of the Literature.” The Sociological Review 52.1 (Feb 2004): 62–89.; 
Marcus, Clare Cooper.  House as a Mirror of Self: Exploring the Deeper Meaning of Home.  Berwick, 
ME: Nicolas-Hays, 1995.   
121 Sopher, David.  “The Landscape of Home: Myth, Experience, Social Meaning.” The Interpretation 
of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays.  Ed. Donald W. Meinig.  New York: Oxford Univ 
Press, 1979.  129-152.  134. 
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consider the themes of exploration, frontier, adventure, and quest, all of which suggest a 
fundamental ambivalence in American culture toward home and not-home.   
In a discussion of the concept “home” in relation to Christmas, Paul Nathanson 
discusses three ways of thinking about home.122 First there is the idea of being or staying at 
home, indicative of a certain level of contentment and stability but also with the possibility of 
discovering that one is “already” home or is “at home” in a place that is not the concrete and 
supposedly originary site.  Second is the idea of “restoring home,” which suggests a 
significant loss/dislocation often involving trauma or material obstacles and the subsequent 
return or recreation of home with a consequent resolving of the initial abnormality.  Finally 
there is the idea of “going home” or “returning home,” which usually includes a current or 
temporary (and non-traumatic, non-dislocated) “home” that is lacking something that the 
“true home” has.  In this sense, “returning home” is often sentimental and nostalgic, about 
reviving earlier memories or recreating a familial atmosphere.  Nathanson next associates 
these various notions of “home” with the idea of “growing up” because so both are associated 
with family, whether biological or not, as children are born into a family of some sort and 
traverse through a “series of stages such as weaning, going to school, coming of age, 
marriage, and death,” “leav[ing] home precisely to establish new homes of their own [so that 
the] generational cycle is complete [and a] new one has begun.”123 For Nathanson, then, the 
success of the project depends precisely on the integration of past-home into the continuation 
of the generational cycle in the new-home. 
This all too heteronormative and cyclical teleology fails to account for the queer
subject who stands outside the generational cycle, and it takes us too quickly down the 
                                                          
122 Nathanson, Paul.  Over the Rainbow: The Wizard of Oz as a Secular Myth of America.  Albany 
NY: State Univ Press of New York, 1991.  322-325. 
123 Nathanson, Over the Rainbow, 327-328.  Emphasis added. 
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common path of reading The Wizard of Oz as a maturation tale in which childish Dorothy 
overcomes obstacles in preparation for establishing a new home of her own.  There is a final 
concept of home that Nathanson identifies as an afterthought but fails to investigate: the 
notion of dying as “going home.”  While Nathanson means this in the sense of being called 
home and of having a heavenly home that surpasses the earthly home, the idea of dying as 
“home” is most relevant to an understanding of the position of the queer subject for it 
suggests that the queer subject as “undead” exists in a heavenly or more advancd home right 
here in this life, raising the possibility that the queer subject’s access to jouissance is always, 
already achieved and incurring both the fear and jealousy of the non-queer subject, who 
remains desirous of jouissance but fearful of its impenetrable depth. 
It is this final closing scene that is most telling and which cues us to read the entire 
film as a statement of the queer uncanny.  Hélène Cixous has referred to footnotes as 
“typographical metaphor[s] of repression,” elements of a text that refuse ref sal, instead 
returning, interrupting, erupting on the page.”124 It strikes me that the dénouement scenes of 
many films (and novels) operate in the same way.  Post-climax concluding sce es, taking 
place after boy kisses girl, after criminal is caught, after the witch is killed, often feel ‘tacked 
on’ and it is not unusual for movie-goers and readers to skip or skim these last few minutesor 
pages; yet it is often in these closing scenes that that repressed themes of the films and novels 
emerge most fully through careful attentive analysis.  In The Wizard of Oz, though, it is in this 
last scene that the conflict of the film arises.  The epistemological violence in this scene is 
perhaps the most striking of any in the entire film.  What we see in this concluding scene i  an 
enforcement of the normative, a refusal in the face of the queer uncanny, a denial so cert in 
and so unrelenting that it is almost unbearable to watch.  Dorothy’s begging plea of “Doesn’t 
                                                          
124 Cixous, “Fiction and Its Phantoms,”  537. 
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anybody believe me” is answered not by the pointedly harsh non/no of refusal that we would 
expect of “the law” (a la Miss Gulch) but rather with the sweetly delivered lie: “Of course we 
believe you, Dorothy.” The response shuts down the communicative lines of discourse, 
effectively placing Dorothy in the position of the infantile subject who does not and cannot 
know her own experiences authentically or with authority, who must be swaddled in false 
reassurance until such time as she can be brought back into the fold.   
 The entire narrative hinges on Dorothy’s supposed desire to return home and much has 
been made of how her journey through Oz is a process of maturation.  But it would seem that 
the situation in Oz is enviable and much desirable in contrast to bleak old Kansas.  Dorothy’s 
experience on the farm is not initially represented as idyllic or joyous.  Auntie Em chastises 
Dorothy for disrupting the chicken count, no one seems to take Dorothy’s tale of woe 
seriously, and Dorothy tells Toto that he is her only friend.  Combined with the stark, gr y 
landscape, there does not seem to be much to be desired in this scenario.  And in Oz the two 
wicked witches are dead, the citizens of the Emerald City welcome Dorothy and her 
companions as their new leaders, the trickery of the Wizard himself has been exposed with no 
negative repercussions.  It seems that troubles have “melted like lemon drops” in thi  place 
and it is clear that Dorothy has both accomplished more than she has ever accomplished (or 
been allowed to accomplish) and made some enduring friendships here in this world.  Yet, she
persists in wanting to return home.  Is it possible that this land has become too normative for 
Dorothy? Is it possible that queer-Dorothy is so queer that she must leave Oz to scape the 
normative family structures that have developed, casting her as matriarch? When Dorothy 
first arrives in Oz she is the odd-one-out, the sole human in a land of strange beauty and even 
strangers beings.  She encounters oddities unlike any she has seen before.  She is asked to do 
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things that seem far beyond the reach of a simple teen-aged Kansas farm girl.  But as the film 
progresses, Dorothy’s familiarity and facility with the language and mores of Oz increases to 
the point where it seems there is no further grit required, no challenge, no skating on thin ice
left to do.  There are no more ‘accidents’ to have in this world; rather, she is now expected to 
operate as mother-figure extraordinaire, overseeing the people of Oz with beneficence and 
skill.  Maybe Dorothy wants the hell out because what began as the queerest place has 
become quite non-queer and therefore quite uninteresting for queer-Dorothy. 
 Consider Dorothy’s comments as she prepares to leave Oz and contemplates what she 
has learned:  
“Well, I -- I think that it -- that it wasn't enough just to want to see 
Uncle Henry and Auntie Em -- and it's that – if I ever go looking for 
my heart's desire again, I won't look any further than my own 
backyard.   Because if it isn't there, I never really lost it to begin with!
Is that right?” 
Immediately Dorothy distances herself from kinship ties (“it wasn’t enough j st to 
want to see Uncle Henry and Auntie Em”), removing herself from the familial te eology 
suggested in some interpretations of the film that understand Dorothy’s journey to be ab ut an 
ultimate return to adult reproduction on the farm, to take over Auntie Em’s role as matriarch.  
Dorothy’s thinking focuses on her own individual capacities and limitations, quite separate 
from her family.     
 This brief self-reflection is generally interpreted as meaning that Dorothy’s desire to 
go somewhere over the rainbow, to escape the stultifying loneliness of the farmstead was 
misguided, that her dreams of other places were the fanciful wishes of a child, that she now 
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realizes and values her ‘own backyard.’ The mature, adult lesson is one of simple rational 
materialist economics: Feel wistful, unwanted, or desirous? Look around at the life you’v  
got.  If that doesn’t satisfy, then your wishes and desires are wrong and you should be 
satisfied with what you’ve got or else realign your desires to match your circumstances.   
 But when we look at Dorothy’s pondering more closely we can sense a different and 
much more queer thread informing her thinking.  Her comments seem ‘of the moment,’ 
invented on the spot, the words of a very queer person uttering the language of the normative 
in order to escape.  When asked “what have you learned” Dorothy’s response comes in fits 
and starts at first (“Well I – I think that -- …”), sounding as if it is being i vented on the spot 
and not at all like the mature self-reflection that some interpretations of the film suggest it is.  
Dorothy’s quick glances around as she speaks, her clipped cadence which increases in 
swiftness as she works up her lie, her rushed and excited conclusion (“Because if it wasn’t 
there…!”) all suggest that this is subterfuge.  And then she expresses the ultimate question 
betraying herself not as an unsure child but as a queer making sure she utters the corect 
passwords: “Is that right?” She wants to leave but she knows she must say the magic words so 
that she will not be detained.  She uses the expected language of normalcy to achieve her own 
ends.    
 It is also of import that Dorothy’s professed lesson learned from her trials and 
travails in Oz is that “if I ever go looking for my heart's desire again, I won't look any further 
than my own backyard.   Because if it isn't there, I never really lost it to begin with!” Odd that 
someone who has claimed to want to go “home” instead uses the word “backyard” to 
capsulate what she has learned.  We might usefully play out the resonances of the word 
backyard in contrast to its opposite, front yard and in relation to the structure they bracket, the 
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house.  The front yard is the public face of a house, fenced, maintained, orderly, manicured.  
It is the super-ego of a homestead, the perfect, demanding face, which the house and backyar
can never live up to.  The back yard is id, the less-kept, messy area, the location of the back 
porch, the boundary between yard and house, where muddy boots come off, where panting 
dogs and messy children play, where the detritus of life untamed by the superego 
accumulates, occasionally tracking into the house.  The ego is the house, the consructed 
center that houses the self, the place where the self dwells and makes itself presentable before 
walking out the front door into the crisp light of the front yard’s demands, the structure that 
always seems at any moment ready to succumb to the messiness of the back yard.  While 
Dorothy’s lesson-learned comment seems at first glance to be admitting defeat and suggests 
that she recognizes now how silly and even infantile she was to wish for something over the 
rainbow, closer inspection tells us that Dorothy has just learned about the chthonic power in 
her own self and how to commit subterfuge in the face of normative expectations.  We find 
that Dorothy is recognizing queer potential as something that is always already present and 
not something ‘out there’ that must be sought.  This notion of the queer is important because 
it forces us to recognize ‘queer’ not as a position or approach that one seeks and adopts but as 
a force in itself, present and possible in each moment in every context.  Dorothy’s comments, 
then, do not necessarily mean that she realizes the folly of longing for what is ‘over the 
rainbow’ but rather that she now recognizes the queerness that was already existent in her life 
on the farm, in her own backyard. 
 We might wonder, too, at the dismay Dorothy expresses at leaving her traveling 
companions.  Is it disingenuous? Is she weeping fake tears as she tells her friends goodbye? 
Not necessarily, because Dorothy’s queerness does not require her to abandon all human 
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emotions.  It simply gives her license to look beyond these intimate relationships as the sole 
means of satisfying herself and gives her an additional lens for analyzing relationships and 
their value to her.  Her heartfelt goodbyes are a bittersweet recognition that her friends are no 
longer fulfilling her biggest needs; witness what she says to the Lion: “Goodbye, Lion.   You 
know, I know it isn't right, but I'm going to miss the way you used to holler for help before 
you found your courage.” Here Dorothy breaks character a moment and let’s on that she 
knows the rules and how to ‘talk right’ but she can’t help revealing that what she liked about 
the lion was his weakness, his fragility.  Now that the Lion is self-assured, he’s much less 
interesting to queer-Dorothy. 
 More to the point of the queer uncanny is the mantra that Glinda instructs Dorothy t 
repeat as she clicks the heels of the ruby slippers together: “There’s no place like home.” The 
dominant interpretation of this adage offers the comforting yet rather banal idea that “home” 
is a special and desirable place, a good and welcoming place unlike any other.  But this idea is 
not on the face of the adage nor is it supported by the narrative of the film.  Taken as truth, the 
adage would suggest a negative connotation; truly there are few places as dismal, stark, and 
unwelcoming as the Gale acreage, where Dorothy is perceived as a pest and a  a disruption to 
the workings of the farm, where her only friend is her little dog, and where the sky is not blue 
but brown, where dreams are dismissed as evidence of laziness, where troubles do not seem to 
melt like lemon drops but indeed chase Dorothy down and vow to kill her best friend.  What 
exactly makes this a desirable place to be or to which to return?  
 Taking this even further, though, it is evident that what Dorothy might be realizing is 
that there is no “home” at all, no center, no safe space, not site in which to feel that all is well 
and familiar.  “There’s no place like home” means something rather different when the 
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emphasis is place on ‘no place.’ There is no place that is like or can be home.  This is much 
more in keeping with the queer uncanny in which those very places that should be or seem 
most home-like (that is, familiar) are the very places that prove to be the most disquieting, 
unfamiliar, and unwelcoming.  This is evident in the open scenes of the film in which Dorothy 
approaches her nearest kin, appearing to expect understanding and support and receivig
instead dismissal.  When she approaches the farmhands, who might be understood as 
underlings owing some attention to their ostensible superior or understood as friend of a sort 
for a young girl, she is again dismissed, albeit with jocularity and what seems like genuine 
affection.  When we then add to this mix that Dorothy is also alone in the sense of being an 
orphan, living on an isolated farmstead, we begin to see that the very notion of ‘home’ must 
mean something quite different to Dorothy than the conventional wisdom would have it.  
When Dorothy demands that her experience Oz, the place from which she has returned 
“wasn’t a dream – it was a place […] a real, truly live place,” she is recognizing the 
multivalency of experience and she is challenging the firm separation between dream and 
what we think of as ‘reality.’ This affront to the ontology expressed by the other farmstead 
characters (“Oh, we dream lots of silly things…”) is not resolved easily.  When Dorothy 
continues to plead her case, crying out, “Doesn’t anybody believe me?” the response he gets 
from Uncle Henry clearly doesn’t satisfy her: 
    DOROTHY 
  Doesn't anybody believe me? 
 
    UNCLE HENRY 
  Of course we believe you, Dorothy. 
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    DOROTHY 
  Oh, but anyway, Toto, we're home! 
 
Dorothy acts as if Uncle Henry has contradicted her.  She senses the insincr ty underlying his 
facial agreement about the reality of Oz and she dismisses it, turning once again to the best 
friend she has.  This replays the earlier conversation between Dorothy and Hunk, whe  
Dorothy complains that Miss Gulch is after Toto again and Hunk tells Dorothy to avoid Miss 
Gulch’s garden by taking a different path home.  When Dorothy responds, “Oh, Hunk, you  
just won’t listen, that’s all” it could be the petulant stubbornness of a child more intent o  
being heard than on being helped.  That is, in its way, an act of queerness that disrupts the 
current normative cultural notion that problems are laid out to be solved, but there is an 
additional element of queerness here and that is that Dorothy may not be asking for help but 
rather reveling in her achievement.  So when Hunk gives advice that sounds like it responds to 
Dorothy’s cry for help, he misreads her motives; similarly, when Uncle Henry benevolently 
agrees that Oz was a “real, truly live place” he is offering Dorothy the obvious response when 
what Dorothy is after seems to be something deeper, a sort of recognition that “some of [her 
experience] wasn't very nice...but most of it was beautiful.” Again, a close eye to the language 
reveals a lack of parallelism in Dorothy’s description.  She says part of it “wasn’t very nice” 
while most of it was beautiful.  One might expect Dorothy to describe parts of herexp rience 
as scary, horrifying, mean, or ugly; but she chooses instead to describe the two parts as “nice” 
and “beautiful” before then negating “nice.” This negation (wasn’t) of the positive (nice) 
places emphasis on the underlying pleasurable (or “nice”) aspects of the experince.   
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 In this chapter I have attempted to offer a reading of The Wizard of Oz that goes 
against a long tradition of reading it largely as the story of a little girl who learns a big lesson 
about being satisfied with what she’s got.  The lens of the queer uncanny has allowed us to 
look more deeply into the surficially comforting platitudes of home and our own backyards 
and to discover that within this beloved film runs a very queer message indeed.  Not only are
characters doubled, but the space from which the double occurs changes over the course of
the film.  Events that might be dismissed as childish become signals of a larger psychic 
struggle.  And the phrases that are so common that we barely hear them any more (“there’s no 
place like home”) become gateways into entirely different ways of understanding ow only 
the experience of Dorothy Gale but of ourselves.  If Dorothy is more than just a silly child and 
if over the rainbow are “real, truly live places” that exist not in conflict with but right 
alongside our own farmsteads, how might our own experiences be altered?  In what ways 
does the normative push toward a singular reproductive futurity limit our abilities to engage 
fully with our experiences? And at what cost?  The queer uncanny casts these supposedly 
irrelevant experiences into a new light and allows us to make connections that we would 
otherwise have overlooked.   
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Chapter Two 
“Alien Brains:  The Queer Uncanny, Troubling Texts, and Mysterious Skin” 
 
 
Mysterious Skin is the story of the sexual abuse of two eight-year old boys at the hands 
of their Little League coach and the differing paths of their lives over the next decade.125  
Blond, frail, inept Brian represses the entire experience at first before late  displacing it on to 
an increasingly obsessional belief that he was abducted by aliens.  Neil, on the other hand, 
precocious and sexually aware even at the age of eight, expresses enjoyment f th  sexual 
intimacy and is compelled to repeat the molestation experiences with a variety of other older 
men.  It is Brian’s search for his truth that serves as the narrative thrust of the novel, which 
unfolds as different characters (including Brian and Neil, their mothers, and two of their 
friends) add to the story in each chapter.126  This chapter takes us further into the queer 
uncanny as I focus on Scott Heim’s novel, Mysterious Skin, which is a less-known and far 
more troubling text than The Wizard of Oz.  Read by most as a tale of redemption in light of 
childhood sexual molestation, the novel is fertile ground for demonstrating the ability of the 
                                                          
125 There are a number of fictional works dealing with child molestation and/or sexual relations 
between children and adults.  Some of these have become canonical classics (e.g., Alice Walker’s The 
Color Purple, Dorothy Allison’s Bastard Out of Carolina, nd Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita).   
126 The novel is structured with a nod toward the geometry of the uncanny, which is always about 
doubling, multiplying, equating, and inverting.  The novel consists of three sections, each with six 
chapters.  In addition, the chapters within each of the three sections play off of each other in uncanny 
ways.  For example, the second chapters of the three sections are titled Neil, Eric, and Neil.  This same 
sequence (N, E, N) is replicated in the final chapters of each section.  The third chapters titled Brian, 
Brian, and Deborah are then in inverted as the fifth chapters of each of the three sections (D, B, B).  
Only the first chapter of each section is the same; Brian’s voice opens each ection.  Similarly, the 
names of two secondary characters – Neil’s friends Eric Preston and Wendy Peterson – are nearly 
anagrams for one another. 
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queer uncanny to broaden not only the available interpretative range vis-à-vis characters and 
scenes but to evoke rethinking of the cultural discourses surrounding so-called traumatic 
events.   
The novel opens as Brian Lackey reveals that “[t]he summer I was eight y ars old, 
five hours disappeared from my life.  I can’t explain.”127  Immediately a mystery of sorts is 
presented and we wonder what did happen? The queer theorist is also alerted to the 
potentiality of a queer time or sequencing in the novel.  Brian is the poster child for anti-
pedophilia campaigns:  frail, pale, blonde, with oversized glasses and a high pitched voice, the 
second child in a solidly middle-class family in rural Kansas.  The other boy, the brunette, 
vocal and forthright Neil McCormick, is much less innocent and naïve and his first 
recollection in the novel tells us that after moving four times in four years, his mother “began 
stripping.  Her clothes piled on the floor… She pranced and discoed through the rooms, a 
dance I’d grown accustomed to.”128  And upon seeing his baseball coach for the first time, 
eight year-old feels that “[d]esire sledgehammered my body, a sensation I still wasn’t sure I 
had a name for.  […] It felt like a gift I had to open in front of a crowd.”129  It seems nigh 
impossible to avoid reading these two boys as doubles of one another, if we keep in mind that 
a “double” is never a duplicate.  As the novel is structured, the two are intimately link d not 
only because of their geographic locale and their age, not by their opposite appearances and 
personalities, but by their life-altering experiences with Coach.  Like uncanny doubles, neither 
is complete unto himself (indeed, what human is, under the psychoanalytic rubric?) but is an 
admixture of knowing and not-knowing that culminates in the final scene of the novel in 
whatever mystery exists is resolved for both boys but to neither’s satisfaction. 
                                                          
127 Heim, Scott.  Mysterious Skin.  New York: Harper Perennial, 2005. 
128 Heim, 17. 
129 Heim, 22. 
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Brian, shy, inept, asexual Brian seems to be occupying the same space of (in)decision 
that Dorothy occupies in The Wizard of Oz, unsure whether to embrace the position of 
sinthomosexual or to work against it.  This indecision begins almost immediately after his 
first interaction with Coach, when his indecision is manifested physically as nosebleeds and 
fainting spells that continue through the next decade.  Unable or unwilling to destroy the 
Coach completely, Brian instead recasts him as an alien, an unknowable, shadowy, other-
worldly figure.  We might be tempted to understand the aliens in Brian’s alien abduction 
fantasies as sinthomosexuals themselves – surely there is little evidenc that they subscribe to 
the reproductive futurity that delimits the normative and the non-normative – and as stand-ins 
for Coach and his predilection for invading the bodies of others in much the same way that 
Brian believes the aliens have invaded his body. 
 
Troubling Texts: Molestation and the Trauma Model 
 The Wizard of Oz is a ubiquitous text.  In other words, if one surveyed a thousand 
people chances are very high that nearly all of those people be familiar with the film and that 
familiarity would range from those who have seen the film just once (or even not at all) but 
are still able to list iconic elements (e.g., the yellow brick road, the “there’s no place like 
home” mantra, et cetera) to those who are fervent devotees of the film, dedicating entire 
rooms of their homes to Oz and its memorabilia.  In other words, it is a text that has circulated 
so widely in culture that it now operates beyond the celluloid, and the imagery and aphorisms 
of the film circulate in culture in widely different contexts.   Mysterious Skin is a text of a 
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quite different nature.130  Only a handful of my friends and colleagues have heard of it, 
despite the favorable critical reception it received, despite its relevance to Kansas and to 
queers, and despite its having been made into a critically acclaimed film by director Gregg 
Araki.131  It is what I call a troubling text or what James Kincaid refers to as a “scandalous 
narrative.”132  Often when we apply a theory to a text or a set of circumstances it is an easy 
task insofar as the text or circumstances are not unpleasant.  But with Mysterious Skin this is 
not the case.  The subject matter is child sexual abuse, made even more so perhaps because it 
has not been wrapped in the blanket of respectability that surrounds other troubling works 
given academic consideration (e.g., Lolita, Boys Don’t Cry, and the like).133  This is perhaps 
the true test of theoretical application: applying the theoretical lens not to texts or 
circumstances that with easy comfort demonstrate the utility of the theory but to texts and 
topics that push back by virtue of their form or subject matter.   
 When we read texts we can read them from multiple points of view at once.  Personal 
anecdote might make this assertion more clear.  When I read the molestation scene between 
Coach and Neil, I am reading it through the chosen words, sentence structures, and narrative 
tools of the author of the novel.  I am also reading it, though, as a multi-faceted and splintered 
human subject who possesses, wields, and reads with multiple personal, sensory, historical, 
sexual, interpretive, and intellectual takes.  A part of reader-Milton readsthe molestation 
                                                          
130 Although this chapter is concerned with Scott Heim’s novel, director Gregg Araki’s film of the 
same name holds faithful to the novel and is visually stunning. Mysterious Skin. Dir. Gregg Araki. 
Perf. Joseph Gordon-Levitt, Brady Corbet. Desperate Pictures / Antidote Films, 2004.  99 mins. 
131 Author Scott Heim is a graduate of the University of Kansas and the novel takes place in 
Hutchinson, Kansas.  Interesting, Heim’s surname evokes thoughts of the uncanny/unheimlich.  
132 Kincaid, James R.  Child-Loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Literature.  New York: 
Routledge, 1992.  15. 
133 The academic study of a troubling text certainly does not nullify the troubling aspects of the text 
itself but under examination in the classroom, with “critical thinking” as the guiding rubric for 
discourse, potentially threatening topics are (too-) often sanitized.   
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scene, visualizes with detail the hairless body of the child with its un-developed genitals 
twisting with the developed adult body and feels nauseated, fearful, disgusted.  But another 
reader-Milton responds to the scene quite differently, recalling a moment from his own 
childhood when “desire sledgehammered” him, when at an age similar to that of Neil in the 
novel, I sat in an innocuous rural 4-H club meeting, and caught a glimpse of the tan, airy 
ankle of one of our young adult leaders.  That glimpse and the feelings it evoked in me are 
still so vivid that when I read Neil’s description of the molestation I can idetify with him.  Of 
course, this is not to suggest that I was molested or that “deep down” all children want to be 
molested.  It does raise, however, the quite Freudian assertion that sexuality and the sexual 
drives are not confined to adults or even those of reproductive age.  Sexuality, the effluent
power of desire, is inherent in the human; children are not immune.  The overlay, the elements 
that cause us discomfort, are entirely cultural.  Without for a moment condoning sexual 
interaction between adults and pre-adolescent children, my point is simply that Mysterious 
Skin is a troubling text precisely because it refuses to settle trauma into a predictably 
explicable (though not necessarily any less unsettling) of a box (even though many readers 
and commentators have rather forcefully submitted it to such a reading).134 
 As in my analysis of The Wizard of Oz, I read Mysterious Skin as a tale of questioning 
and development: will either or both of the boys embrace the position of queerness, “the side 
                                                          
134 Feminism has in the past played a role, oddly, in both stabilizing narratives of child sexual abuse 
and opening them up to critique.  Thirty years ago Shulasmith Firestone urged feminists to “think of 
children’s liberation from male oppression as being linked to women’s liberation” by paying attention 
to child sexual abuse as part of the larger patriarchal project of oppressing women. Firestone, 
Shulasmith. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution.  New York: Morrow, 1970.  
Florence Rush was more pointed in her critique of the then-prevalent model: “It categorically assigns a 
real experience to fantasy, or harmless reality at best, while the known offender – the one concrete 
reality – is ignored… The child’s experience is as terrifying as the worst horror of a Kafkaesque 
nightmare: her story is not believed, she is declared ill, and worse, she is left at the mercy and 
‘benevolence’ of psychiatrically oriented ‘child experts.’”  Rush, Florence.  “The Freudian Cover-Up.” 
Chrysalis 5 (1977): 31-45. 
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outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive 
futurism,” which their life experiences may ineluctably have thrust at them as an option?135 
We would dishonor the very core of queer theory if we allowed that only certain subject  can 
take this side and embrace this figuration, especially if we place upon those certain subjects a 
degree of honor and choice.  Certainly there are those among us who do accede to this place 
of the queer with forethought and through a system of considered choices; but we must also 
understand that there may be some among us who are thrust into the position – or at least into
the position of having it as a nearly unavoidable option – from circumstances that are less 
than desirable.  Brian’s search for answers to explain his alien abduction, along with his 
nosebleeds, bedwetting, and fainting spells, are his own attempts at symbolicizing an 
experience for which he has (and at the time it happened had) no words.  The resolution he 
seeks is his attempt to destabilize the traumatic experience and to situate it in th  associative 
network of the symbolic via a vocalized, spoken retelling of it by Neil.136 This demand for 
symbolicization, which Brian makes of Neil, is differentiated from Brian’s desire, which is 
always for Lacan the desire for nothing.  What happens as Brian listens to Neil’s explanation 
for the missing hours of Brian’s life is Neil’s words distort rather than clarify, as Neil himself 
recognizes: “Those words were no longer accurate.  […] There was so much more I could tell 
him, but everything seemed irrelevant.  […] I placed my tongue against the inside of my 
                                                          
135 Edelman, No Future, 3. 
136 Trauma is no new field of inquiry, especially in the realm of gay/lesbian and queer studies.  Ann 
Cvetkovich has written extensively on how trauma and traumatic experiences can serve as the genesis 
for “collective experience that generates collective responses,” in ways th t challenge traditional ways 
of thinking about identity and connection.  My approach to and use of trauma differsfrom Cvetkovich 
in that I am intensely focused on the singular psyche rather than on collectives.  C etkovich, Ann.  An 
Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures.  Durham, NC: Duke Univ Press, 
2003.  19. 
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cheek, tasting the steely bud of my wound….”137  Neil recognizes the failure of language, the 
necessity by which language failures to convey accurately or precisely our intended meaning. 
 Unlike Neil, Brian appears to handle the molestation by dissociating, a term for the 
psychological process by which the mind defends itself and the body against pain by simply 
removing the mind from the scene – essentially spacing out, blanking out, or going int  what 
appears to be a trance.138 Where Neil defies the standard “innocent child” profile for child 
sexual abuse, Brian fits it almost perfectly.  Studies suggest that there are basically two 
situations in which suppression and repression are less than fully effective in keeping 
memories away from the conscious mind of the subject.  In one situation the memories are 
perceived as negative (“bad memories”); in the other “environmental cues” evoke the 
memories.139 
One interpretation of Mysterious Skin finds the narrative participating in exactly the 
dictatorship of reproductive futurity that this dissertation challenges becaus  the novel can be 
read as a tale of redemption in which trauma is experienced, worked through, and survived as 
witnessed by the final scene of the novel in which Brian and Neil cling to each other, the 
molestation replayed in Neil’s retelling, Brain’s nosebleed a baptism of healing and renewal.  
This certainly fits with the model of reproductive futurity that we find in American culture, 
for it is not only the figure of the Child that is held before us as the “perpetual horizon” for all 
political engagement but the supposed virtues of the child state: innocence, freshness, 
                                                          
137 Heim, 285-286. 
138 Van der Kolk, Bessel A. and Rita Fisler.  “Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic 
Memories: Overview and Exploratory Study.” Journal of Traumatic Stress 8 (1995): 505-525.  See 
also Freyd, J.J.  Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of Forgetting Childhood Abuse.  Cambridge MA: 
Harvard Univ Press, 1996.   
139 Schacter, Daniel L.  The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers.  Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2001.  For specific data sets, see  Schacter, Daniel L., Kenneth A. Norman, and 
Wilma Koutstaal.  “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Reconstructive Memory.” Annual Review of 
Psychology 49 (1998): 289-318. 
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blankness, the tabula rasa.140 These values have become translated in the unfolding of late 
capitalism into a cultural attachment to rebirth, fresh starts, and new beginnings.  The result is 
that we are all ultimately infantilized as innocence becomes equated with moral value.  When 
faced with “no future,” when the questions seems unanswerable, when the avenues of attempt 
have been exhausted, when the limits of unbearability have been reached, when satisfaction, 
satiation, closure, and wholeness seem impossible, a fresh start awaits, a sort of “reset” button 
that can return us to the state of ignorance, which is then understood as Edenic and 
originary.141  This has psychic and material ramifications for the individual and for culture at 
large.  As Henry Giroux as aptly noted:  
In an endless array of mass media advertisements, innocence is 
reduced to an aesthetic  or a psychological trope that prompts adults 
to find their ‘inner child,’ adopt teen fashions and buy a range of 
services designed to make them look younger.  This type of adult 
infantilization enables them to identify with youth while it 
simultaneously empties adulthood of its political, economic, and 
social responsibilities and educative functions.  Such indifference 
allows adults to impose on young people the demands and 
responsibilities they themselves have abandoned.142 
Giroux is writing in a different context but the point remains the same.  The figur of 
the Child is so exalted and so deeply held as the figure of innocence, opportunity, and 
                                                          
140 Edelman, No Future, 4. 
141 This idea is nowhere more evident than in popular psychology, the realm in which one examines 
onself for failings, confesses those failings, and then develops an action plan to overcome or 
circumvent those failings.  Popular television shows like Intervention feature weekly examples of how 
to admit that one is addicted and how to just “let go” and start over after an lngthy rehabilitation stay.  
But the idea of starting over is not confined to docu-reality television.  The system of bankruptcy in 
the United States is a mechanism for taking stock of one’s finances and erasing consume debt, 
ostensibly to develop a fresh start at managing one’s money.   
142 Giroux, Henry.  Stealing Innocence: Youth, Corporate Power, and the Politics of Culture.  New 
York: St.  Martin’s Press, 2000.  18. 
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beginning that otherwise mature subjects seek to return to this supposed ideal momentand to 
reenact it at various moments during the life cycle.143  This is not, however, a matter confined 
to the individual subject; it is inherent to the Symbolic insofar as “the symbolic order is 
simultaneously non-being and insisting to be, that is what Freud has in mind when he talks
about the death instinct as being what is most fundamental – a symbolic order in travail, in the 
process of coming, insisting on being realized.”144  There is a continual turning in on itself 
that is not antithetical to the Symbolic but constitutive of it.  To do this requires stabilizing the 
figure of the Child, divorcing it from any actual children, and placing upon it the heavy 
burden of being that which we say it is.  The consequence of this is that empirical and 
anecdotal evidence of children and their vagaries is ignored or separated out and becomes 
subject to the adult fantasy of the child.  In other words, mature subjects so desperately need 
the security and comfort of the supposed innocence and fresh-wholeness of the figure of the 
child that the treatment of actual children is greatly limited.  As Bruhm and Hurly have 
suggested,  
If writing is an act of world making, writing about children is doubly 
so: not only do writers control the terms of the words they present, 
they also invent, over and over again, the very idea of inventing 
humanity, of training it and watching it evolve.  This inscription 
makes the child into a metaphor, a kind of ground zero for the edifice 
that is adult life and around which narratives of sexuality get 
organized… Utopianism follows the child around like a family pet.  
The child exists as the site of almost limitless potential (its future not 
                                                          
143 I mean “mature” here to refer to age and attainment of adulthood as defined by the culture at hand, 
though I recognize that a mature subject means something quite different in psychoanalysis. 
144 Lacan, Jacques.  The Seminar of Jacques Lacan.  Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1945-1955.  Ed. Jacques Alain-Miller.  Tran. Sylvana Tomaselli.  New 
York: Norton, 1991. 
95 
 
yet written and therefore unblemished).  But because the utopian 
fantasy is the property of adults,, not necessarily of children, it is 
accompanied by its doppelganger, nostalgia.  ..  Caught between these 
two worlds, one dead, the other helpless to be born, the child becomes 
the bearer of heteronormativity, appearing to rend ideology invisible 
by cloaking it in simple stories, euphemisms, and platitudes.145 
Nowhere is this more true than in the treatment of childhood sexuality and in particular in 
narratives of childhood sexual abuse and molestation, where the figure of the child as
innocent and blank is so paramount and so firmly entrenched that the ways we can write talk 
about molestation are limited.146  There is a great deal of research suggesting that even 
authorities and experts in the field of childhood sexual abuse fall prey to letting their own 
adult prejudices influence their research, even when such research is ostensibly child-centered 
or focused on the child victims and their perceptions of the abuse context: “Due to the morally 
reprehensible nature of child sexual abuse, researchers have an understandable tendency to 
project their adult fears, repulsion and horror onto child victims, to assume they react lik  they 
do when faced with sexual situations.”147  The problem with attempting to challenge the 
dominant theory of child sexual abuse is that even when the children themselves claim to not 
have understood what was happening to them at all or claim not to have felt the experience as 
threatening or disruptive – and hence, did not feel danger or violence – this is seen not as a 
                                                          
145 Bruhm and Hurly, Curiouser, xiii. 
146 To even use the phrase “childhood sexual abuse” is already to have evoked a prepared script of 
very adult fears and horrors.  I use this phrase because the bulk of the literature on the subject – even 
that challenging the dominant trauma theory paradigm – uses this language. 
147 Burkhardt, Sandra A. and Anthony F. Rotatori.  Treatment and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse: 
A Child-Generated Model.  Washington DC: Taylor & Francis, 1995.  2. 
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challenge to the theory encouraging additional research and refinement but rather as evidence 
of the overwhelming nature of the trauma itself.148 
 The trauma model (more precisely known as the traumatogenic model) of sexual 
abuse developed three decades ago and has become firmly entrenched in the counseling and 
medical fields as well as in the culture at large.  The trauma model rests on the assumption 
that the experience in and of itself, regardless of circumstance or consequence, is traumatic to 
the child.  But this does not gel with anecdotal research or with diagnostic definitions of 
trauma, which place childhood sexual abuse in the same category as rape and wartime combat 
under fire and which often connect childhood sexual abuse to post-traumatic stress 
disorder:149 
… the theory behind PTSD does not readily adapt to the experience of 
sexual abuse.  The classic PTSD theory says the symptoms result 
from ‘an overwhelming event resulting in helplessness in the face of 
intolerable danger….’ This theory is well suited to traumas such as 
war shock and rape and probably to sexual abuse that occurs under 
violent circumstances.  However, much sexual abuse does not occur 
under conditions of danger, threat and violence….  Abuse experiences 
may be degrading, humiliating, and stigmatizing but not necessarily 
frightening or threatening to bodily integrity….150 
                                                          
148 See, for example:  Russell, Diana E. H.  The Secret Trauma: Incest In The Lives Of Girls And 
Women. New York: Basic Books, 1987. (Rev’d 1999). Russell rather blithely explains away 
discordant accounts of trauma by insisting that the reports are simply manifestations of dissociation, 
repression and outright denial. 
149 American Psychiatric Association.  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR).  Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2000. 
150 Finkelhor, David.  “Early and Long-term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse: An Update.” Professional 
Psychology: Research and Practice 21 (1990): 325-330.  328.  In addition, it should be noted that 
diagnosis of PTSD is based not on an objective evaluation of the trauma supposed to have caused the 
disorder but on patients’ memories of those events.  See Rubin, David C., Dorthe Berntsen, and 
Malene Klindt Bohni.  “A Memory-Based Model of Postraumatic Stress Disorder: Evaluating the 
Basic Assumptions Underlying the PTSD Diagnosis.” Psychological Review 115 (2008): 985-1011. 
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But this is not a new development.  Nearly a century ago, children were placed into either of 
two categories with regard to sexual abuse: “accidental victims” and “partici nt victims.”151 
The first category includes children who are abducted, harmed with violence or under threat 
of violence, and/or who are fully cognizant that what is happening is abusive.  The second 
category is, as the moniker suggests, one in the situation is not built around violence but 
rather on familiarity.  The child likely knows the adult but does not necessarily understand 
that what is happening is bad, the sexual interactions continue over time, and there is an 
exchange economy in the interactions – the adult has sexual access to the child in return for 
providing the child material or emotional bounty.  Some researchers have suggested that i  is 
this last element – the exchange – that is central to understanding which children mght be 
most at risk.  Children who lack material goods certainly, but even more “a common ethod 
of coercion used by perpetrators involves the economic exploitation of a child’s normal need 
to feel loved, valued and cared for by parents.”152  This at first seems to fit Brian and Neil 
quite conveniently into the two categories, although with Brian there was no violence or 
physical force used.  Like Neil, Brian knew Coach.  With Neil the second category fits more 
surely given that Neil has no father but only a series of his mother’s boyfriends in his life.  
But such an account fails to give appropriate credence to the incredibly tight bond that Neil 
experiences with his mother.  In the novel, it is really Brian who seems to have the rockier 
home life, his mother working odd shifts at the local prison, his father unrelentingly 
opinionated and demanding, both parents bickering and fighting regularly until Brian’s father 
finally storms out.  If we push the second category to its logical conclusion then all um n 
                                                          
151 Abraham, Karl.  “The Experiencing of Sexual Traumas as a Form of Sexual Activity.” Selected 
Papers of Karl Abraham, M.D.  London: Hogarth Press, 1927.  47-63. 
152 Berliner, Lucy and Jon R. Conte.  “The Process of Victimization: The Victims’ Perspective.” Child 
Abuse and Neglect.  14 (1990): 29-40. 
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subjects would fall into its purview, given that the psyche is constructed around a ce tr l lack 
that dates back to infancy and that we all try to fill in a variety of ways (“you complete me”).   
As Jon Davies writes in “Imagining Intergenerationality,” [t]he discourse of 
pedophilia is a kind of black hole into which any measured speech about consent, pleasure, 
and desire in intergenerational relationships seems to vanish” making any analysis of a text in 
which pedophilia figures both difficult and risky.153  This is as true for the casual reader with 
an inquiring mind as it is for the educator attempting to cover honesty and fully a novel or 
film in which pedophilia or childhood sexual abuse play a part.  What words one uses, the 
framework in which one places it, the lens through which one views it – these are all tightly 
circumscribed.  This is no less true of the novel which is the subject of this chapter tn of the 
films that Davies reviews in his article (including the film version of Mysterious Skin).154  It is 
worth noting Davies’s observation that even in films that try to interrogate intergen rational 
sex, there is a “tension between speaking openly yet never being able to show openly[,]” a 
tension that is often, even in the films that venture most closely to a legitimate and honest 
exploration of the subject, resolved by “eliding and eclipsing the sex scenes, or the 
subjectivities of the pedophiles or children themselves” or through assurances by th  director 
and cast that no children were harmed in the making of this film.155  
                                                          
153 Davies, Jon.  “Imagining Intergenerationality: Representation and Rhetoric in the Pedophile 
Movie.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian & Gay Studies.  13.2-3 (2007): 369-85.  370.   In his article, 
Davies discusses how even acclaimed films that seem to break the mold for representing pedophilia 
actually work within a very narrow range of representational possibilities. 
154 It is important to note that pedophilia and child molestation are distinct.  While a pedophile may be 
a child molester, the inverse is not necessarily true.  Pedophilia is a diagnosis, the criteria for which 
are outlined in §302.2 of the DSM-IV.  A pedophile has sexual interest in children while child 
molestation may be the result of curiosity, uncertainty with sexually permissible behavior, or 
attributable to other mental or physical health issues.  American Psychiatric Association.  Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR).  
Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2000. 
155 Davies, “Imagining Intergenerationality,” 371-372. 
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 In other words, to talk about childhood sexual abuse in the aim of eliminating it is one 
thing; to describe it or dramatize is tantamount to committing it, especially when that 
dramatization does not comply fully with the dominant discourse on childhood sexual abuse 
and “the discourse of abuse collapses representations of the act into the act itself.” 156  The 
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) is a perfect example of this because it 
extended bans on child pornography even to computer-generated images and virtual 
pornography – images in which no living children were involved.157 Mysterious Skin commits 
exactly this crime against the dominant because although it can be read as a tle of ul imate 
redemption and recovery from trauma, it does not present the so-called “traumatic even ” as 
violent, painful, or even particularly unpleasurable.158  This is not say that the molestation 
does not have consequences for both main characters but it is to say that standard equation of 
“innocent child + evil predator = ruined life” is not the only algebra that may be used to 
understand the situations in the novel.    
 
Queer But Not Queer:  Coach Heider 
Coach Heider is our culture’s most feared being: a man who seems too darned ‘right’ 
with his blond hair and lithe body, his interest in athletics, his masculine insouciance, his 
                                                          
156 Davies, “Imagining Intergenerationality,” 371. 
157 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), 18 U. S. C. §2251 et seq. In Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the CPPA in 2002 for 
being overly broad, the portion prohibiting computer-generated images was revived in th  
“Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today” Act (PROTECT 
Act) of 2003, which prohibits “a computer image or computer-generated image that is, or appears 
virtually indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” PROTECT Act 
of 2003.  Pub. L. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650. 2003. 
158 Of course I do not mean to advocate sexual interactions between adults and children; rather, I am 
trying to point out that we are only allowed to talk about such interactions usig very particular and 
limited language and only for very particular ends.  Anything falling outside of those limits is likely to 
be read as child pornography.   
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fatherly role as baseball coach steering young boys toward wholesome, athletic, healthy 
adulthoods yet behind the scenes bad-touching the children, feeding them soda and sugar and 
preservatives and then telling them that it’s okay to feel desire or pleasure in their bodies and 
in their little still-acceding-to-the-Symbolic minds.   Precisely because they are children, 
because their psyches are in such a stage of development, they are at the stage in which they 
are most recruitable, to use the language of the current discourse surround homosexuality.  He 
is, in popular parlance, a threat to children because he looks just like the rest of us but he acts 
so very differently.  He molests children, which is just the shorthand way of saying that he 
steals the future from us all.    
Neil is Coach’s favorite, a naturally gifted player who illicits Coach’s attention and 
long afternoons and evenings at Coach’s house after practice while Neil’s sing e mother is 
working or out with her many different male friends.  Coach’s house is a bit like Oz.  Coach 
has video games, snack foods, colorful array of childhood diversions and desires that most 
children are proffered only in limited quantity by their parents.  Coach encourages Neil to act 
up, to make funny faces, to drink Nehi soda and then belch while Coach takes instant photos 
and lets Neil record himself on the tape deck.  Neil’s mother seems not only to allow but to 
encourage the relationship as healthy for young Neil, who without a father is in need of male 
role modeling.    
 The sexual relationship begins in very Oz-like circumstances.  Though Neil clearly 
spends a great deal of time at Coach’s house, the actual sexual encounter occurs in the 
kitchen, a room filled with brightly colored boxes of assorted sugary kids’ cereals and 
cabinets stocked with marshmallow cream and bags of candy.  When Neil spies the miniature 
boxes of cereal, the sort his mother ‘never buys,’ Coach asks him which one he wants.  The , 
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as with the Wizard of Oz ̧when Dorothy’s journey across the rainbow seems to happen quite 
by accident, Neil accidentally spills the cereal across the floor.  Coach responds not with 
anger but with a smile and tosses the brightly colored cereal from his own box into the air.  
The two rip open the little boxes of cereal, tossing Froot Loops and Cocoa Krispies and Corn 
Pops up into the air, “their sugar coatings gleaming in the kitchen light” and the trip begins as 
Coach tells Neil, “Here we go….”159 This is more than Coach literally showering Neil with 
sweets; it is a psychic explosion.  Coach, who represents for Neil some version of the 
symbolic, both as an adult and as a coach, is turning in upon himself.  The bright sugary 
cereal is not only part of the “economy of candy [in which children] have agency, choice, 
access, a measure for barter...” which the pedophile uses to lure the children; the deliberate 
undoing and opening of tightly sealed miniature boxes of cereal, the resulting explosion of 
color and texture, mimics the psychic economy.160 In a world that Neil surely recognizes as 
limiting, Coach is permission for the release of jouissance.  Neil interprets these interactions 
as love and displaces any confusion or dissonance they may have produced in him into a 
homosexually situated desire for a particular type of man -- hirsute and older – and Neil 
begins to prostitute himself in a local park known for gay cruising. 
Coach Heider.  With no first name, he is indistinct, a placeholder of sorts, defined by 
his role (coach) and his surname.  The surname itself suggest multiple meanings and 
resonances, especially when we factor in that it is Coach Heider’s molestatin acts that set 
both boys (and unnamed others) onto abnormal paths.  “Heider” suggests “hider,” one who 
hides and this is not far afield the images of pedophiles often cast about in American popular
culture, as lurking behind bushes, as faceless predators reaching to open the passenger side 
                                                          
159 Heim, 34-35. 
160 Stockton, The Queer Child, 238.   
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doors of cars.   In reality, studies show that most child molesters are people that th  child 
knows, often a family member or other trusted person.  In the case of Coach his “hiding” is 
done masterfully because he hides in plain sight.  Add to this the nearness of “heid” (hide) to 
“heim” (home) and this cannot but evoke thoughts of the uncanny – that which is familiar yet 
unfamiliar – for us and Coach’s young victims.  “Heid-er” also suggests “hide” in the sense of 
the skin or pelt, perhaps evoking the title of the novel itself, most especially when nine year-
old Neil notices the “thin blond hairs that curled from his shirt collar … the darker shadeof 
his mustache … the salt of his skin.”161 Neil has already developed a taste for a certain type of 
hirsute masculine man given his foray into his mother’s under-the-bed stash of Playgirl 
magazines and her interactions with her rough-neck Kansas boyfriends, some of which Neil 
has witnessed firsthand.162  Neil’s discovery of his mother’s stash of pornography and his 
witnessing his mother have oral and vaginal sex with her boyfriend is analogous to the 
subject’s entry into language and the Symbolic.  It is not precisely the same but it does mimic 
the process because Neil believes that his mother is enjoying these interactions nd finding 
some sort of fulfillment in them, even as he masturbates himself to a voyeuristic physical 
level of enjoyment. 
But hide here takes on an even more nuanced meaning than Coach’s pelt of chest and 
facial hair or Coach’s “hiding” in plain sight for it is also Neil here who hides: “the small 
copper-colored sunbursts that ringed each black pupil.  And, inside that black, a reflection of 
my face.”163 Coach is not only hiding Neil within himself but is hiding himself as Neil.  It is 
but a small single letter separates “heid” from “heim” – hide from home – and we are back to 
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the uncanny again, whereby Coach is both the home that Neil seeks and Neil is the home that 
Coach seeks.  Neil has moved four times in as many years before he is nine years old, does 
not know his father, and sees his mother work her way through a succession of dead-end jobs 
and whatever local yokel is her “current boyfriend.” It is clear in the novel that Neil’s mother 
adores him and offers him a love that he returns without hesitancy but it the love of a mother 
who treats her young child with perhaps too much of a degree of familiarity for the child to 
see the mother as other; yet Coach offers Neil a different sort of love: “Th hand on my knee 
tightened.  It seemed faultless, the hand of someone amazing, superior, invincible.  ‘Neil, I’ve 
been thinking about you a lot this week.’”164  
We could appropriately read this within the standard dominant framework of child 
sexual abuse.  I suggest, however, a slightly larger (though not necessarily anti-thetical) 
reading.  Though this could legitimately be read as Neil’s need for a father- igure, a filler for 
the sense of “emotional deprivation,” a queer theoretical approach sees this as something far 
more.165  Coach offers Neil something for which most human subjects long: meaning and 
existence through absorption into something larger, superior, and faultless both in the se se of 
non-blame-worthy and in the sense of without fracture or breakage.  This plays out on the 
kitchen floor as “his breaths moved into my mouth” and as “[h]is bottom lip curled over my 
jaw line.  My head was disappearing, he was swallowing me.  I moaned and understood it was 
the right noise.”166  This offering is for a child like Neil often irresistible and tempting 
precisely because it melds so perfectly with Neil’s burgeoning and somewhat confused senses 
of parenting, sexuality, love, and care and Neil “knew what was happening.  Half of me 
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realized it wasn’t right.  The other half wanted it to happen.”167  Key here is that Neil does not 
linguistically set this up as a right/wrong situation; that Neil “knew what was happening” does 
not indicate that what was happening was “wrong” to Neil, only that he was aware of the 
events taking place and they possible end-point, given that he had seen similar scenes between 
his mother and her then-current boyfriends.  That Neil knew half-realized that it “w sn’t 
right” could suggest that he knew the behavior was inappropriate in a good-touch/bad-touch 
kind of way, but I think it also speaks to the larger sense of Neil’s not being satisfied fully by 
the interaction, which has up until this point been a pleasurable experience.  That something 
“wasn’t right” does not necessarily mean that it “was wrong,” and this linguistic difference 
suggests that Neil is experiencing a psychically advanced sense of his own place within the 
Symbolic.  The language Neil uses further supports this interpretation as viable because Neil 
does not say that he half realized it was wrong and half realized it was acceptable, 
counterpoising right and wrong, good and bad.  Instead, he says that “half of me realiz d it 
wasn’t right,” which is not at all the same as saying that something is certainly wrong, and his 
next statement is not that he felt what was happening was “right” but rather that “the o her 
half of me wanted it to happen.”168  The comment that seems to clear on its surface becomes 
much more fraught when we consider it through the lens of the queer uncanny and locate the 
disconnections in linguistic structure. 
Important to note that Coach (and for that matter pedophiles like him) is not 
necessarily a sinthomosexual, despite being childless, partnerless, non-reproductive, casual, 
corrupting, and queer.169  Coach capitalizes on the idea of queerness without actually 
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occupying the structural position of the queer.  We see this in the way that Coach seduces 
Neil, with an insouciant approach to time and place, to the rules and strictures of the typical 
grown-up.   The pedophilic Coach is perhaps even more immersed in the notion of 
reproductive futurity than others whom we might describe as uber-heteronormative for Coach 
preys upon the Child, both literally and figuratively.  The system of desire in which he 
operates depends not only upon the figure of the Child as innocent and as a representation of 
the future (as in Edelman’s schema) but also as a mechanism for accessing and securi g his 
own position as a child in the stream of time.  As Jim Davies has described it, “[t]hrough 
relationships with children, life tries to fold back on itself, run backward instead of forward by 
turning away from adulthood into childhood.”170   
 
Jouissance of an Alien:  Neil McCormick 
This tale offers us at least the possibility that sinthomosexuality is not something that 
one grows into or chooses as an adult but is something that for some people may be a site 
which they take up or into which they are thrust very early on, even as children.171  In many 
ways, before his episode with Coach, Neil is already evidencing traits that are connected to 
the position of the sinthomosexual.  The narrative introduces Neil as a sexually functioning 
male at the childish age of eight and Neil’s own words tell us that to great degree he is already 
cognizant of and able to articulate his own desires, as when he meets Coach and recognizes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pedophiles among Sex Offenders against Children: An Exploratory Study.”  Journal f Sex and 
Marital Therapy. 18.1 (1992): 34-43; and Hall, Ryan C.W., and Richard C.W. Hall.  “A Profile of 
Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatm nt Outcomes, and Forensic 
Issues.”  Focus: The Journal of Lifelong Learning in Psychiatry.  7.4 (2009): 522-537. 
170 Davies, “Imagining Intergenerationality,” 378. 
171 There is a point to be made about the possibility about children being closest to the position of the 
sinthomosexual than adults for children tend to operate with fewer boundaries and ontological 
limitations than more fully-sybolicized adults.  We would want to avoid, however, suggesting any 
connection between increasing age and increasing enmeshment in the Symbolic. 
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that “desire sledgehammered me.” Given Neil’s tender age, one might expect his description 
of the meeting to be couched in terms much more expected of a child his age.  But already 
Neil is using language that indicates the self-shattering, sledge-hammering jouissance that 
typifies the position of the sinthomosexual, and he is well-versed in a discourse of desire. In 
other words, Neil is already a “queer child” insofar as he  
is, generally, both defined by and outside of what is ‘normal.’ But the 
term queer derives also from its association with specifically sexual 
alterity.  […The] figure of the queer child is that which doesn’t quite 
conform to the wished-for way that children are supposed to be in 
terms of gender and sexual roles.  In other circumstances, it is also the 
child who displays interest in sex generally, in same-sex erotic 
attachments, or in cross-generational attachments.172 
Bruhm and Hurley’s collection explores the rather quite queer way in which our 
culture interprets children as sex-less (in the sense of not having sexual drives or int rests, not 
having knowledge of sexual matters, of existing as pre- or not-yet sexual beings) yet also as 
assumedly heterosexual.  A common tale in our culture is the tale of childhood innocence 
corrupted and a great deal of post-childhood non-normative sexual behavior (homosexuality, 
licentiousness, promiscuity) is traced back to childhood trauma, which is often interpreted as a 
too-early introduction into adult sexuality – through molestation, premarital sex, over-
exposure to popular culture, and the like. 
Neil, like Ebenezer Scrooge in A Christmas Carol, seems also beholden to an idol that 
is idolatrous; unable or unwilling to experience emotional intimacy with others, Nil uses the 
very traits that are supposed to rouse in us a comforting assurance in our own coherence and 
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the ‘rightness’ of the world – that is, his youthful vitality, the bright future of the hopeful 
youth, the tender yet potent potentiality of his own reproductive capacity – and expends it in 
the mouths and on the faces of a series of unidentifiable older men whom he meets in the 
local  park and who kneel between his legs in the announcer’s box at the local baseball 
diamond -- the same one, presumably, where he was first sledge-hammered by desire for 
Coach, a site of repetition.   Eschewing anything akin to emotional connection with these 
men, Neil conjures Playgirl images of hirsute men, creating a peculiar and particular sinthome 
to make manifest his own connection to the Real.   Neil’s interactions with the men are 
moments of the queer uncanny in which he both consciously and unconsciously returns to the 
repressed and is compelled to repeat as closely as he can the actions that inaugurated the 
development of his particular sinthome (that is, node of pleasure) in the kitchen with Coach.   
He closes his eyes, he looks away, or the men sink their heads beneath his line of sight and 
thereby Neil doubles the Coach, intentionally recreating and reliving the iniial experience.   
The name Neil is a homonym for the verb “kneel,” as in to be prostrate before, and until the 
closing scene of the novel, this is exactly what Neil does before the image of Coach that he 
keeps in his mind.   The “kneel” reference reminds us that moments of the queer uncanny, 
emerging as they do from a queer theoretical framework, can never be assumed to be positive 
or freely chosen; the queer uncanny is not more beholden to a preset system of moral or
mathematical precision than queer theory itself and we must recall from Freud that the 
compulsion toward repetition is exactly that: a compulsion. 
“Neil” is also an acronym for both “lien” and – with the addition of the indeterminate 
“a” – “alien.” Both are here relevant for it is Neil who has a lien of psychic sorts on Brian’s 
life, a permanent alien lien for a debt that Brian does not know how he incurred and which he 
108 
 
seeks intently to have lifted.  In the final scene of the novel, when Neil is revealing in specific 
detail what Brian has for so long misinterpreted as alien abduction, Brian deman s of Neil to 
“[k]eep going.  Don’t stop again until you’ve finished.”173  In other words, the resolution may 
not be positive and may not be of the sort that would satisfy Brian’s decade-long search for 
resolution through appeal to the Other in the form of the aliens whom he believes abducted 
him and continue to monitor him, but it does resolve and connect the various strands of 
images, sense perception, and psychosomatic elements that have haunted Brian for so lo g.  
Neil is also alien to Brian in multiple ways; not only as the out-going kid who led Brian to 
Coach but also as the one of the two who seems to have processed the experience in a less 
repressed albeit not necessarily positive way.  How is it that two young boys with relatively 
similar life circumstances could have experienced this molestation and emerged to follow two 
very different paths of understanding and recognition of the experience?  
Jouissance is translated most often as “enjoyment” but the word in Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory means something quite different.  Jouissance for Lacan suggests a 
surplus of excitation, an abundance of stimulation, that which is too much for the organism to 
bear.  Because it is of the real and therefore outside of or resistant to symbolicizati n and 
meaning, jouissance is experienced as the very anti-thesis of the way we generally think of 
“enjoyment.” It is experienced as on-going suffering because it is experi nc d but 
unspeakable, because it blocks symbolic association, and because it connected to the other.  
For Freud this lethal drive was the death drive, the drive which compels humans to repea 
patterns and behaviors even against their own best self-interests.  Jouissance is akin to the 
death drive, as Suzanne Barnard explains:  
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While the subject of the drive also is ‘born’ in relation to a loss, this 
loss is a real rather than a symbolic one.  As such, it functions not in a 
mode of absence but in a mode of an impossible excess haunting 
reality, an irrepressible remainder that the subject cannot separate 
itself from.  In other words, while desire is born of and sustained by a 
constitutive lack, drive emerges in relation to a constitutive surplus.  
This surplus is what Lacan calls the subject’s ‘anatomical 
complement,’ an excessive ‘unreal’ remainder that produces an ever-
present jouissance.174 
 Over the course of the life (“growing up”), the symbolic world, the many connective, 
structural, regulative systems in which we live demand that we evacuate jouissance from the 
body and that what jouissance is present be controlled.  This regulatory pressure begins early 
and continues through the life cycle, from weaning and sitting up straight in our school desks 
to making a toast and practicing monogamy.  But jouissance is plentiful in the body and a 
portion refuses evacuation and remains in the body, generally in the very spaces wher  the 
boundary between self and other is most permeable: the erotic zones, the edges, those places 
on the body where we are allowed to feel excitation, although when and how that excitation 
may be expressed or experienced is often subject to tight regulation.   
Neil eschews love, turning instead to the love of money that he takes from older men 
and to the Playgirl fantasies he conjures in his head while performing the sexual acts.  
Escaping from the heartland safety of small-town Kansas, Neil travels over the rainbow to an 
Oz of his own, New York City, where he continues to hustle his youthful lithe body to the 
men he meets in various bars and on the street.  But where the men back home were relativ ly 
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harmless (one distributed snack machine crackers from the back of his Volvo wagon) – a clear 
but less vivid representation of coach’s kitchen, the same variety of colors but this time 
packed tightly into boxes in the back seat, the men in New York present entirely different s ts 
of issues in front of Neil.  Where one man in Hutchinson offered Neil a package of peanut 
butter in between bright orange crackers, a man in New York removes his clothesto reveal a 
body covered in the scarlet and wine-colored Kaposi sarcomas indicative of HIV infection.  
Where the men in Kansas tell Neil that he is beautiful and special and that they need him, the 
men in New York seem less interesting in aggrandizing Neil’s need for attention or praise.   
Where men in Kansas reach up to stroke Neil’s still-smooth face while they perform fellatio 
under the announcer’s stand at the baseball diamond, a man in New York smashes his fist into 
Neil’s face, slams his naked body over the edge of a bathtub and rapes him anally, bashing
Neil’s head into the drain while ejaculating in Neil’s rectum.  And this ghost, thi final of 
three who visit Neil during his long night in the city that never sleeps sends him rigt back 
over the rainbow, back to Kansas, back to the mother who, no matter her faults – her 
promiscuity and drink not far afield from Aunt Em’s hard-scrabble brusqueness toward the 
Orphan Dorothy – is, after all the progenitor, the keeper of the hearth, a reminder of a future, 
some future. 
Any truth that the ego may provide would then be found only in those moments when 
the boundaries and borders between self and other dissolve or are revealed as more permeable 
than the ego would have us imagine.  The point of orgasm may be one of those moments, 
provided it is reached with another being present or in mind, for it is at the point of orgasm 
that we are both most alone and most dissolved into the other, the moment when our pleasure 
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consumes us and the notion of the other is driven from our minds while at the same the 
boundaries of our bodies and minds meld most pleasurably with the other that is beyond us. 
  
Eyes, Fists, and the Search for the Objet Petit (a)lien 
 While Neil seems to seek this truth compulsively, reaching orgasms in the city park, in 
the announcer’s box at the baseball diamond, etc, Brian avoids the truth by avoiding sexuality 
and orgasm.  Unlike Neil, who I have argued took up or showed a predilection toward the 
place of the sinthomosexual at a very early age, Brian has the role (or, more precis ly, the 
option to choose that role) thrust upon him from circumstances that are less than optimal.  
Although he plays on the same baseball team as Neil, he is inept, lacking even the sort of 
masculinity that normative young boys often present and adopt.  And as with Dorothy in The 
Wizard of Oz, there is no certain indicator that Brian is gay.  (In fact, there is very little in the 
novel to indicate that Brian has any sexual orientation or interest in the sexual at all; he seems 
asexual.) It is perhaps these two elements – his lack of child-masculinity and his seeming 
asexuality – that alerts us to his potential status as a queer.  Brian only meets Coach when he 
is brought to the house when a game is unexpectedly rained out and Brian’s parents are not 
there to take him home themselves.  But we learn this only much later in the novel for in 
much the same way that Brian himself represses the memory so too does the novel, allowing
both Brian and the reader only intermittent and greatly veiled hints at what has happened.  
Like any good mystery novel, Mysterious Skin, is best read multiple times because in each 
reading new clues and new connections emerge.  Unlike Neil, Brian is unaware of his own 
sexuality and is instead obsessed with the idea that the missing hours from his past, his 
bedwetting, his unexplained nosebleeds, his occasional fainting spells, his visions of a 
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shadowy shape standing before him and over him all have something to do with alien 
abduction.  He investigates the subject as extensively as possible in the pre-intern t world of 
small town Kansas.   
 Brian Lackey is a nerd.  He is slight and awkward, he wears large glasss.  His name 
suggests that in some way he is a lackey, a servile follower, rather than a leader.  In his family 
structure, in his inept performance on the Little League field, even in the context f he 
molestation scenes he is passive and more likely to be lead than to lead – a double with a 
difference, in contrast to Neil who is an active force in the novel.   As Brian seeks 
confirmation of his alien abduction theory, this changes dramatically.  He steals a Little 
League photograph from the walls of the local Chamber of Commerce, he takes his mother’s 
car with permission, he even imbibes liquor for the first time and then challenges his father 
over the telephone.  His life from 1981 until the conclusion of the novel at Christmas of 1991 
forms more and more firmly around the central lack that those “five hours” form and his 
attempts to resolve that lack in what we might usefully analogize to the ways that subjects 
both individual and collective work to cover over the central lack that structures the human 
psyche.  It is fitting, then Brian’s name is an acronym for Brain because he, through a fairly 
logical system of detective work, attempts to solve the riddle of his own existence.  In my 
reading of this novel as presenting us with an instantiation of the queer uncanny, the 
resolution of Brian’s detective work – realizing that the shadowy alien figures are actually 
Coach and Neil, finding Neil’s name and hunting him down – is not satisfaction or resolution 
at all.  Nor is it dissatisfaction or a lack of resolution.  It is, rather, as we hall in my analysis 
of the final scene of the novel, a moment of recognition for Brian, a moment of looking 
around, looking awry, and feeling at home. 
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 In a way, this search for meaning is replicative of the logic of reproductive futurity 
insofar as it is an organized system of quest or attention paid toward a future (i.e., the Child, 
the answer, the figure or moment of resolution) that is retroactively applied to xplain or 
connect the events of the past (i.e., the nosebleeds, the loneliness, the fractured self, etc).  
Although “[b]elieving that the narratives we create to explain our distress accurately reflect 
reality is both optimistic and naïve,” it is the narrative or psychic value of the beliefs that is 
ultimately of more importance to the subject than any empirical or historical validity.175 
If we remember the early work of Lacan, we know that it is the identification of the 
infant with an image outside of itself that produces the illusion of completeness and of 
mastery over the body.  This identification with the other, captured elegantly in Lacan’s 
mirror phase, is more than a moment in time, a singular event that one passes through;it is a 
principle of organization that organizes much of the experience of the individual in the world 
over time.  This “imaginary” register – so named because it is both based on image and in 
some degree “not real” – forms at the core of our beings a lack.  At the very moment when we 
feel most individuated, contoured, and whole, we are immediately thrust into the position f 
being least so because our entire sense of ourselves is based on something external to 
ourselves.  This early alienation is the basis for the ego, that seat of narcissism and self-
awareness and the site from which an untrue agency is recognized as the ego does the w rk of 
hiding or concealing the lack of unity around which it is formed.  Eventually the work of the 
ego extends far beyond covering this initial realization of fragmentation and begins to make 
sense of the world in various ways when the world the subject encounters is nonsensical, 
disconnected, or otherwise fragmented. 
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 For Brian the specular is central.  From the moment he “opened my eyes to darkness” 
in the crawl space under the house to the even more evocative incident on Halloween when, 
dressed as Lucifer, Brian is taunted by a group of older boys who tear off his mask and with it 
his glasses: “My right boot landed on the glasses.  I heard the crack, felt them snap like potato 
chips.  I bent to pick them up.  Nothing but shards, as thin and sharp as the teeth in a 
monster’s mouth.  I swept the pieces aside and grabbed my mask.”176  Perhaps this 
unintentional prank is not so unintentional, in much the same way that Dorothy Gale kept 
having little accidents in The Wizard of Oz, for Brian does not express anger, panic, or fear at 
his broken glasses; instead he describes the pieces as fragments and then tidily sweeps them 
aside.  As he runs out of the haunted house and in to a grove of trees, “[w]ithout glasses, the 
world melted from focus […] I put the mask back on.”177 Brian seems to be avoiding looking 
upon the other, the mirror image, the double of himself, as he grabs the mask and puts it back 
on even though he is alone and in the dark, and far away from the haunted house.   This may 
perhaps be a moment when the queer uncanny is most intimately connected to the mirror 
stage; Brian uses the mask to mask his own self-recognition, to avoid seeing the double, not in 
Lacan’s mirror but in the eyes of the other taunting children.   Because without his glasses he 
cannot see, the taunting children become his proxy eyes, their taunts descriptively offering 
him a vision of himself that cannot stand if he is to remain a unified psyche.   But the queer 
uncanny also suggests that for Brian the mask is a return to the moments in the haunted house 
when he was active, when it was he who surprised the other children, when it was he took 
initiative and action.   The mask offers Brian a double with a difference – same Brian but 
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different Brian-actions.   And what more symbolic figure of non-reproductive futurity han 
Lucifer himself, the antidote to the tale of the Christ-child who promises an unending future? 
 For Brian, the fainting spells signal a loss of the conscious self while the nosebleeds 
and the bed-wetting are expulsions of the life force, an admixture of necessary liquid and 
wasteful discharge.  They suggest not only a crossing of thresholds between 
conscious/unconscious and self/other but an evacuation of the life force, an acceding to the 
real of the molestation experience, which Brian has been unable to symbolicize fully.  His 
attempts at symbolicization are useful to him to a point; the myriad documentaries on alien 
visitation, the bookshelves of books detailing alien abductions, the objective-appearing check 
list of alien encounter symptoms all allow Brian to stabilize his molestation experience and to 
translate it into the language of knowing but his translation process is never complete for he 
struggles to determine precisely the exact details and narrative of his experience.  The real, 
that which refuses to be or cannot be symbolicized, haunts Brian’s attempts, erupting in 
moments of the uncanny that force Brian to confront the un-speakable (as in literally 
unspeakable) experiences he has buried and then reworked.   Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the scene with the eviscerated calf.  Avalyn has thus far been to Brian a believ bl  
guide to his interest in alien visitation, encouraging him to follow the clues and to be his own 
detective.  And what is a detective but someone highly skilled in the processes of resolution, 
logic, and symbolicization?  
 Because he cannot fully integrate the Coach into his psyche, Brian displaces the entire 
experience into the figure of the alien – an unknowable, other-worldly shadow figure, not 
fully understood yet not so foreign as to disintegrate Brian’s psyche.  The alien in popular 
culture is another version of the sinthomosexual, a figure divorced from the normative fam ly 
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structure, seemingly without ancestor or progeny or mate.  Culturally the alien, like the witch, 
denotes insistent difference; although the alien has (or seems to have) a purposefor the 
abductions, neither Brian nor the other abductee (Avalyn) knows what that purpose is. 
The unconscious has to resort to particularly drastic measures in order 
to make its content perceived.  It does this most vividly by projection, 
by extrapolating its content onto an object, which then mirrors what 
had previously lay hidden in the unconscious….  They [flying 
saucers] are based essentially on an omnipresent emotional 
foundation, in this case a psychological situation common to all 
mankind.178 
When a television documentary chronicles the abduction story of a young woman in 
nearby Inman, Kansas, Brian contacts her and she encourages him to investigate hi abduction 
dreams.  In line with many survivors of childhood sexual abuse and abetted by a scenein th  
novel in which Brian and several others see a UFO above his house, Brian begins to attribu e
this missing time and his symptoms to alien abduction.  He immerses himself in this belief by 
developing a fascination with book and television documentaries on the subject.  When one 
such documentary dramatizes the story of Avalyn Friesen who lives near Brian in the rather 
tellingly named village of “Inman,” he contacts her and they begin a friendship in which 
Avalyn encourages Brian to investigate his slowly surfacing feelings and to pay heed to any 
clues that he may find in his dreams.  The queer uncanny tells us that the repressed returns 
and the “alien” of which Brian dreams and onto which he casts all of his questions, his doubt, 
and his need is “a neil,” one Neil McCormick.  “As I drifted toward sleep my mind focused 
on two things, a pair of the summer’s images I’d never forget.  I saw the cramped room of the 
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crawl space… And then, equal in power and mystery, I saw the UFO, still out there 
somewhere, levitating the earth.”179  This Unidentified Flying Object, the unidentified capital 
O “Other,” the great round lighted disc that Brian saw in the cold dark night, that was both 
present and not-present (“out there somewhere”) is now connected firmly for him to the 
Unidentified Other of the dank crawlspace, the dark round entrance hole, and, ultimately, to 
Coach.  The abduction, the UFO sightings, the fascination with aliens can be fruitfully 
understood using the queer uncanny as doubles with a difference and as a compulsion to 
repeat a prior experience but through different linguistic and imaginative symbols.    
Though Brian is well on his own journey, it is perhaps not until he meets Avalyn that 
he begins most fully to engage the queer uncanny.  Avalyn is perhaps the queerest figure in
the novel, timeless, trapped in a childhood state, literally committed to an alien log c. It 
should be no surprise that she lives in “Inman, Kansas” for her it is through Avalyn that Brian 
reaches into himself to recall the molestation scene in which his arm disappeared into a man 
called Coach.  Her name itself evokes the experience that Brian must have.  Avalyn is formed 
of the two names Ava and Lyn, Ava possibly linked to the Hebrew Chava meaning life or 
serpent or perhaps the Latin avis meaning bird.  Lyn likely comes from Spanish or English to 
mean beautiful.  Her last name Friesen is also relevant, coming from the German “fries” and 
perhaps further back to the root “prei-” (to cut).  This suggests that Avalyn Friesen is the 
means by which Brian ‘cuts” through to the truth of his memories and that this proces, which 
is to a degree “life-giving” or that will help him fly like a ‘bird” (like a bluebird over the 
rainbow?), it is also with peril (serpent).   
Avalyn is also a figure of retarded childhood for despite being a woman in her 30s, 
whose room “looks like a teenager’s: posters … covered the walls, and clothes, books, 
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albums, and tapes scatter the floor.”180  She gives Brian a copy of book which she 
autographed with a “series of tiny valentines.”181  When she is describing what happened to 
the eviscerated calf she observes that “they take away the sex organs away, the udders and the 
slits on the females, the you-know-whats on the males,” language which suggests a sexual 
knowledge that is both clear and clouded.182  Her favorite band is Kiss, a band that she would 
have listened to during its heyday in the mid-seventies when Avalyn would have been in her 
teens, and which Avalyn describes as “so theatrical.  You could get lost in them.  Every day 
was Halloween,” evoking not only the second episode of molestation for Brian but also the 
notion of being lost, out of normative time and space.183  Although never explicitly clear in 
the novel, this may all may indicate that Avalyn herself was the victim of sexual molestation.  
She tells Brian that back when she “wasn’t so fat” she had a single high school boyfriend who 
was scared off by her father and then attempts to seduce Brian by sliding kissi  him 
awkwardly telling him “I really want to make you feel good.”184 
Ironically, it is Avalyn’s insistence that leads Brian to the “real” truth and the pivotal 
scene occurs when Avalyn has summoned Brian to her farmstead to examine a calf that h s
been eviscerated, ostensibly by aliens.  Avalyn points out the lack of blood from the mutilated 
animal and encourages Brian to reach inside of the body of the animal to see (feel) for himself 
that the internal organs are missing.  When Brian pushes his hand into the body, his 
experience splits; as Freud traversed again to the illicit section of the Italian city, Brian moves 
at once between two experiences.  He feels not only the inside of the calf but something else 
as well and it is at this moment that, although he cannot force the memory into the clear vision 
                                                          
180 Heim, 140. 
181 Heim, 147. 
182 Heim 157. 
183 Heim, 140. 
184 Heim, 183. 
119 
 
of his conscious mind, he is surrounded by a sense of the uncanny, of having been in this 
warm, wet place before. 
We learn late in the novel that Coach had the boys fist him.  This imagery comes up 
several times – Brian is found in the crawlspace or “bowels” of his house, the evisc rated calf 
feels “spongy” inside, they “break into” Coach’s old house, and Brian comments that he baby 
he holds feels “spongy.”  Toward the end of his short essay “The Uncanny” Freud off rs the 
comment that “[s]evered limbs, a severed head, a hand detached from the arm […] feet that 
dance by themselves […] – all of these have something highly uncanny about them, esp cially 
when they are credited … with independent activity.”185  And what is fisting but an act of 
dismemberment in which one loses a part of oneself in the bowels of another, experienced by 
Brian as the fear almost of being consumed or emptied, and yet at the same time experiences 
an embodiment in the most literal sense of the word, a perhaps revisiting of what Freud says 
is “merely a variant of another, which was originally not at all frightening, but relied on a 
certain lasciviousness; this was the fantasy of living in the womb” (Leben Im Mutterlieb).186  
Other interpreters have suggested that the rectum of Coach is the objet petit a, “the touchstone 
of [Brian’s] quest and the haunting abject of his life,” and that this objet petit a resurfaces 
when Brian puts his hand into the dark innards of the cow.187  While this fits in a quite literal 
sense as the “hole in the real,” it does not fully mesh with how Brian reworks and re-
experiences the situation over the ten years following the molestation incidents.  Coach’s 
rectum is not the “empty space on which the subject projects the fantasies that support his 
desire,” as Žižek phrases it; Coach’s rectum is the situs for the trauma but it is not the empty 
space of desire.  The identity of Neil McCormick is Brian’s desire-point, h s objet petit a, to 
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use the language of Jacques Lacan, the surplus of jouissance.  Slavoj Žižek uses the concept 
to analyze the MacGuffin-Effect, the element on which narrative and plot are based ut which 
is in itself unknown or generic. It is the gimmick from which the dramatic thrust of the film or 
novel hangs.  In Alfred Hitchcock’s masterpiece, Psycho, it is the $40,000 that Marian Crane 
steals; in Quinton Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, it is the briefcase.  As Žižek notes, “[the] 
MacGuffin is objet petit a pure and simple: the lack, the remainder of the real that sets in 
motion the symbolic movement of interpretation, a hole at the center of the symbolic order, 
the mere appearance of some secret to be explained, interpreted, etc."188 Similarly, writing of 
the black house in Patricia Highsmith’s story of the same name, “the "black house" in [a] 
Patricia Highsmith story: a quite ordinary, everyday object that, as soon as it is 'elevated to the 
status of the Thing,' starts to function as a kind of screen, an empty space on which the subject 
projects the fantasies that support his desire, a surplus of the real that propelsus to narrate 
again and again our first traumatic encounters with jouissance [...] it is an empty form to be 
filled out by everyone's fantasy [object petit a] is thus the 'hole in the real' that sets 
symbolization in motion ….”189  Neil is the MacGuffin, the objet petit a for Brian, the face 
and the screen on which Brian pre-writes a story of resolution and presumbably redemption.  
In the framework of the queer uncanny, it is Neil’s identity that haunts Brian, th t resurfaces 
repeatedly in the form of a being-presence beside him in his dreams and visions. This 
formless figure is the hinge upon which Brian’s quest proceeds, but the resolution that 
locating Neil provides is no resolution at all, highlighting two elements of the queeruncanny: 
the repletion or reappearance of certain tropes or figures alongside the inability of final 
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resolution.  Just as returning to Kansas does not resolve the issues of Dorothy Gale’s life, so 
too does locating Neil McCormick not bring Brian’s experiences to a final conclusion. 
 
Two Boys in the Dark:  Dislogic in the Final Scene of Mysterious Skin 
 And again, a return to a final scene, although final scenes are rarely final.  Wh t makes 
this novel less satisfying for the reproductive futurity oriented and less amenable to a 
recuperative reading is the final scene, a return to the scene of the crime, when the two young 
men break into Coach’s old house (we are not told what happened to Coach; like a ghost he 
seems simply to have disappeared), now occupied by what surely must be a 
heteronormatively typical family of mother, father, and children judging fromthe furnishings.  
Brian urges Neil to revive the illicit jouissance of that moment while Neil recruits Brian into 
the knowledge of that night, finding his own sinthome node in the retelling of the sexual 
goings on and in the revealing to Brian the circumstances of his own jouissance, urging him 
forward not to a resolution of the alien dilemma, not toward a final resolution of the when and 
the where and the who of that night or any other, not toward a future fantasy project in which 
all of the questions and lack we have inside of us are brought to full force in the upturned face 
of a waif-like child and we feel the (w)hol(l)y stillness of the night, but instead oward a 
position, toward a reckoning of the self, toward a grasping and embracing of jouissance that is 
neither sanctioned nor condoned.  That the boys are reliving their experience in the mdst of 
this holiday and familial deluge is of little surprise; what is more intriguin  is that the 
resolution they seem to reach is not one of mutual support in a post-traumatic event but rather 
a joining of forces with no thought of the future.   
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 If any holiday is swaddled in reproductive futurity it is surely Christmas with its focus 
on the child of all children, the infant Christ, the literal and figurative harbinger of the fu ure 
and of the rebirth offered all who believe.  Even for those of us who are not Christian, it is 
nigh impossible to avoid the holiday, saturated as our American culture is with the imag ry, 
music, and fantasy of this divine birth and the promise of the great future it portends.  Yet 
what a queer birth it is, this little child with two daddies, this infant whose earthly father is but 
a space-filler for the heavenly, omnipotent, omniscient father who is truly the Name of the 
Father.  The closing scene of Mysterious Skin takes place Christmas Eve of 1991 when both 
Brian Lackey and Neil McCormick are just shy of eighteen years of age, the cusp of legal 
adulthood.  As in The Wizard of Oz, it is this closing scene that at first seems to braid the 
strings of the novel together but which actually leaves the narrative much more rupturd than 
resolved, revealing the ways in which the queer uncanny can alert us to fractures nd fissures. 
 After Brian finally identifies Neil and arranges to meet him when Neilis back in 
Kansas to visit his mother at Christmas, they drive to the house where Coach used to live, a 
sort of primal crime scene for both of the young men.190 The house itself is the architectural 
representation of reproductive futurity: a modest ranch home with a two-car garage,  master 
bedroom, and two smaller bedrooms.  Tellingly, though, while “[n]eighbors’ homes were lit 
up, flashing their greetings and noels to the night street, … here, in this home from their 
memories, there was only darkness.  No Christmas lights braceleted its exterior, no tree 
blinked its varicolored eyes from the front window.”191  In this moment, at Christmas, with 
carolers singing “Silent Night,” outside the house of this family in this small town of families 
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in this heartland state of family values, Neil and Brian enter into a mutually sinthomosexual 
moment, Brian urging Neil to tell him what happened that night. 
Brian’s search for answers to explain his alien abduction, along with his nosebleeds, 
bedwetting, and fainting spells, are his own attempts at symbolicizing an experience for which 
he has (and at the time it happened had) literally no words.  The resolution he seeks of/from 
Neil is clarity, answers, certainties that will situate the half-formed, still alien, still a-Neil 
memories in the associative network of the symbolic via a vocalized, spoken retellig of it by 
Neil.  What happens as Brian listens to Neil’s explanation for the missing hours of Brian’s life 
is that Neil’s words distort rather than clarify, proliferate the question  rather than answer 
them, as Neil himself recognizes: “Those words were no longer accurate.  […] There was so 
much more I could tell him, but everything seemed irrelevant.  […] I placed my tongue 
against the inside of my cheek, tasting the steely bud of my wound….”192 Neil recognizes the 
failure of language, the necessity by which language fails to convey accurately or precisely 
any intended meaning. 
If speech presupposes an other, a position external to oneself and from which one is 
heard, Lacan posits that other as the space of language and speech as the mechanism by which 
the subject situates itself in the symbolic.  This means that the interpretation of speech should 
not focus on the words that are spoken but on the position from which they are spoken – and 
by extension on the position from which they are heard.  In other words, when a subject 
speaks, that subject is speaking from an unconscious identificatory position.  Any professed 
“I” in speech would then be coming not from a coherent, recognizable “I” but from the spac  
of imaginary alienation around which the ego has cohered.  Neil, wordless, unable to locate 
the precise words, is doing more than just indicating the limitations of the English language 
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and perhaps even doing more than simply indicating the fracture between language and 
meaning.  He is, suggesting that he is in a position and speaking from which there is no 
speaking that is permissible, or comprehensible within the field of the symbolic.  His 
identificatory process has placed him in a position vis-à-vis the reproductive futurity oriented 
symbolic that he is no longer able to talk or even himself be “talkable.” This is the position of 
the sinthomosexual. 
The closing scene between the boys recalls the E.T.A.  Hoffman story recounted in 
Freud’s essay on “The Uncanny.”193 In the Hoffman tale, the pivotal early scene is of young 
Nathaniel, who has been warned that the Sand Man will throw sand into the eyes of little 
children who refuse to go to bed and then take the eyes and feed them to his own bird-
children.  Nathaniel defies this warning one night and hides in his father’s study to sp on his 
father and his friend, Coppelius.  While working together over the brazier making something 
that the boy cannot see, Coppelius cries out, “Eyes here! eyes here! [sic]”194 Nathaniel 
screams, ostensibly connecting the physically repulsive Coppelius and the directive garding 
eyes to the Sand Man, and so shocks Coppelius that Coppelius attempts to put hot coals in the 
boy’s eyes.  And what proof might we have for reading this as a primal scene? It takes place 
at night when children should be asleep.  Nathaniel hides and is “spellbound” by what he sees, 
knowing that if he is discovered he will be punished.  The two men – Nathaniel’s father and 
Coppelius – disrobe from their street clothes, reveal a hearth that the child thought was merely 
a cupboard, and both bend low over the hot brazier and begin to create something.   
 The final scene of Mysterious Skin is not at first glance related to opening scene of 
Hoffman’s tale until we consider the opening of Hoffman’s tale as a queered version of the 
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primal scene, featuring not the coupling male and female parents that the child spies upon but 
two nearly half-men half-boys embracing in a non-reproductive union, come upon not by the 
curious child but by the penultimate symbol par excellence of reproductive futurity, he 
nuclear family.  As carolers near the house, suspecting that no one is at home, a young boy 
peeks in and sees them.  But at precisely the moment when the reader might be wondering 
how the boy sees the two young men, the focus is upon the entering family, “in the room with 
us, stood the family, their outlines barely visible within the weight of the room’s light,” a 
reversal of the point of view of the standard Freudian primal scene.  Neil wonders to himself 
what the boy sees: “two boys in the dark, sprawled together on the couch, holding hands; one 
battered and bruised, the other bleeding from the nose”, just as in the Freudian primal scene 
the spying child is likely to see coitus as an infliction of violence rather than as physical 
coupling.195 As if setting the primal scene up, divorcing it from its usual narrative in which a 
youngster espies coupling adults while hidden behind a door or comes up the adults quite by 
accident, the carolers begin to sing “Silent Night” and the family that lives in the house 
unlocks the door –– and enters.   
This is a moment of the queer uncanny for Neil and Brian, not only in the sense of 
replicating the Freudian primal scene (which Neil has witnessed several times in various 
forms) but also in the way that it plays on and returns both boys to the event around which 
Brian has structured his entire quest: the day when Coach molested Brian and Neil, except 
this time Neil does not guide Brian into Coach’s house and then into his rectum but into a 
different dark space, the erotogenic zone not of the building or of the body but of the 
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symbolic, the dark space of the queer and the sinthomosexual, the “site where the fantasy of 
futurism confronts the insistence of a jouissance that rends it precisely by rendering it.”196 
 If we then think that perhaps there has been a retroactive installation of this scene in 
both young men, it is possible to see them as doubles: Neil the one for whom the primal scene 
has been witnessed over and over and for whom sexual behavior has become a conscious 
currency as he moves through the world, Brian the one for whom sexuality is so far removed 
from his daily existence that the molestation by Coach was simply not assimilble into his 
psyche, displaced instead onto something seemingly far more fantastical – alien abduction.  
One event, two lives, similar, doubled, yet not identical.  The narrative leaves us with a sense 
that the story is not over, that this meeting up has produced an entirely new field of questi ns 
that must be answered.  Where Brian sought stability and depended on the epistemological 
framework of “mystery-solving,” he has found instead the possibility of an entirely new field 
of relations. 
  
 In Mysterious Skin, the queer uncanny has been applied to a troubling text in which 
the story is one likely to produce distaste under current epistemic norms.  Characteristic of the 
queer uncanny is its refusal, emerging as it does from queer theory, to provide a final solution 
or a singularly authoritative reading.  Instead the queer and the uncanny unite to disrupt the 
trauma narrative that structures so many tales of childhood sexual abuse, highlighting the 
instability of cultural notions about children and sexuality and challenging the dominate 
victim tale.  This chapter has deepened our approach to the queer uncanny, incorporating 
more fully elements of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to demonstrate how doubling and 
repetition might play out in troubling texts.  
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Chapter Three 
“This Ordinance Which is Not One:  The Performative Potential of the Queer Uncanny” 
 
 
 I admit that when I first thought to write about the domestic partner registry in the 
university town where I live and study, my intention was to skewer it and to unleash my pent-
up and not-so-pent-up hostility toward the notion of same-sex marriage in the first place and 
toward the particular substance-less municipal ordinance in the second.  The ordinance 
seemed inane at best and dangerous at worst.  (Inane for offering no rights or obligations for 
registering; dangerous because what easier way for homophobes with violent tendencies to 
obtain the names and address of gays and lesbians?)  As I begin working with the idea of the 
queer uncanny and applying to other texts, like films and novels, I kept returning to my fiery 
disregard for this ordinance, unsure now that my derision was well-placed.  This final chapter 
takes us out of the realm of film and literature and into the law as I apply the lens of the queer 
uncanny to this municipal domestic partnership registry ordinance that by its own terms 
provides no rights to registrants but which upon further analysis turns out to offer evid nce of 
the performative potential of the queer uncanny. 
After the State of Kansas passed an amendment to its state constitution specifically 
defining marriage as a civil contract between a man and a woman, thereby denying to same-
sex partners any of the benefits or obligations of marriage or civil unions, the City of 
Lawrence developed a domestic registry which allows two people (same-sex or other-sex) to 
128 
 
register their names officially with the city.197  Beyond the criteria required for inclusion on 
the registry (which include being residents of the city, being over the age of eighteen, and 
agreeing to be in a “relationship of mutual dependence,”  the registry produces no rights and it 
requires no obligation beyond the criteria to be registered.198  In other words, the registry 
exists simply to exist as a registry on which people have registered.199  But just as “[t]he 
existence of a sexual continuum does not strip sexuality of its politics” so too does the 
existence of a “no legal rights clause” in a city ordinance not necessarily strip the ordinance of 
                                                          
197 The amendment to the Constitution of the State of Kansas was enacted in 2005.  Article XV, 
Section 16 states: “(a) The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract.  Marriage 
shall be constituted by one man and one woman only.  All other marriages are declard to be contrary 
to the public policy of this state and are void.  (b) No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be 
recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage.” Constitution of 
the State of Kansas. Art XV; Sec 16.  Available online at 
http://www.kslib.info/constitution/art15.html.  Accessed 20 March 2011.   
198 Chapter 10, Article 2, Section 10-201 of the Code of the City of Lawrence, Kansas, 2011 Edition.  
Full text of the City Code section dealing with the domestic registry i  available online at 
http://www.lawrenceks.org/city_code/system/files/chapter10.pdf .  I have been unable to locate any 
registries similar to the one adopted by Lawrence, Kansas – i.e., is one n which the primary main 
objective is registration, with an explicit denial of additional rights or obligations – at the city, county, 
or state levels.  Most offer some, if not full, rights.  The Domestic Partnership Registry of the City of 
Columbia, Missouri, extends rights to all city accommodations and facilities to domestic partners and 
their off-spring to the same extent they are offered to married spouses and makes specific reference to 
the registry being available as proof of relationship for health care visitation and employee benefit 
plans.  Chapter 12, Section 70A et seq of Columbia Code of Ordinances.  
http://www.gocolumbiamo.com/Council/Columbia_Code_of_Ordinances/index.html Accessed 03 
February 2011.  Others, such as the domestic partnership ordinance of the City of San Francisco, 
California, grant fuller rights: “The purpose of this ordinance is … to afford to domestic partners, to 
the fullest extent legally possible, the same rights, benefits, responsibilities, obligations, and duties as 
spouses.” San Francisco Administrative Code.  Chapter 62, Section 62.1.  Available online at 
http://www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx?page=29  Accessed 2 May 2011.  A comprehensive list of cities 
and counties offering domestic partnership registries is available online at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cities_and_counties_in_the_United_States_offering_a_domestic_partners
hip_registry or at http://2fwww.hrc.org/issues/marriage/domestic_partners/9133.htm.  Both accessed 
03 March 2011. 
199 Proponents of the registry tell me that some private companies will use the registry as proof of 
partnership to confer particular benefits (e.g., medical) on registered couples, but as of now no one has 
been able to point me to any company that has changed its policies as a result of the registry.  Many 
companies already offered such benefits based on internal documentation for which the registry 
provides an air of officialness, while others remain resistant despite the registry. 
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its political ramifications.200  Of course, the immediate analytical off-shoot of the registry for 
any student of contemporary gender and sexuality theory is that it perpetuates the notion 
(albeit in an intensely false way) that the “right” thing to do” as a couple is to – well… be 
coupled and then to seek external authority state sanction of that relationship in some form.  
This is a bow to Edelman’s notion of reproductive futurity insofar as it reifies and resanctions 
the mythos of the reproductive couple but it is also evidence of a certain sort of reproductive 
logic in that even this sterile act is seen as pushing forward the progressive l bian and gay 
agenda in preparation for the birthing of a brighter future for the Child to come. 
 
How to Do Things with the Queer Uncanny 
Here is where the crux of queer theory becomes apparent.  While it would seem at first 
glance that a queer theoretical approach would do nothing if not castigate and deride the 
agents who managed to get this local ordinance passed and those couples who have registered 
their partnerships under its schema, we must not lose sight of the essence of queer theory, that 
coiling and recoiling upon itself, forever evading a certainty with regard to motive or 
outcome, and always working to dethread, denaturalize, and defy normative logic.  By 
introducing the concept of the queer uncanny to the analysis it becomes apparent that this 
seemingly benign, impotent, and toothless municipal ordinance may be doing exactly the sort 
of work that Berlant, Sedgwick, et al have described as the very essence of quer: app aling 
to and working at the site of “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and 
resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning.”201  To read this ordinance as meaningless and as 
ineffectual is to do so at the very high risk of relying on an implicitly identitarian politics in 
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which the ordinance is judged either as a colossal failure for its inability to provide rights or 
as a mere stepping stone toward the advancement of a neoliberal gay agenda.  I have so far 
attempted to demonstrate in this dissertation that while there is no set method or route to 
taking up the position of the queer in the regime of reproductive futurity, as Edelman calls us 
to do, there are myriad texts circulating in our culture that offer us at least the sugg stion of 
what such taking up might look like when examined through the lens of the queer uncanny.  
The queer uncanny is not the key or map certain; it is, rather, the particular set of moments 
and circumstances when our epistemological antennae might be most piqued and our options 
for new – and queer – ways of thinking most possible.  Where Freud leaves in the dust any 
sense that the uncanny might be useful or usable on the social or political scene, the quer 
uncanny is inherently agitative at the levels of the individual and the community, the psyche 
and the social, concerned not only with the moments and instances in which the uncanny 
arises but also the ways in which those moments can serve as nodes at which the options for 
knowing, sensing, and acting can proliferate.   
Many theorists like Judith Butler, who work at the intersection of gender, sexuality, 
and language, are hesitant to predict the transgressive potential of any act:  “The incalculable 
effects of action are…a part of their subversive promise […and…] subversiveness is the kind 
of effect that resists calculation.”202  To great degree, this must-needs be true for any act 
(transgressively intended or not) takes place within discursive fields and discursive 
recuperation or subsumation of the act back into standard discursive terms is ever a 
possibility.  But even accepting that any “performance” or node of the queer uncanny th t 
might tend toward the transgressive or subversive is necessarily implicated by, located in, and 
to great extent (re)/(con)strained by larger matrices of hegemonic power does not necessarily 
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preclude us from imagining and enacting (presently, anticipatorily, or even r troactively) 
events of potential subversion and transgression.  As Lloyd puts it: 
Even if we accept that there are incalculable effects to all (or most) 
statements or activities, this does not mean that we need to concede 
that there are no calculable effects.   Without this possibility, political 
intervention may be construed as either totally meaningless (why 
bother?) or entirely spontaneous (it just happens).   Critical reflection 
upon past, present or future practices is essential to the exploitation of 
the gaps within hegemonic norms that allow for potential 
transformation of social relations.   At least one dimension of that 
critique is generated by an attention to context.   This enables us to 
measure, to some degree, the efficacy of past practices but it also 
provides us with a (historically sedimented) resource base from which 
to draw ideas and practices about suitable political tactics for specific 
contexts.203  
Although I have thus far attempted rather single-mindedly to demonstrate how the 
queer uncanny is a unique breed of animal, a useful lens and vehicle through which to 
effectuate “a radical questioning of social and cultural norms” which might proliferate not 
only the what but the how we know, I attempt in this chapter to demonstrate that the queer 
uncanny need not be too tightly yoked to any project that attempts to thwart the regim of 
reproductive futurity in favor of taking up the displace position of the queer in socio-politics 
.204  Instead I offer this syncretic approach which seeks to demonstrate the potential for the 
queer uncanny to be usefully mobilized to promote a rights-based identitarian agenda while at
the same time incorporating a quite queer underpinning for that project.   
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Performativity and the Queer Uncanny 
In the case of the local ordinance that is the subject of this chapter, we are firmly in the 
realm of the uncanny because what could be more familiar, housed as we are in the structure 
of reproductive futurity with its focus on heteronormative coupling, than two people “with a 
mutual commitment in which the partners share the necessities of life?”205  And yet what 
could be more unfamiliar – to the point of verging on the nonsensical – than an ordinance that 
by its own terms offers no legal substance?  What this tells us is that this simple little 
ordinance composed of barely thirteen hundred words is a viable text for analysis using the 
lens of the queer uncanny because not only is the ordinance itself a form of doubling with a 
difference in the ways that it produces the space for “marital doubles” but the sec ion of the 
ordinance evacuating it of any substantive legal effect operates as a form of self-castration, in 
which the text disavows its own legal-narrative drive.  The site of advancement for this jump 
to the queer uncanny as more than a moment or instance, but as a potentially political force, is
in the notion of the performative, as begun by philosopher-linguist J.L. Austin and extended 
radically by Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler.   
It is not such a far stretch from Sigmund Freud to J.L. Austin.  The reason that Freud 
and Austin come together in the first place for this chapter is that both seem to have 
something to say about the ways in which certain states of affairs are brought into being and 
then understood, Freud through his notions of doubling and the repetition compulsion, Austin 
through his notion of the performative utterance.  Too, there is more than a little similarity 
between Freud’s speculative essay on the uncanny and J.L. Austin’s playful treatment of 
language in How to Do Things with Words.  In The Uncanny, Freud works through the 
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etymology of the two words (heimlich and unheimlich) only to discover that the two words, 
which are supposed to be opposites, actually end up meaning the same thing: “Heimlich thus 
becomes increasingly ambivalent, until it finally merges with its antonym unheimlich.”206  In 
similar fashion the sets out to look at what philosophers had set aside as a marginl pseudo-
statements (performatives, an exception to the category of statements known as constatives), 
and ends up finding that instead of performatives being a subset of constatives, it is actually 
that constatives are a category of performatives.  In both short works, there is a circling back 
to home and an over-turning of the expected – in Freud’s case, we learn that heimlich and 
unheimlich are not exact opposites after all; in Austin’s case we learn that constative  re a 
subset of performatives rather than the reverse.   
 Prior to J.L. Austin’s short book How to Do Things with Words, “[i]t was long the 
assumption of philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ [could] only be to ‘describe 
some state of affairs,’ or to state some fact, which it [would] do either truly o  falsely.”207  
Anything that fell outside of these parameters was considered exceptional and remained 
largely unclassified and unstudied until Austin picked up the matter and introduced the idea of
the performative utterance.  Designating the class of statements that “describe some state of 
affairs” or which “state some fact” as constative utterances, Austin then distinguishes 
performative utterances as those which do not simply describe and which are not subject to 
true/false claims but those which “do” what they say – that is, the utterance itself performs an 
action or brings into being a state of affairs.  The example par excellence for Austin – and the 
one most relevant to the subject at hand – is the wedding vow “I do.” In uttering these two 
                                                          
206 Freud, The Uncanny, 134. 
207 Austin J.L.  How to Do Things with Words.  Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ Press, 1975.  1. 
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small words, neither party at the altar is describing anything but is rather “doing” it.208  As 
Austin pithily puts it, “I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it.”209  There is one 
caveat: performatives may be either felicitous or infelicitous, meaning that they may be 
successful or they may fail, depending on the immediate circumstances.  If the of iciant is not 
authorized to conduct marriage ceremonies, for example, the utterance “I do” will be
infelicitous and the performative will fail.   
 At this point, Austin begins to follow the trajectory that we read in Freud’s essay on 
the uncanny.  Where Austin began by explicitly situating what he calls performative 
utterances as outside of the usual scope of statements, he is now in murkier water and th  two 
do not seem as separate as they did earlier in his essay.  If some statements are performative, 
then we should be able to list and catalog them, and derive from them a list of verbs that do 
this sort of work.  After working through a series of such problematic constructions (e.g., 
“Stop it at once!” and “I order you to stop.”), Austin introduces another moniker, the implicit 
performative, and suggests that perhaps all statements are at least implicitly performative.210  
In other words, any statements that portend to describe or which is subject to a true/false t st 
is in some way performative such that “‘The cat is on the mat’ could be seen, rather as the 
elliptical version of ‘I hereby affirm that the cat is on the mat,’ a performative utterance that 
accomplishes the act of affirming to which it refers.”211  In this way, Culler rightly points out, 
                                                          
208 There may be some question about the sincerity behind the performative utterance, but whether a 
speaker utters the words sincerely or not is irrelevant to the creation of the relationship or state of 
affairs.  The groom who says “I do” insincerely, feeling in his heart a murderous hatred for the bride, 
is no less married than the groom who gazes upon the bride adoringly.  At the moment the words are 
uttered the state of marriage is produced; what brought them to that moment and what happens after 
that moment is not controlling.   
209 Austin, 6. 
210 Culler, Jonathan.  “Philosophy and Literature: The Fortunes of the Performative.” Poetics Today.  
21.3 (Fall 2000): 503-519.  505. 
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“Austin starts from a situation where performatives are seen as a specil case of constatives – 
pseudo-statements – and arrives at a perspective from which constatives are a particularly 
type of performative.,” very much in the way that Freud starts with heimlich and traces its 
meanings to the point where “it finally merges with its antonym, unheimlich.”212 
 What has this to do, then, with the brief municipal ordinance that I earlier wished to 
skewer as ineffectual?  Where Austin seems to find the failure (or “in felicitousness”) of 
certain statements merely a troubling side note, Derrida exalts in infelicitousness and finds the 
potential failure of statements and signs to be a necessary characteristic (i.e., “constitutive”) 
of all statements and signs.  This potential for failure, existing as it does in every statement 
and sign, is not only to be read as insufficiency or as a negatively-nuanced short-coming.  It is 
instead for Derrida and others a potential for movement, as any sign can be transported and 
transplanted into new and unexpected contexts – i.e., “citationally grafted.”213  Differing from 
Austin’s rather implicit focus on the singularity of the performative event (e.g., the marriage 
vow, the boat christening), Derrida questions instead, “Could a performative statement 
succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable statement, in other words if the 
expressions I use to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as 
conforming to an iterable model, and therefore if they were not identifiable in a way as 
‘citation’?”214  To broach this in the language of the queer uncanny would mean to “could a 
performative statement succeed if its formation did not repeat, return, or come back as a 
double, if it were not identifiable as referring to something other, similar, previous?” 
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The couples who have signed up to be listed in the registry, despite accruing no 
benefits or obligations, legal or otherwise, other than being required to pay the appropri te 
registration fee to the city, are using what might be termed “loose performatives.”  That is, 
unlike a performative act which creates a new situation or relationship at the mom nt of its 
utterance by an authorized utterer (e.g., “I now pronounce you man and wife”), the utterance 
of the domestic registry registrant and the municipal bureaucrat who marks the registration as 
official does indeed create a new relationship (“domestic partners”) but one without any 
immediate or weighty substance in the political or legal arenas.  The loose performative has 
the imprimatur of felicitousness as the municipal ordinance that makes it possible was duly 
enacted and the two people so registering might clearly have followed the correct 
administrative procedure for registering.  But that is all.  Yet, because som  type of new 
relationship is born in the process and because that relationship harkens to the 
heteronormative male-female relationship, there arises a sense that there is “something more” 
going on here. 
 Judith Butler builds on these ideas of the performative and citationality both in Gender 
Trouble and its companion or extension, Bodies That Matter.  But before discussing Butler’s 
revolutionary work in this regard, it is necessary first to consider “Womanliness as 
Masquerade,” a 1929 piece by Joan Rivière which sets the stage for later work on identity and 
performativity.  In the brief essay, Rivière asks “What is the essential nature of fully 
developed femininity?”215 Following on the work of Sigmund Freud Rivière posits that the 
“mask” of womanliness is put on as a form of self-protection to hide the “possession of 
masculinity.”216  While some have taken the essay and Rivière's word choices (mask, 
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masquerade) to suggest that identities are parts that we play or costumes that we put on, 
Rivière is actually suggesting something much more radical: “The reader may now ask how I 
define womanliness or where I draw the line between genuine womanliness and the 
‘masquerade.’  My suggestion is not, however, that there is any such difference: whether 
radical or superficial, they are the same thing.”217  Rivière is suggesting that there is no 
essential nature, that behind the mask is nothing, that it is only in the putting on of the mask 
that the woman comes into being.   
In early works, Judith Butler extends Rivière’s brief essay, asserting that it is the 
performance of gender that constitutes the subject in the first place; in other w rds, there is no 
subject prior to the performance.  In Gender Trouble Butler concerns herself with a critique of 
feminism that centers on effacing a feminist politics that understands identity as anything but 
a creation of the social and the political.  The argument produces the idea of the 
performativity of gender itself.  In other words, gender is not a constative statement about 
what is or is not but is a per formative insofar as gender is created in the doing; one is n t a 
girl, then, but is rather “girling.”218  The subject is constituted by and in the performance and 
the performance may both comply with and work against any essentialized, naturalized of 
“authentic” or “originary” identity.  The radical proposition then moves us from a 
grammatical construction in which a “noun verbs” (i.e., the subject does something) and 
instead into a construction in which the “verbing” is central.  This “verbing” offer more 
possibility for dynamicism and hence change because it reflects not only the retroactive 
installing of the subject as the doer (“verb-er”) but also implies the possibility of context.  As 
with Austin, there are particular routes to felicitous or infelicitous performatives of gender, 
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dependent on the cultural and social contexts in which the subject lives, so that one may not 
perform one’s gender in any way one chooses and achieve  a “valid” gender anymore than 
saying “I do” to a dog would produce a valid marriage. 
 Yet as Butler imagines performativity, it is this dynamicism where we find potential, 
despite our inability to predict outcomes: 
Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that 
which one opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce 
alternative modalities of power, to establish a kind of political 
contestation that is not a “pure” opposition, a “transcendence” of 
contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labor of forging a 
future from resources inevitably impure.219  
 Butler continues to offer insight into this matter when she asserts that it is discourse 
and power which constitute any “I” or other notion of identity because “there is not “I” who 
stands behind discourse and executes its volition or will through discourse.220   The 
intelligibility of an identity develops through the performance and citation of cultural norms.  
Butler is specifically concerned with the use of the term “queer” as a pejorative term which 
“produc[es] a subject through that shaming interpellation” and its subsequent taking up by 
individuals and groups wishing to resignify the term and leverage it as a fluid, variable 
term.221  It is important to Butler’s schema that the term has not simply been redefin  and 
restabilized but rather that it remains a “site of collective contestation.”222  
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Word Recognition and the Queer Uncanny 
 It is already a well-worn path to recognize that one of the primary conflits over same-
sex marriage is just that: the word “marriage.”  In the courts, a definitional argument has 
prevailed since the first relevant challenges in the early 1970s.223  Even a quarter century ago, 
commentators like Mary Ann Glendon were prescient enough to predict that the use of the 
definitional approach to marriage might be the bugaboo above all others in future legal battles 
over marriage in which the crux of the argument would be to view “same-sex marriage not as 
prohibited but rather as outside the scope of marriage altogether.”224  In other words – no pun 
intended – two people of the same-sex cannot be married because the definition of marriage is 
the union of two opposite-sexed people.225  Such definitional issues, whether circulating in the 
lay or legal communities, have hardly kept people of the same-sex from developing 
                                                          
223 Myriad courts have relied on the definition of marriage.  For example, in Jones v.  Hallahan the 
court relies on a dictionary-based definition: “In all cases, however, mariage has always been 
considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been presented with no authority to the 
contrary … appellants are prevented form marrying … by their own incapability of entering into a 
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contract – health care decision-making, property ownership and transfer, child parentage and custody, 
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planners have assisted unmarried couples to structure and manage their relationships in ways that 
mimic marriage and as individual couples have become more aware of these issues.  See, for example: 
Clifford, Denis, Frederick Hertz, and Emily Doskow.  A Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay Couples.  
Berkeley CA: Nolo, 2010; Burda, Joan M.  Estate Planning for Same-Sex Couples.  Chicago: 
American Bar Association, 2004; and Hertz, Frederick.  Making It Legal: A Guide to Same-Sex 
Marriage, Domestic Partnerships and Civil Unions.  Berkeley CA: Nolo, 2009.  In fact, other than 
these matters which have legal defaults provided by statute to married couples saving them the time 
and expense of explicitly addressing these issues through the employment of a lawyer and the creation 
of several documents, the only element of the marriage relationship that seems to remain unique to the 
marriage relationship is the imprimatur of morality and licitness the marriage contract grants to the 
sexual act. 
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relationships that mimic to one degree or another traditional marriage and to use language 
(like married, commitment, spouse, husband, wife, family) that cites, refers to, and recognizes 
an iterable though not identical model.  In other words, this relationship that seems like the 
normative male-female pairing but which of course is not, this doubling with a differenc , 
exists not just in and of and by its own creation (as the language of the ordinance would have 
us believe: “Registration pursuant to this Article creates no legal rights, other than the right to 
have the registered Domestic Partnership include in the City’s Domestic Partner Registry 
pursuant to this Article.”226) but as a double or reiteration of a chain of repeated and 
recognizable relationship forms extending back centuries. 
 Perhaps the key here is the one word that is used by both proponents and detractors of 
same-sex marriage on a regular basis: “recognition” – as used in the oft-bandied phrases 
“recognition of relationship rights,” “same-sex marriage recognition,” “lega  recognition and 
protection,” and the like.227  Merriam-Webster defines the term as: 
1 : the action of recognizing : the state of being recognized:  
 
a : acknowledgment; especially : formal acknowledgment of the 
political existence of a government or nation  
                                                          
226 Chapter 10, Article 2, Section 10-208 of the Code of the City of Lawrence, Kansas, 2011 Edition. 
227 The term appears widely in treatment of same-sex marriage and relationships, from the written 
communiqués of gay rights organizations like the Human Rights Campaign and groups that o pose 
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b : knowledge or feeling that someone or something present has been 
encountered before228  
 
 While fair to assume that the term is being used by advocates and detractors of same-
sex marriage in the sense of subset (a) (“formal acknowledgement”), one cannot overlook the 
last part of the definition, which harkens to Freud’s definition of the uncanny as “that species 
of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar.”229  
The double in psychoanalytic theory is never an exact duplicate but is always a double with a 
difference and this is the case with same-sex marriage and same-sex relationships in general.  
And as the double produces awe, nervous laughter, or fear, so are these effects produced by 
same-sex relationships. 
Because the heterosexual model is the unmarked standard, many gays and lesbias 
have entered into their relationships and adopted (or co-opted, depending one’s point of view) 
the terminology and social customs of the heterosexual model: solemnizing relationships 
through commitment ceremonies or “weddings”; using heterosexual terminology like 
“husband” or “girlfriend” or their near-equivalents “partner” or “companion”; and celebrating 
anniversaries and romantic holidays like Valentine’s Day with the same dinners, flowers, 
chocolates, and greeting cards.  Saturated as American society is with the heterosexualized 
model of coupling, to see the image of two brides atop a wedding cake, to hear two men refer 
to each other as husband or partner, even to know that the possibility of such relationships 
being not comical but recognized socially and legally as existent and of note (if not of full or 
partials rights) produces a moment of social, cognitive, and legal uncanniness.  For the subject 
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(of any sexual orientation) raised in American culture of the past many decades, these 
practices both make sense and do not make sense.  Even among my progressive liberal gay 
and lesbian friends, the sight of two brides on a wedding cake produces giggles or a special 
“aww” (awe).  For some, like the conservative far-right, these are inded frightening images 
in the most culture-crushing way as Focus on the Family’s leader James Dobson has bluntly 
described: “Barring a miracle, the family as it has been known for more than five millennia 
will crumble, presaging the fall of Western civilization itself.”230 The giggling, the awws, and 
even the fear of the fall of Western civilization itself are all legitima e because they are all 
responses produced in the face of the queer uncanny.  And the responses all boil down to a 
question of epistemology, not only in the grand philosophical sense but in the minutiae of 
daily life.  This minutiae is, of course, not minutiae at all for if theory of the past half century 
has taught us anything it is that the personal is political, that supposedly little things do indeed 
mean a lot, as Maggie Gallagher captures eloquently when she observes that  
One thing same-sex marriage indubitably does is displace certain 
formerly core public understandings about marriage; such as, that it 
has something to do with bringing together male and female, men 
and women, husbands and wives, mothers with fathers.  Husband 
will no longer point to or imply wife.  Mother no longer implies 
father.231 
 In other words, the linguistic links – which serve as larger cognitive and social links – 
are rent asunder and we are back to the Symbolic and its constructed natured, various 
signifiers linked together into a durable web that serves to lend a sense of stability and order 
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and fullness to the central lack around which each of our individual psyches coheres.  When 
the web weakens, most especially when the weakness is in the regions of the web which seem 
most certain, like gender and sexuality, we are forced to confront not only the matter at hand 
in all its apparently banality (“how awkward to address the invitation to Mr. and Mr.”) but the 
much larger and much more potentially costly disruption of our sense of our place in the 
Symbolic, what we might also term our weltanschauung.232 
Given the already widespread confusion, not only among opposite-sexed partners but 
among same-sex partners, as to the correct usage and valencies of the various terms ed to 
designate paired, mutually dependent relationships (marriage, civil union, domestic 
partnership, and the like) the queer potential of this little ordinance, bound as it is by the city 
limits, is immense for it allows the possibility of mis-iteration, of deliberat  production of 
moments of the queer uncanny, of potential widespread and society-shaking change based 
almost entirely on the repeated misuse of the term “domestic partner” or variants thereof 
which play on but not duplicate the usual normative meanings.  The casual but incorrect 
perception of equivalences among the terms marriage, civil union, and domestic partner 
suggests the sorts of “promises, orders, or acts of constitution or legislation which do not only 
change language or which, in changing language, change more than language.” 233 
                                                          
232 The concern over how to address the invitation is not purely banal.  With origins dating back to 
Immanuel Kant, cultural schema theory tells us that “[w]hen a person enters a familiar situation in his 
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 The city ordinance itself neither recognizes same-sex couples as married nor grants 
them any of the rights attendant to civil marriage; yet it is not without its performative force 
because it by virtue of its own existence calls into existence the category of “domestic 
partner” and creates a state of being in which one is “domestically partnered.” While no legal 
rights adhere, the status itself, drawing on the language of legally-laden domestic partner 
statutes and registries in other jurisdictions in the United States and around the world, 
resonates with nearly as much linguistic force as if it did come with a full panoply of rights 
and obligations.  Some evidence of this is seen in the community response just prior to and 
after the passage of the Domestic Partnership Registry by the City Commission of Lawrence, 
when the full and relatively short text of the ordinance was widely available online a d in 
print, after an online web discussion and an in-person public debate was held, and after 
numerous local newspaper stories laid out the details of the proposed registry.  Although 
many people grasped that the registry offered no rights, except perhaps as proof of a 
relationship if required by an employer might offer partner benefits, many, like 
“mom_of_three,” a supporter of the registry: “If you are married, then you already receive the 
rights that the gay registry would possibly allow gay couples.”234  An opponent of the registry, 
“b3” goes even further and asserts that “[e]very man and woman in this country already has 
equal rights, this will be granting a portion of the population additional rights.”235  The greater 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
equivalent can work to quell the struggle for political and legal rights, akin to the logic of “separate 
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bulk of readers who commented on the many news stories published in the local city paper 
recognized that the registry provided no legal benefits but felt that it “would indicate that the 
city is welcoming and supportive of its gay community members.  In my mind the primary 
benefit is symbolic,” admitted Maggie Childs, then head of the local chapter of the Kansas 
Equality Coalition.236  Readers posting in the comments section following the stories often 
felt similarly to “lawyerlee,” who expressed support for the registry because “[i]n a perfect 
world, same sex couples would be able to marry in this state.  Since that isn’t possible right 
now, I would fully support any step in that direction, such as this registry.”237  Opponents of 
the registry also saw it as a “first step by a gay and lesbian community to prom te a ‘pro-gay 
agenda’ at City Hall,” and Reverend Leo Barbee of the conservative Victory Bible Church 
advised city commissioners that “[i]t would be best to stop it now.”238  The symbolism was 
not lost on some members of the city commission, like Commissioner Boog Highberger, who 
commented that “I think this will help some people feel they are full citizens.”239  As Butler 
suggests,  
Performative acts are forms of authoritative speech: most 
performatives, for instance, are statements which, in the uttering, also 
perform a certain action and exercise binding power.  Implicated in a 
network of authorization and punishment, performatives tend to 
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include legal sentences, baptisms, inaugurations, declarations of 
ownership, statements that not only perform an action but confer a 
binding power on the action performed.240 
 In the case of the Domestic Partnership Registry, no legal rights are conferred 
yet a relationship that did not exist precisely in this form prior to the Registry is 
allowed fertile ground in which to flower, alongside and in form if not substance 
mimicking the legally-recognized form of marriage between two opposite-sex d 
partners. 
 And there in Commissioner Highberger’s comment lies the queer uncanny again, 
prone as it is to doubling back in on itself, prone as it is to attending to multiple meanings.  
The registry will help which people? And who are they who might be full citizens, at least in 
affect if not effect? Facially, Highberger was likely referring to ays and lesbians and to the 
City’s attempt to include them as fully as possible in the realm of equal rights, iven the high 
authority of the state constitution which prevents same-sex marriages or any version thereof: 
“I think the registry will help gays and lesbians feel that they themselves are full citizens.”  
Yet, if the power of the queer uncanny is taken seriously, if the power of repetition and 
doubling might indeed have socio-political effect through their productive abilities vis-à-vis 
their performative aspects, Highberger is also referring to the anti-registry members of the 
community as well as to the homophobes living in the city (the two groups are not necessarily 
the same) for they are the ones who might for the first time feel that the domestic partners, as 
individuals and as a unit, are “full citizens.” While the domestic partners have not bythis 
ordinance gained any legal rights, they have gained a linguistic right to refer to th mselves as 
“domestic partners” (or any similar nomenclature indicating two people “with a mutual 
                                                          
240 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 235. 
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commitment” and as they do that among their friends and in the larger public there begins to 
be a melding process.241  They “look” like a traditional husband and wife unit, they serve as 
doubles of the normative marriage relationship, but with a difference: they are both of the 
same-sex.  Where Freud’s analysis might end with recognition that would be fright ning or 
would produce nervous laughter, an analysis using the queer uncanny sees in this doubling 
political potential in the form of normalization.  “First comes love, then comes marriage” is 
queered into first come the terms, then comes (perhaps) the substance. 
 
Celebration through Castration 
 What makes the Lawrence Domestic Partnership Registry so queer is that it can be 
read to celebrate sexuality in a way not contemplated by most other domestic partnership 
statutes in other jurisdictions and quite possibly outside of the regime of reproductive f turity.  
That is perhaps not the best way to understand how the domestic partnership schemes work in 
other municipalities; better, perhaps, to suggest that sexuality is not foregrounded or that is 
even disavowed in favor of a progressive liberal focus on families, commitment, respect, and 
equality.  It is customary for a statute or ordinance to contain a preface of findings section in 
which the governing body lists a number of rationale for the law that follows.242  For example, 
the ordinance in Iowa City, Iowa, a university town not unlike Lawrence, Kansas, starts with 
the assertion: “It is appropriate and fair that certain of the societal privileges and benefits now 
                                                          
241 Chapter 10, Article 2, Section 10-201 of the Code of the City of Lawrence, Kansas, 2011 Edition. 
242 These are variously termed preambles, findings, or declarations of intent.  They are used in 
statutory interpretation to give context to the law and to provide both the executive and judicial 
branches assistance in enforcement and interpretation, although they are not “th law” and are not of 
themselves enforceable.  See American Jurisprudence 2d. Eagan, MN: West Group, 2001. Vol. 73; 
and Singer, Norman J. Statutes and Statutory Construction. 6th ed.  Eagan, MN: West Group, 2000.  
Vol. 1A, §20.12.  
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accorded to members of a marriage be extended to those who meet the qualifications of a 
domestic partnership.”243  Ann Arbor takes this a bit further: 
Many persons today share life as families in enduring and committed 
relationships apart from marriages… The City of Ann Arbor has an 
interest in strenghtening and supporting all caring, committed and 
responsible family forms.244 
The City of San Francisco is even more forthcoming about sexual orientation: 
The purpose of this ordinance is to create a way to recognize intimate 
committed relationships, including those of lesbian and gay men who 
otherwise are denied the right to identify the partners with whom they 
share their lives.245 
It is clear from the language of the Iowa City, Ann Arbor, and San Francisco 
ordinances that the domestic partnership schemes contemplated in those municipalities are 
meant to address inequalities in legal and social recognition of non-marital rela ionships, most 
especially those involving lesbians and gays.  The Lawrence registry does offer tate 
imprimatur to at least the titular status of a two-person relationship, suggesting that such 
relations are of some value.  The chosen name for the relationship and the registry itself 
reveals this: domestic partnership.  Domestic suggests the home and family, domesticated and 
tame, while partnership suggests intimacy, union toward a common goal, and single-
mindedness.  But other than a titular status, the Lawrence Domestic Partnership Registry 
offers no preambles, no mention of families, and no references to equality or rights.  In fact, 
                                                          
243 Iowa City, Iowa, Code.  Ch 6, Sec 2.6.1 (1994).  
http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=320 
244 Ann Arbor Code.  Ch 110.  Section 9:86 (2000). 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=11782&stateId=22&stateName=Michigan 
245 San Francisco, California, Municipal Code.  Section 62.1 (1990).  
http://www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx?page=29 
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the Lawrence ordinance is oddly sterile in this regard, eschewing the language of reproductive 
futurity, marriage, family, and the future except for the brief – and multiply interpretable – 
reference to “a relationship of indefinite duration, with a mutual commitment in which the 
partners share the necessities of life and are financially interdependent,” language which 
might just as easily describe long-term roommates or friends as a couple replicating the 
romantic and social connection of marriage.246  Not only does the ordinance not proffer the 
neoliberal rights and identity-based context that anchors so many other domestic partnership 
ordinances and statutes around the nation, but the ordinance on its face repudiates the notion 
that that is the purpose of the ordinance, in effect proclaiming to do something while doing 
nothing.  Or conversely, doing nothing while indeed doing something.  So here we have the 
same sort of dislogic that we explored earlier in closing scenes of The Wizard of Oz and 
Mysterious Skin; moments in which the queer uncanny arises not in the form of the double but 
in the form of self-castration in which the economy of terms of the text itself turns back on 
itself and disrupts narrative or logical expectations.   
The castrative section in this ordinance reminds of us Hélène Cixous, who in her essay 
on Freud’s treatment of the uncanny, referred to textual footnotes as “typographical 
metaphor[s] of repression,” elements of a text that refuse refusal, instead re urning, 
interrupting, erupting on the page.”247  Though relegated to smaller type font and cast to the 
bottom of the page as mere notes, it is in the footnotes that readers and scholars find the most
engaging elements of any article or work.  Similarly, the Lawrence Domestic Partnership 
Registry begins life as one sort of creature and ends up being quite another.  Though lacking 
preamble, the registry ordinance reads nearly identically (or at least not far afield) from 
                                                          
246 Chapter 10, Article 2, Section 10-208 of the Code of the City of Lawrence, Kansas, 2011 Edition. 
247 Cixous, “Fiction and Its Phantoms,” 537. 
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similar municipal registries around the country with reference to definitions and requirements 
that the two people be of the age of consent, that there be some relationship of 
interdependence, that the two partners be citizens of the municipality, and general instructions 
for otherwise establishing and ending the partnership.  Then, nearly eighty percent of the way 
through the ordinance, practically the closing scene of the ordinance, some eleven hundred 
words into an ordinance that is only a scant thirteen hundred words long, comes the castrating 
short thirty-word sentence: “Registration pursuant to this Article creates no legal rights, other 
than the right to have the registered Domestic Partnership include in the City’s Domestic 
Partner Registry pursuant to this Article.”248  
This illogical disruption evacuates the entire ordinance of the very substance for which 
we look to the state and the law – rights – and by doing so situates the ordinance potentially 
outside of the realm of the normative and Symbolic understandings of marriage, partnership, 
and by extension the future.  By doing so, the ordinance de-symbolicizes itself by its own 
terms, makes of the terms of its body an empty vessel to be filled, as we have seen, with the 
various epistemological stakes of the various constituents who believe they have a stake in the 
matter, whatever their political or sexual proclivities.  The queer uncanny arises nd we gaze 
upon this ordinance that does and does not, that allows at one and the same time the inclusion 
and exclusion of various forms of two-person coupling, that alerts us to the citation of 
normative marriage followed closely by the disavowal of that citation in favor of something 
that is double with a difference. 
 What the queer uncanny allows us to do with this short municipal ordinance is to read 
it as an open text, one which seems to have taken the channels of power that exist and to 
dislodge them from their intended purposes.  Ordinances, statutes, and court decisions have 
                                                          
248 Chapter 10, Article 2, Section 10-208 of the Code of the City of Lawrence, Kansas, 2011 Edition. 
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the gravity of “mattering” but can be revisioned as “real, truly live places” in a sense far 
beyond the “real, truly live” sanction of the law.  The chicanery of the American marital 
system in which the civil contract of union between two people is the crux or nexus for an 
entire system of rights and obligations, most of which have little or nothing to do with the 
union state itself, is not simply challenged but openly mocked.  Sexuality is celebrat d y 
virtue of being enshrined and embedded in language that portends order and formality but 
which turns back in on itself, castrating that order and formality and opening a space for the 
play of linguistic and legal concepts.  The ordinance does exactly what legal and social 
theorists like Nancy Polikoff have long been urging; it evacuates the union of two peopleof 
any attendant rights or obligations, reducing the union to its simplest form, stripping away 
concerns about inheritance, health care, economic dependency, and the like and leaving only 
two people who presumably have a desire to cleave themselves to one another in a way that 
surpasses regulations, legal presumptions, and social approbation, and the logic of 
reproductive futurity, leaving only the couple in its past, present, future time-bounded-less-
ness.249 
  
                                                          
249 Polikoff, Nancy.  Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families under the Law.  
Boston: Beacon Press, 2008.   
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Conclusion 
“The Way We Play: Directions for the Queer Uncanny” 
 
 
The tag line for Atlantis all-gay cruises and resort vacations is “Atlantis: The Way We 
Play.”  It is an apt phrase for marketing, drawing as it does on a supposed “we” of gay men 
who through some implicit shared sense of oneness or community have developed a “way of 
playing” that is unique or somehow different from how “they” play.  The inclusiveness of the 
statement is alluring (like the all-inclusive nature of the resorts or the cruise vacations aboard 
the Allure of the Seas boat) and as a queer theorist I might be tempted to castigate nd dismiss 
the tag line as yet another capitalist play on the identitarian politics that eems to have 
overtaken lesbian and gay studies and activism.   
But as I have demonstrated in this dissertation, that really would not be a very queer 
theoretical approach at all because it would be too abrupt and too elementary.  Indeed, if th re 
is one thing queer theory does do, it is play, seriously: play with, play at, put into play, play 
both ends against the middle, play out.  When I play with this tag line “The Way We Play,” 
when I put it into play in the framework of the queer uncanny, I discover that it is quite queer 
indeed.  If (qua Edelman) the queer is structurally located in that position where the future is 
inoperative as a compulsory framework and if the sinthomosexual maybe a type of quer who 
locates jouissance in the node of the sinthome that is play, reveling, disavowing, then perhaps 
this is the way we (should) play: no future (other than the departure date, when vacation is 
over), no Child actually or figuratively framing the day, a moment of time outside and next 
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time to heteronormative time (qua Halberstam), a time-space-context in which the world is 
topsy turvy and expectations are upended.   
But of course the inevitable return to what is persistently and annoyingly called
reality, the responsibilities and obligations and preparation of the “real world.”  The return 
perhaps need not be so bleak or oppositional.  If the queer uncanny allows us to experience 
multiple valencies simultaneously, keeping the frame blurred and just slightly out of focus, 
could it alter the face of the experience of the subject?  Could it create for us a ro te, a 
passage, to be and not to be at the same time?  To exist outside of normative time-space while 
also traversing the normative?  To undermine the persistence and rigor of the Child’s
demands, to make as our goal neither capitulation nor resistance but a vibrating exisenc  on 
the cusp?   
This all sounds a rather grandiose way to describe a simple beach resort vacation in 
which much of my time is spent lounging around the pool, sipping cocktails, and trading bon 
mots with my buddies.  But again, that is the point.  To locate the unusual in the usual, to 
defamiliarize the familiar, to locate in the usual, regular, and expected, all the little fissures, 
fractures, and open spaces where new knowledges might take root.  For some of my friends, 
the Atlantis vacations are just fun vacations and my queries into the uniqueness of their 
experiences are detractors.  There will always be those who insist that “over he rainbow” is 
just a place in dreams.  Taken seriously, however, these experiences become incredible 
opportunities.  What if the elements of the queer uncanny that I experience at the Mexican 
resort return with me to my farmhouse?  What if the amazing experience comes back with me 
not as a series of vacation snapshots and a few anecdotes about jellyfish stings or high waves 
or over-consumption?  What if the promise of “The Way We Play” delivers a type of play that 
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is not contemplated in the terse economy of terms of the phrase itself?  If I move about the 
resort, newly secure that everyone about me shares a facet of my identity that is not so fully 
shared by others in my “real life,” can I take that feeling (or the way I respond to that feeling) 
back with me to Kansas?  The queer uncanniness of the experience may follow me, I may be 
able to recreate it, or it may desert me.  Depending on how I bring it back, it could lead to 
personal violence or personal salvation, my transferring the topsy turvy feeling back home 
may result in my making an assumption that results in my being harmed or even killed; but it 
may also result in a new connection.  As with the performativity of gender, the results are 
unknown not completely unpredictable. 
Dorothy Gale’s insistence that Oz was a “real, truly live place” just as re l, true, and 
alive as the Kansas farmstead; Neil and Brian’s investing their childhood experi nces with a 
valuation beyond survival; and the implicit avowal of sexual jouissance in a municipal 
ordinance that portends to be about a social relation: these clue us into the ways that the queer 
uncanny – doubling, repeating, dislogic, circling – challenge the normative not straight-on but 
from many fronts and across multiple borders.  Where this may take us as we read nov ls, 
watch films, live our lives in all the various ways that we may choose to do that, is imposs ble 
to know.  That, finally, may be the point at the heart of the queer uncanny: not the knowing 
but the not-knowing, not the certainty but the mystery. 
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